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The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical historical analysis of the business (mis)behaviors and influencing factors that discourage enduring cooperation between principals and agents, to introduce strategies that embrace the social values, economic motivation and institutional designs historically adopted to curtail dishonest acts in international business and to inform an improved principal–agent theory that reflects principal–agent reciprocity as shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, strategic and ideological forces

The critical historical research method is used to analyze Chinese compradors and the foreign companies they served in pre-1949 China.

Business practitioners can extend orthodox principal–agent theory by scrutinizing the complex interactions between local agents and foreign companies. Instead of agents pursuing their economic interests exclusively, as posited by principal–agent theory, they also may pursue principal-shared interests (as suggested by stewardship theory) because of social norms and cultural values that can affect business-related choices and the social bonds built between principals and agents.

The behaviors of compradors and foreign companies in pre-1949 China suggest international business practices for shaping social bonds between principals and agents and foreign principals’ creative efforts to enhance shared interests with local agents.

Understanding principal–agent theory’s limitations can help international management scholars and practitioners mitigate transaction partners’ dishonest acts.

A critical historical analysis of intermediary businesspeople’s (mis)behavior in pre-1949 (1840–1949) China can inform the generalizability of principal–agent theory and contemporary business strategies for minimizing agents’ dishonest acts.

The smart contract provides an opportunity to improve existing contract management practices in the construction projects by replacing traditional contracts. However, translating the contracts into computer languages is considered a major challenge which has not been investigated. Thus, it is necessary to: (1) identify the obstructing clauses in real-world contracts; and (2) analyze the replacement's technical and economic feasibility. This paper aims to discuss the aforementioned objectives.

This study identified the flexibility clauses of traditional contracts and their corresponding functions through inductive content analysis with representative standard contracts as materials. Through a speculative analysis in accordance to design science paradigm and new institutional economics, the economic and technical feasibility of existing approaches, including enumeration method, fuzzy algorithm, rough sets theory, machine learning and artificial intelligence, to transform respective clauses (functions) into executable codes are analyzed.

The clauses of semantic flexibility and structural flexibility are identified from the contracts. The transformation of semantic flexibility is economically and/or technically infeasible with existing methods and materials. But with more data as materials and methods of rough sets or machine learning, the transformation can be feasible. The transformation of structural flexibility is technically possible however economically unacceptable.

Given smart contracts' inability to provide the required flexibility for construction projects, smart contracts will be more effective in less relational contracts. For construction contracts, the combination of smart contracts and traditional contracts is recommended. In the long run, with the sharing or trading of data in the industry level and the integration of machine learning or artificial intelligence reducing relevant costs, the automation of contract management can be achieved.

This study contributes to the understanding of the smart contract's limitations in industry scenarios and its role in construction project management.

Although outcome sharing in construction is a well-established concept in the literature, there is still an ongoing debate on the most effective approach for distributing project outcomes between an owner and downstream contracting parties (DCPs). To address this issue, this paper aims to investigate an optimal framework for distributing project outcomes among various levels of subcontracting in construction projects. The framework includes contractors, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors and other related parties.

To formulate the optimization problem, the principal–agent model is utilized. The theoretical development is validated through an experiment conducted with employees from road construction companies.

When distributing outcomes among various levels of subcontracting, the sharing should be determined by their contribution to the outcome, effort costs, level of outcome uncertainty and risk preference.

This paper expands on the existing principal–agent theory by incorporating multiple levels of agents, transforming the conventional view of outcome sharing among downstream subcontracting levels into testable hypotheses and well-defined concepts. The paper has practical implications for industry practitioners seeking to effectively allocate benefits and costs throughout a project's subcontracting chain.

This study aims to examine the impact of board characteristics on firm performance while also exploring the influential mechanisms that help Chinese listed companies establish effective boards of directors and strengthen their corporate governance mechanisms.

This paper uses machine learning methods to investigate the predictive ability of the board of directors' characteristics on firm performance based on the data from Chinese A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China during 2008–2021. This study further analyzes board characteristics with relatively strong predictive ability and their predictive models on firm performance.

The results show that nonlinear machine learning methods are more effective than traditional linear models in analyzing the impact of board characteristics on Chinese firm performance. Among the series characteristics of the board of directors, the contribution ratio in prediction from directors compensation, director shareholding ratio, the average age of directors and directors' educational level are significant, and these characteristics have a roughly nonlinear correlation to the prediction of firm performance; the improvement of the predictive ability of board characteristics on firm performance in state-owned enterprises in China performs better than that in private enterprises.

The findings of this study provide valuable suggestions for enriching the theory of board governance, strengthening board construction and optimizing the effectiveness of board governance. Furthermore, these impacts can serve as a valuable reference for board construction and selection, aiding in the rational selection of boards to establish an efficient and high-performing board of directors.

The study findings unequivocally demonstrate the superiority of nonlinear machine learning approaches over traditional linear models in examining the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance in China. Within the suite of board characteristics, director compensation, shareholding ratio, average age and educational level are particularly noteworthy, consistently demonstrating strong, nonlinear associations with firm performance. Within the suite of board characteristics, director compensation, shareholding ratio, average age and educational level are particularly noteworthy, consistently demonstrating strong, nonlinear associations with firm performance. The study reveals that the predictive performance of board attributes is generally more robust for state-owned enterprises in China in comparison to their counterparts in the private sector.

Promoting technological innovation is important to address the complexity of major engineering challenges. Technological innovations include short-term innovations at the project level and long-term innovations that can enhance competitive advantages. The purpose of this study is to develop an incentive mechanism for the public sector that considers short-term and long-term efforts from the private sector, aiming to promote technological innovation in major engineering projects.

This study constructs an incentive model considering the differences in short-term and long-term innovation efforts from the private sector. This model emphasizes the spillover effect of long-term efforts on current projects and the cost synergy effect between short-term and long-term efforts. It also explores the factors influencing the optimal incentive strategies for the public sector and innovation strategies for the private sector.

The results indicate that increasing the output coefficient of short-term and long-term efforts and reducing the cost coefficient not only enhance the innovation efforts of the private sector but also prompt the public sector to increase the incentive coefficient. The spillover effect of long-term innovation efforts and the synergy effect of the two efforts are positively related to the incentive coefficient for the public sector.

This research addresses the existing gap in understanding how the public sector should devise incentive mechanisms for technological innovation when contractors acting as the private sector are responsible for construction within a public-private partnership (PPP) model. In constructing the incentive mechanism model, this study incorporates the private sector's short-term efforts at the project level and their long-term efforts for sustained corporate development, thus adding considerable practical significance.

This study aims to focus on public policy concerning the implementation of public procurement policies in Nigeria and Ghana toward achieving value for money in the procurement of goods, services and works. It specifically analyzes some major administrative challenges Nigeria and Ghana are faced with in the administration/implementation of public procurement policies toward achieving value for money. It looks at the relationship between the state (regulatory authorities) and substate (procurement entities) in the public sectors of Nigeria and Ghana.

A comparative case study approach is adopted, where the two countries are compared in terms of achieving value for money. Data was collected from multiple sources, including in-depth interviews. The use of official documents and direct observations at the procurement regulatory authorities and entities’ premises.

This study found Nigeria often used the four Es – economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity while Ghana mainly used the traditional five rights (right quantity, right quality, right price, right place and right time) as their criteria for ensuring value for money. The major administrative challenges found include corruption, low capacity of procurement personnel and poor knowledge of the procurement laws.

It recommends effective collaboration between government and civil society groups in the fight against corruption in procurement-related activities, with the implication that there is a need for periodic training for public procurement officials.

It adds to the field of public procurement in terms of value for money in the procurement of goods, services and works in developing countries context.

This article conceptualizes and constructs a comprehensive framework that can better help to answer that question – Who is accountable for social and public problems? – theoretically and practically.

Tracing the drivers behind two phenomena “accountability hole” and “accountability black hole”, stemming from “pushing power game” and “pulling power game”, respectively, this study considers (1) the three actors of society: citizens (civil society), corporations (market) and civil servants (government), and (2) the principal-agent relationship between the three actors in the face of social and public problems. As a result, the 4CAs framework that contains the three actors’ collaborative accountabilities to one another is presented.

The 4CAs model emphasizes (1) all three actors function as agents that are accountable to one another, (2) collaborative accountability beyond collaborative governance and (3) repowering citizens and corporations beyond just empowering them, i.e. returning their inherent rights and obligations to serve one another.

The 4CAs model may function as a descriptive and prescriptive lens through which the trilemma between market failure, government failure and citizen failure can be re-assessed and balanced. The model can also be used as a set of indicators for assessing and helping a society to better resolve the social and public problems collectively.

The construction industry has long been criticized for unethical conduct. The owner usually manages the contractor's opportunistic behaviors by employing a professional supervisor, but there is a risk of covert collusion between the supervisor and contractor. Based on the principal–agent theory and collusion theory, this paper aims to investigate optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts.

This paper presents a game-theoretic framework comprising an owner, supervisor and contractor, who interact and pursue maximized self-profits. Built upon the fixed-price incentive contract, cost-reimbursement contract, and revenue-sharing contract, different collusion-proof incentive contracts are investigated. A real project case is used to validate the developed model and derived results.

This paper shows that the presence of unethical collusion undermines the owner's interests. Especially, the possibility of agent collusion may induce the owner to abandon extracting quality information from the supervisor. Furthermore, information asymmetry significantly affects the construction contract selection, and the application conditions for different incentive contracts are provided.

This study still has some limitations that deserve further exploration. First, this study explores contractor–supervisor collusion but ignores the possibility of the supervisor abusing authority to extort the contractor. Second, to focus on collusion, this paper ignores the supervision costs. What's the optimal supervision effort that the owner should induce the supervisor to exert? Finally, this paper assumes that the colluders involved always keep their promises. However, what if the colluders may break their promises?

Several collusion-proof incentive contracts are explored in a project management setting. The proposed incentive contracts can provide the project owner with effective and practical tools to inhibit covert collusion in construction management and thus safeguard construction project quality.

This study expands the organization collusion theory to the field of construction management and investigates the optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts. In addition, this study is the first to investigate the effects of information asymmetry on contract selection.

This study aims to examine the role of blockchain technology (BCT) in trust in financial reporting (TFR) and the use of smart contracts (USC). It aims to ascertain the mediating role of USC in the relationship between BCT and TFR, thereby contributing to the limited empirical literature in this domain.

Based on a sample of the accountants’ familiarity with BCT, a structural equation model was constructed and analyzed using AMOS 24. The model proposes and tests relationships between BCT, USC and TFR.

The study highlights BCT’s significant positive influence on TFR, with USC mediating this effect. It provides empirical evidence that supports the transformative potential of BCT and USC in enhancing TFR.

These findings have significant implications for practitioners, regulatory bodies and policymakers. By highlighting the effectiveness of BCT and USC in fostering TFR, the study makes one aware of strategies to mitigate financial malpractices. It promotes the adoption of BCT in accounting practices.

This study addresses a gap in the literature by investigating the complex interplay of BCT, USC and TFR. It offers a unique perspective by exploring the mediating role of USC, thereby enhancing our understanding of the mechanisms through which BCT can foster TFR.

Green technology innovation is the organic combination of green development and innovation driven. It is also a powerful guarantee for shaping sustainable competitive advantages of manufacturing enterprises. To explore what kind of executive incentive contracts can truly stimulate green technology innovation, this study aims to distinguish the equity incentive and reputation incentive, upon their contractual elements characteristics and green governance effects, and then put forward suggestions for green technology innovation accordingly.

This study establishes an evaluation model and uses empirical methods to test. Concretely, using data from A-share listed manufacturing companies for the period from 2007 to 2020, this study compares and analyzes the impact of equity and reputation incentive on green technology innovation and explores the relationship between internal green business behavior and external green in depth.

This study finds that reputation incentives focus on long-term and non-utilitarian orientation, which can promote green technology innovation in enterprises. While equity incentives, linked to performance indicators, have a inhibitory effect on green technology innovation. Internal and external institutional factors such as energy conservation measures, the “three wastes” management system, and environmental recognition play the regulatory role in the relationship between incentive contracts and green technology innovation.

Those findings validate and expand the efficient contracting hypothesis and the rent extraction hypothesis from the perspective of green technology innovation and provide useful implications for the design of green governance systems in manufacturing enterprises.