An analysis of residential sanitation collection pricing under alternative delivery arrangements

Abstract

This paper investigates residential sanitation collection (RSC) pricing under two different service delivery arrangements: (1) the municipal RSC arrangement where municipal employees collect residential refuse, and (2) the contract RSC arrangement where private sector firms, under contract with a municipality, collect residential refuse. The results of the study indicate that municipal RSC prices are significantly higher than contract RSC prices. Furthermore, municipal RSC prices exhibit greater variability than contract RSC prices. These findings suggest that contract pricing is consistent with pricing in a competitive market.

Citation

Brooks, R.C. (1995), "An analysis of residential sanitation collection pricing under alternative delivery arrangements", Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 493-514. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-07-04-1995-B002