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An in-depth analysis of how senior managers in a large multinational corporation interpret their social and environmental responsibilities revealed that, notwithstanding formal corporate interpretations, discrepancies persisted in their interpretation of what was expected of them and how to implement it. Two fault lines emerged: (1) an instrumental versus a normative interpretation of corporate societal responsibilities, and (2) a focus on ‘doing less/no harm’ versus ‘doing more good’. This chapter introduces a theoretical framework that combines these fault lines to form four quadrants that each represent a different set of challenges managers face as they commit to improving their organisation’s impact on society. Rather than adjudicate between them, a holistic interpretation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) takes all four types into account. But the four types of challenges differ considerably in nature and thus in the strategic approach that is necessary to deal with them. In this chapter, each quadrant is discussed in detail. What characterises the issues in this quadrant, what mindset, and what strategy are necessary to address them? The chapter concludes with the observation that the framework, and the taxonomy of types of CSR challenges that it brings to the fore, creates greater awareness of how industries are confronted with different sets of challenges and thus need different strategic approaches. A better understanding of these differences may lead to more support, in particular for those managers who work in industries that face a disproportionate share of one particular type of challenges, the ‘nasty trade-offs’.

Driven by the evidence from the literature on the significance of mobile (m-)payment in economic growth and productivity and at the same time the relative dismal adoption of this service, the purpose of present paper is to elucidate the merchants’ m-payment adoption from the perspective of trust, drawing upon the game theory framework, in the Malaysian context.

An online survey consisting of 302 respondents was carried out to investigate the impact of trust and opportunism on merchants’ perceived trustworthiness using a two-staged structural equation modeling–neural network approach to determine the significance and relative importance of variables. This study also applies a game-theoretic approach to analyze the impact of trust on the relationship between merchants and m-payment service providers.

The results indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship between merchant trust, merchant opportunism and perceived trustworthiness, and a statistically significant negative relationship was found between m-payment provider opportunism and perceived trustworthiness. The findings from the prisoner’s dilemma two-player model indicate that the scenarios of mutual trust and mutual opportunism as paradigmatic of cooperation and defection produce the best and worse outcomes, respectively. An intriguing result was the positive impact of merchant opportunism on perceived trustworthiness, which indicates a very calculative orientation of merchants in m-payment contracting.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is among the first attempts to propose a game theory approach to the interaction between merchants and m-payment providers under the framework of trust and opportunism. A game theory study in the context of m-payment adoption can contribute to the theoretical literature by providing insights into the decision-making processes of merchants. By incorporating trust and opportunism into the game theory model, we can gain a better understanding of how they affect the decision-making process and overall adoption rates. The conclusions and implications provide useful insights for managers of both m-payment platforms and merchants in this relational exchange. The results of the present research can provide insights into the factors that influence merchant decisions and guide them toward suitable partnerships for successful adoption and can guide authorities for policy interventions and supporting adoption efforts.

The expansion of bike-sharing enterprises has led to a series of social problems, and due to the high breakage rate and high recycling cost of bike sharing, enterprises are reluctant to maintain them. Therefore, government regulation does play a leading role in maintaining bike sharing. This study’s purpose is to investigate how the government should regulate the bike-sharing enterprises that maintain bicycles.

Firstly, the authors assume that there is only one bike-sharing enterprise and establish a game model that the government regulates the enterprise. Furthermore, the authors extend the model to the case that there are two competing enterprises in the market. Finally, through numerical analysis, the influence of various factors on the government strategy and revenue is analyzed.

The authors find that the regulatory probability of two enterprises are regulated by the government is larger than that of one enterprise. When two bike-sharing enterprises compete without government regulation, both will choose the non-self-discipline strategy, thus falling into the Prisoner's Dilemma. If the government regulates them, then both enterprises will choose the self-discipline strategy. Finally, through numerical analysis, it is found that the self-discipline behavior of bike-sharing enterprises is related to the government regulatory probability, the cost of self-discipline, the probability of being reported and the penalties. Interestingly, the cost of government regulation will not affect the regulation probability of government.

This research provides a theoretical reference for the government to make the regulation strategies of bike sharing and achieve the sustainable development of bike sharing.

This research provides a theoretical reference for the government to make the regulation strategies of bike sharing and achieve the sustainable development of bike sharing.

As the quality of the environment decreases, enterprises and consumers' awareness of environmental protection is constantly improving. More and more enterprises begin to increase their investment in carbon emission reduction and attract environmentally friendly consumers to buy low-carbon products through advertising. The purpose of this paper is to utilize a realistic differential game model to provide dynamic carbon emission reduction strategies, advertising strategies and cooperation methods for complex supply chain members from a long-term perspective.

This paper uses the extend Vidale-Wolfe model (V-W model) to discuss the dynamic joint emission reduction strategy in the supply chain.

(1) When consumers' awareness of environmental protection increases, on the whole, carbon emission reduction and profit of products show an upward trend. (2) From a long-term perspective, the manufacturer's advertising subsidy to one of the retailers is the best choice. If the strength of the two retailers is unbalanced, the manufacturer will choose to cooperate with the dominant retailer. (3) Advertising, as a marketing means for retailers to promote low-carbon products, can alleviate the adverse effects of prisoner's dilemma in a semi-cooperative state, but it cannot achieve the Pareto optimization result.

This paper focuses on the analysis of the situation that when the manufacturer is the leader and thinks that consumers are active advocates of low-carbon products.

The results of this paper can provide theoretical basis for the joint emission strategy of supply chain members in low-carbon environment.

Within the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) supply chain, one of the problems facing the distribution channel strategy is the presence of the gray market. The article shows two novel antecedents of the participation of official distributors in this gray channel: Negative impact on distributor performance and the relationship with their supplier. Knowledge of this background helps to preserve the strategy outlined for the official distribution channel.

Data were collected from 172 Spanish wholesale distributors and analyzed using PLS-SEM.

The authors found that the damage through negative affectation in the official distributor's performance and the cooperation provided by the manufacturer, have different effects. While affectation is shown to be a powerful antecedent of participation in the gray market, the effect of perceived manufacturer cooperation does not show strong results.

In business practice, these findings lead the manufacturer to keep transactions carried out in the gray market at low levels and provide cooperation to official distributors to guarantee the official channel strategy aimed at efficiency in the distribution of branded goods.

The background of the gray market discussed in the study has not been previously analyzed in the literature. In this way, the authors contribute to the knowledge of such a common problem as the presence of the gray market in the segmentation of distribution channels of high-demand products.

Stakeholder theory understands business in terms of relationships among stakeholders whose interests are mainly joint but may be occasionally conflicting. In the latter case, managers may need to make trade-offs between these interests. The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of managerial decision-making about these trade-offs.

This paper draws on the ordonomic approach which sees business life to be rife with social dilemmas and locates the role of stakeholders in harnessing or resolving these dilemmas through engagement in rule-finding and rule-setting processes.

The ordonomic approach suggests that stakeholder interests trade-offs ought to be neither ignored nor avoided, but rather embraced and welcomed as an opportunity for bringing to fruition the joint interest of stakeholders in playing a better game of business. Stakeholders are shown to bear responsibility for overcoming the perceived trade-offs through the institutional management of social dilemmas.

For many stakeholder theorists, the nature of managerial decision-making about trade-offs between conflicting stakeholder interests and the nature of trade-offs themselves have been a long-standing point of contention. The paper shows that trade-offs may be useful for the value creation process and explicitly discusses managerial strategies for dealing with them.

Working conditions, pay rates and the rights of workers to collectively negotiate have become important points of discussions in recent years, with support for unions and union applications rising to levels long unseen in America. In many instances, though, companies have responded aggressively. This is not the first time such a dynamic has played out in American business. This study aims to take a fresh look at one of America’s most prominent historical disputes between labor and ownership – the Homestead Massacre of 1892 – to glean lessons from that conflict that remain relevant to today’s business environment.

This study adopts game theory and the principles of repeated interaction to assess how differing discount factors led to differences in time orientations between the workers and the Carnegie company. These differing time orientations affected both the strategy each side deployed in the negotiations and the payoffs received by the parties. Letters, contemporary news reports and histories of the events leading up to and immediately following the 1892 Homestead Massacre are qualitatively analyzed with a genealogical pragmatic approach.

Differences in temporal orientation between management and workers exacerbated the conflict, with the workers adopting a more cooperative stance and distal time orientation, while the Carnegie company negotiated with a proximal time orientation and played to “win” a game that, in fact, could not be fully won or lost given its infinitely repeating nature. The result was a short-term victory for the Carnegie company but with long-term negative consequences that highlight the suboptimal outcome the company achieved by playing a proximal strategy in an infinite game.

Although the incident at Homestead is a well-studied labor dispute, many of the themes that preceded the incident have resurfaced in the modern work context. This work, by adopting game theory as an analytical framework, provides new insights into management mistakes that led to the labor conflict and lessons for what present-day managers can do to avoid exacerbating labor strife.

Literature on product innovation (PI) has witnessed tremendous growth over the past 60 years. Yet, there has been a dearth of a comprehensive review of the extant PI research maintaining the breadth and depth of the topic. To seal this gap, this paper aims to explore the intellectual foundations and emergent trends in 2,588 research papers on PI from 1962 to 2022.

The paper adopts a bibliometric analysis approach via visualization maps of prolific contributions, co-citation, co-occurrence and thematic networks.

Emerging streams, frontiers and hotspots in PI research are revealed and a knowledge graph is developed. The review provides a broad spectrum of opportunities that enrich imminent research to better inform business decisions.

The review addresses 20 research questions associated with barely examined areas in PI research that require further analysis in imminent research.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first review that comprehensively synthesizes the intersected knowledge base of PI research using bibliometric analysis of a vast number of documents within a long time span.

Influencer marketing mediated by social media is prevalent in social commerce. Micro-, meso- and macro-influencers all play an irreplaceable role in marketing. The purpose of this paper is to explore how companies with limited budgets choose influencers according to products' various levels of brand familiarity.

This study constructs an evolutionary game model of influencer marketing based on evolutionary game theory on complex networks. This model initiates various networks to demonstrate how influencers disseminate information and constructs update mechanisms to depict how individuals react to this information based on individuals' information utility and friends' strategies.

Simulation results suggest that companies should invest more in macro-influencers than in meso-influencers, however investing all in macro-influencers is not a good choice. The investment in meso-influencers will increase as brand familiarity decreases, whereas it will not exceed investment in macro-influencers. Furthermore, the accumulation of micro-influencers can accelerate the marketing process.

This study examines the combined effects of micro-influencers, meso-influencers and macro-influencers in marketing by simulating the marketing process initiated by influencers on social media.