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Federal agencies can directly purchase more than 8 million commercial products and services through the General Services Administration’s (GSA) multiple award schedules (MAS) contracts. Over the past 10 years, MAS contract sales have increased dramatically--with sales jumping from $4 billion to $32 billion. In addition to simplifying the procurement process, the MAS program is designed to take advantage of the government’s significant aggregate buying power. While GSA seeks to negotiate best pricing for its MAS contracts by analyzing vendor-provided information--such as discounts given to other customers and recent sales data for the same or similar items--past reports have found that GSA has not always used pricing tools effectively and that management controls for better ensuring fair and reasonable pricing had been reduced. This report discusses GSA’s process for negotiating most favored customer prices for MAS contracts and its efforts to improve the overall quality of negotiations. Contract negotiators at the four MAS acquisition centers that GAO reviewed use a variety of tools for obtaining most favored customer pricing--that is, the prices vendors offer their best customers. However, the GAO analysis of GSA’s review of selected fiscal year 2004 MAS contract files found that nearly 60 percent lacked the documentation needed to establish clearly that the prices were effectively negotiated. Specifically, the contract documentation did not establish that negotiated prices were based on accurate, complete, and current vendor information; adequate price analyses; and reasonable price negotiations. GSA’s efforts to ensure most favored customer pricing have been hindered by the significant decline in the use of pre-award and postaward audits of pre-award pricing information, two independent pricing tools that have helped GSA avoid or recover hundreds of millions of dollars in excessive pricing. In fiscal year 1995, GSA conducted 154 pre-award audits; by 2004 the number of pre-award audits fell to 40. Postaward audits--which resulted in an average annual recovery of $18 million in the early 1990s--were discontinued in 1997 when GSA revised its MAS contract audit policies to increase the use of pre-award audits--an increase that has not materialized. In March 2003, GSA established the Acquisition Quality Measurement and Improvement Program, initiating the use of prenegotiation panels and postaward quality reviews of contracts. However, the effectiveness of these initiatives has been limited due to insufficient oversight. For example, three of the MAS acquisition centers that GAO visited had not reported the results of their 2003 prenegotiation panels--information needed by management to identify problems and make needed improvements. Moreover, the fourth acquisition center--which accounted for about 56 percent of the fiscal year 2004 MAS sales--has yet to hold a panel. While the postaward quality reviews--the second program initiative--have identified deficiencies in contract file documentation, they did not determine the underlying causes of these deficiencies or prescribe actions needed to address them. As a result of these weaknesses, GSA cannot be assured that fair and reasonable prices have been negotiated for its MAS contracts.

The purpose of this research is to investigate how to introduce a financing scheme to tackle the manufacturer's capital constraint problem, discuss the effects of data-driven marketing (DDM) quality, cross-channel-return (CCR) rate and financing interest rate on the members' pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions and optimal performances, and analyzes `how to achieve the coordination within a dual-channel supply chain (DSC) by contract coordination.

This work establishes a DSC model with DDM, and the offline retailer can provide internal financing to the capital-constrained online manufacturer. The demand under the price is determined based on DDM quality, customer channel preference and delivery lead time. Then, combined with the Stackelberg game, the optimal pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions are discussed under the inconsistent and consistent pricing strategies with decentralized and centralized systems. Furthermore, it designs a manufacturer-revenue sharing contract to coordinate the members under the two pricing strategies.

(1) The increase of DDM quality will reduce the delivery-lead-time under the inconsistent or consistent pricing strategy and will push the selling prices; (2) The growth of the CCR rate will raise selling prices and extend the delivery-lead-time under the decentralized decision; (3) Under price competition, the offline selling price is higher than the online selling price when customers prefer the offline channel and vice versa; (4) The retailer and the manufacturer can achieve a win-win situation through a manufacturer-revenue sharing contract.

This paper contributes to the studies related to DSC by investigating pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions based on DDM, CCR, internal financing and supply chain contract and proposes some managerial implications.

In the hybrid electricity market consisting of renewable and conventional energy, the generation output of renewable power is uncertain because of its intermittency, and the power market demand is also fluctuant. Meanwhile, there is fierce competition among power producers in the power supply market and retailers in the demand market after deregulation, which increases the difficulty of renewable energy power grid-connection. To promote grid-connection of renewable energy power in the hybrid electricity market, the authors construct different contract decision-making models in the “many-to-many” hybrid power supply chain to explore the pricing strategy of renewable energy power grid-connecting.

Considering the dual-uncertainty of renewable energy power output and electricity market demand, the authors construct different decision-making models of wholesale price contract and revenue-sharing contract to compare and optimize grid-connecting pricing, respectively, to maximize the profits of different participants in the hybrid power supply chain. Besides, the authors set different parameters in the models to explore the influence of competition intensity, government subsidies, etc. on power pricing. Then, a numerical simulation is carried out, they verify the existence of the equilibrium solutions satisfying the supply chain coordination, compare the differences of pricing contracts and further analyze the variation characteristics of optimal contract parameters and their interaction relations.

Revenue-sharing contract can increase the quantity of green power grid-connection and realize benefits Pareto improvement of all parties in hybrid power supply chain. The competition intensity both of power supply and demand market will have an impact on the sharing ratio, and the increase of competition intensity results in a reduction of power supply chain coordination pressure. The power contract price, spot price and selling price have all been reduced with the increase of the sharing ratio, and the price of renewable power is more sensitive to the ratio change. The sharing ratio shows a downward trend with the increase of government green power subsidies.

On the basis of expanding the definition of hybrid power market and the theory of newsvendor model, considering the dual-uncertainty of green power generation output and electricity market demand, this paper builds and compares different contract decision-making models to study the grid-connection pricing strategy of renewable energy power. And as an extension of supply chain structure types and management, the authors build a “many-to-many” power supply chain structure model and analyze the impact of competition intensity among power enterprises and the government subsidy on the power grid-connecting pricing.

This paper considers an option contract in a two-stage supplier-retailer supply chain (SC) when market demand is stochastic. The problem is a Stackelberg game with the supplier as a leader. This research assumes demand information sharing. The purpose of this study is to determine the optimal pricing strategy of the supplier along with the optimal order strategy of the retailer in three option contract cases.

The paper model the option contract pricing problem as a bilevel problem. The problem is then solved using bilevel programing methods. After computing, the generated outcomes are compared to a benchmark (wholesale price contract) to evaluate the contract.

The results reveal that only one of the contract cases can arbitrarily allocate the SC profit. In both other cases, the Stackelberg supplier manages to earn the total SC profit. Further analysis of the first contract, show that from the supplier’s perspective, the first stage forecast inaccuracy is beneficial, whereas the demand uncertainty in the second stage is detrimental. This contracting strategy guarantees both players better outcomes compared to the wholesale price contract.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research is the first that links the option contract literature to the bilevel programing literature. It also the first to solve the pricing problem of the commitment option contract with demand update where the retailer exercises the option before knowing the exact demand.

This paper aims to explore optimal pricing policies and characteristics of a two-level dual-channel supply chain under price- and delivery time-sensitive demand. Besides price of the product, the delivery lead time is also a crucial factor in customers’ purchase decisions. A longer delivery lead time would diminish customers’ acceptance and faithfulness on the online channel, while a shorter delivery lead time would lead to incorporation of a substantial amount of logistics costs. In formulation of mathematical model, the effects of delivery lead time on the manufacturer and the retailer’s pricing strategies and profits in cooperative and non-cooperative dual-channel supply chain are explained analytically.

The analytical models are formed for both non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios under inconsistent and consistent pricing. The authors examine whether revenue sharing (RS) contract or delivery cost sharing contract can solely coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. If a single contract fails, then the combination of RS contract with delivery cost sharing to achieve channel coordination is discussed.

It is found that the RS or delivery cost sharing contract cannot coordinate the channel individually but revenue and delivery cost sharing contract jointly coordinate the channel. All analytical results are illustrated numerically, along with sensitivity analysis.

There are many correlated issues that need to be further investigated. First, one good extension to this research may include the consideration of the channel structure with competitive retailers. It will be interesting to analyze the performance of coordination mechanisms by considering the retailer as a Stackelberg leader in retailing.

The findings and subsequent methodological discussions aim to provide practical guidance to retailers who are allowing customers to choose how, when and where they interact and purchase by offering a combination of websites (fully functional and mobile-enabled), catalogs and stores with increasing convergence of channels.

Alpha contracting is a collaborative effort between a buyer and supplier during contract formation to maximize efficiency and effectiveness. Collaborative efforts between the United States Department of Defense and its suppliers have recently been scrutinized. Although several benefits of Alpha contracting are identified within the literature, the phenomenon is not ubiquitous nor is it well understood. Using the case study methodology, this research explores Alpha Contracting to define success and to identify its contributing factors. Additionally, this research identifies antecedents for and consequences of use, variations of the processes employed, and some misuse. The study culminates in the development of a conceptual model of collaborative pricing, and provides five recommendations for enhanced use.

This paper investigates residential sanitation collection (RSC) pricing under two different service delivery arrangements: (1) the municipal RSC arrangement where municipal employees collect residential refuse, and (2) the contract RSC arrangement where private sector firms, under contract with a municipality, collect residential refuse. The results of the study indicate that municipal RSC prices are significantly higher than contract RSC prices. Furthermore, municipal RSC prices exhibit greater variability than contract RSC prices. These findings suggest that contract pricing is consistent with pricing in a competitive market.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed analysis of industry loss warranties (ILWs), an alternative risk transfer instrument which has become increasingly popular throughout the last few years.

The authors first point out key characteristics of ILWs important to investor and cedent, including transaction costs, moral hazard, basis risk, counterparty risk, industry loss index, and regulation. Next, the authors present and discuss the adequacy of actuarial and financial approaches for pricing ILWs, as well as the aspects of basis risk. Finally, drivers of demand and associated models frameworks from the purchaser's viewpoint are studied.

Financial pricing approaches for ILWs are highly sensitive to input parameters, which is important given the high volatility of the underlying loss index. In addition, the underlying assumption of replicability of the claims is not without problems. Due to their simple and standardized structure and the dependence on a transparent industry loss index, ILWs are low‐barrier products, which can also be offered by hedge funds. In principle, traditional reinsurance contracts are still preferred as a measure of risk transfer, especially since these are widely accepted for solvency capital reduction. However, the main important impact factor for the demand of ILWs from the perspective of market participants, i.e. large diversified reinsurers and hedge funds, is the lower price due to rather low transaction costs and less documentation effort. Hence, ILWs are attractive despite the introduction of basis risk and the still somewhat opaque regulatory environment.

An important issue for future research is how reinsureds deal with the basis risk inherent in ILWs. Another central point is the development of a European industry loss index and the creation of an exchange platform to enable an even higher degree of standardization and a faster processing of transactions.

ILWs feature an industry loss index to be triggered, and, in some cases, a double‐trigger design that includes a company indemnity trigger. ILW contracts belong to the class of alternative risk transfer instruments that have become increasingly popular, especially in the retrocession reinsurance market. There has been no comprehensive analysis of these instruments in academic literature to date. Consequently, the authors believe that this paper provides a high degree of originality.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a model for ruin‐contingent life annuity (RCLA) contracts under a jump diffusion model, where the dynamics of volatility is governed by the Heston stochastic volatility framework. The paper aims to illustrate that the proposed jump diffusion process, for both asset price and stochastic volatility, will provide a more realistic pricing model for RCLA contracts in comparison to existing models.

Under the assumption of the deterministic withdrawals, the authors use a partial integro differential equation (PIDE) approach to develop the pricing scheme for the fair value of the lump sum charges of RCLA contracts. Consequently, the authors employ an elegant numerical scheme, finite difference method, for solving the PIDEs for the reference portfolio, as well as the volatility. The findings show that a different pricing behaviour of the RCLA contracts under the authors' model parameters is obtained compared to that in the existing literature.

RCLA pricing in the complete market often underestimates the jump risk and the persistent factor in the volatility process. The authors' generalized model shows how these two random sources of risks can be precisely characterized.

The parameter values used in the numerical analysis require more empirical evidence. Hence, in order for more precise pricing practice, the calibration from real data is needed.

The model, as adopted in this study, for pricing of RCLA contracts should provide a general guideline for the commercialization of this product by insurance companies.

The demand for RCLA contracts as an alternative to the commonly‐practised annuitization option has recently increased, rapidly, among the soon‐to‐retire baby boomers. This paper investigates the fair value of this particular product, which could be beneficial to researchers for a better understanding of the product design.

This is the first research paper which prices the RCLA contracts in the incomplete market. The gap between RCLA contract pricing and studies of jump diffusion models for derivative pricing, in the literature, is therefore filled.

Research on business-to-business (B2B) pricing has been mainly focussed on the supplier’s pricing process, thus adopting traditionally an internal perspective and perceiving pricing as a profit distribution parameter rather than an opportunity for collaboration with customers. Recently, the opportunity to develop win-win, collaborative relationships in the B2B pricing process by embracing a supply chain perspective has started to attract the attention of scholars across several research streams, who have highlighted the emergence of this topic using different definitions, perspectives and methodologies. The purpose of this paper is to address the need for integrating the fragmented body of knowledge on B2B pricing toward supply chain collaboration.

This critical literature review adopts an interdisciplinary approach, focussing on industrial marketing and operations and supply chain management areas.

The authors provide a critical synthesis and discussion structured in four streams clustered around two dimensions, i.e. the “extension” of the collaboration in the pricing process along the supply chain and the “direction” of collaboration.

Drawing on the literature gaps, the paper concludes by proposing an agenda for future research for a relevant topic both for academics and practitioners.

This paper offers a novel comprehensive view of the supply chain collaboration in the B2B pricing process and provides opportunities for intensifying dialogue across different research areas.