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This study aims to examine the impact of institutional investors and their classes on the stock return volatility of an emerging market. The paper also determines the moderating role of firm size, crisis and turnover on such relationships.

The study covers nonfinancial companies of the Bombay Stock Exchange-100 index that are listed during the study period. The study uses fixed effects and systematic generalized method of moments estimators to look over the association between institutional investors and firms’ stock return volatility.

The study provides evidence that institutional investors destabilize the Indian stock market. It indicates that institutional investors do not engage in management activities; they earn short-term gains depending on information efficiency. Pressure-insensitive institutional investors have a significant positive relation with stock return volatility, while pressure-sensitive institutional investors do not. The study also reflects that pressure-sensitive institutional investors are underweighted in India, which jointly represents an insignificant nonlinear association between institutional ownership and stocks’ volatility. Furthermore, outcomes reveal that the intersection effect of the crisis, firm size and turnover is positively and significantly related to such relationships.

The outcomes encourage initiatives that keep track of institutional investors in the Indian stock market. To control the destabilizing effect of pressure-insensitive institutional investors, regulators should follow strict regulations on their trading patterns. Moreover, it guides the potential researchers that they should also take into account the impact of other classes of ownership structure or what type of ownership can help in stabilizing or destabilizing the Indian stock market.

Abundant literature studies the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in the Indian context. From the standpoint of making management decisions, the return and volatility of stock returns are both different aspects. However, this study examines the effect of institutional ownership and its groups on the volatility of stock return using the panel data estimator, which was previously not discussed in the literature.

Previous empirical evidence scrutinizing the impact of the institutional ownership on the firm performance has produced inconclusive results and mostly concentrated in the developed market. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the ownership engagement by pressure-resistant, pressure-sensitive and foreign institutions on the corporate financial performance in a developing market like India post US financial crisis.

This study considers a panel data set of 361 Indian listed firms from National Stock Exchange (NSE) 500 index for a period of eight years from financial year (FY) 2008-2009 to FY 2015-2016. The panel data regression (pooled ordinary least square [OLS], fixed-effect [FE] and random-effect [RE]) and simultaneous equation modeling are used by considering the institutional ownership engagement as both exogenous and endogenous variable.

The test results show that institutional ownership engagement by the pressure-resistant and foreign institution have a robust and positive effect, while ownership engagement by the pressure sensitive institution has an adverse impact on the financial performance of the Indian listed firms.

The findings will boost the monitoring activities of the institutional owners in the developing markets. The investment from pressure-resistant and foreign institutions needs to be augmented in Indian firms to improvise their governance functions and performance.

This research will enrich the governance literature of the developing economies as the studies on institutional ownership engagement are limited in the developing world. Further, this study adds value by capturing two emerging institutional ownership category such as the pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive, which are still untouched in the Indian context. Next, the consideration of the institutional ownership as both exogenous and endogenous is also novel to the Indian literature.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of institutional shareholdings on earnings management activities of their portfolio firms.

Using a final sample of 94 top firms on the Bursa Malaysia based on market capitalization as at 31 December 2007, this paper uses the magnitude of discretionary accruals as the proxy for earnings management. The paper measures the aggregate institutional ownership percentage of shareholdings of the five top institutional investors which are further divided into two categories: pressure sensitive consisting of percentage ownership by banks and insurance companies; and pressure insensitive institutional investor consisting of percentage shareholdings by unit trusts, pension funds and state‐owned institutions. Data were collected over a six‐year period from 2002 to 2007. The year it started was also when all the listed companies in Bursa Malaysia started adopting the MCCG requirements as mandatory reporting in annual reports.

The results show that only Malaysia Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) institutional shareholdings are effective in mitigating self‐serving earnings management behavior of their portfolio firms. Within MSWG shareholdings, Permodalan National Berhad (PNB) is the most effective institutional shareholder in mitigating opportunistic earnings management behavior. Overall, the findings suggest that ownership may not be enough to mitigate earnings management. Firms may have to engage in shareholder activism such as through proxy voting and establishing direct dialogues with management in order to preserve the value of their investments.

One of the limitations in this study is measurement error which is a critical problem for studies on earnings management. Hence, this study inherits all the limitations of the Jones model although it is noted that it and the modified Jones model are extensively used in earnings management literature. Overall, this study provides empirical evidence to assess the merits of calls for institutional investors to play a greater role in portfolio firms' corporate governance practice in Malaysia. In essence, the results from the study provide evidence that ownership alone is not enough and institutional investors need to be involved in shareholder activism in order to be effective as an external monitor. In other words, by engaging in shareholder activism, institutional investors would be better able to safeguard the value of their investment. Moreover, the size of their shareholdings should provide powerful incentive for them to monitor their investee firms.

This is the first published paper that focuses on institutional investors and earnings management in Malaysia, as previous studies have focused more on developed countries. This study aims to provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of institutional investors in mitigating opportunistic earnings management, in order to ascertain their generalizability to developing countries like Malaysia.

Purpose – This chapter presents the results of an exploratory study carried out on activist institutional investor strategies. It aims to identify the way in which different types of institutional investors are reacting to new institutional pressures in the French context.

Design/methodology/approach – Our methodology is based on a series of semi-directive interviews, combined with additional relevant data.

Findings – The interpretation of results makes use of institutional theory, more specifically the work of Oliver (1991). Our study shows that active institutional investors may opt for different responses when confronted with new institutional pressures, and that these responses would seem to depend on antecedents underlined by Ryan and Schneider (2002), which in turn depend on the nature of their business relationships with the firm in which they invest. Whereas pressure-sensitive investors (such as banks and insurance companies) generally adopt acquiescence responses, pressure-resistant investors (such as pension funds and investment funds) pursue joint strategies of co-optation, influence or control with key actors such as local and international proxy advisors and French investor associations. Acting conjointly, certain pressure-resistant investors are often considered as institutional entrepreneurs in that they initiate changes and actively participate in the implementation of new norms in the field of shareholder activism in the French context. In parallel to this ongoing professionalization, other pressure-resistant investors such as activist hedge funds seem to lack sufficient legitimate power to be effective.

Originality/value – This chapter illustrates that the level of institutional investor activism depends largely on the relevant national legal framework. It also shows how institutional investor coalitions take advantage of new institutional pressures to enhance their legitimacy or increase the effectiveness of their action.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of large equity ownership by both institutions and outside block shareholders in monitoring the board of directors’ decision to initially adopt defense mechanisms and the subsequent capital market reaction to the adoption.

This paper employs an empirical methodology that controls for selection bias. Multiple regressions were employed to assess the relationship among the variables.

Stockholder wealth effects of poison pills are positively related to pressure‐resistant institutions, which is consistent with effective monitoring. The wealth effects of poison pills, however, are negatively related to pressure‐sensitive investors, consistent with passivity. No empirical relation was found between ownership structure and shareholder approved amendments such as classified boards and fair price amendments.

This study was conducted as a large sample analysis over an earlier time period that was more applicable for evaluating anti‐takeover techniques.

The results are consistent with pressure‐resistant institutions actively monitoring to prevent unilaterally implemented defense mechanisms of all types, whereas pressure‐sensitive institutions appear to more readily accept poison pills.

These results suggest that failing to control for the type of outside investor may not clearly portray documented relations in other corporate governance studies.

Research on the significance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and value creation is nascent as compared to CSR and financial performance. The concept of value is also evolving because of changing business environments, globalization and the expanded idea of CSR. Nowadays, managers expect a more quick, pragmatic approach to satisfy valid stakeholder claims while simultaneously creating competitive advantage through reputation and investor value. The paper aims to examine the impact of CSR on the market and sustainable value creation through CSR expenditure in India and the moderating role of pressure-sensitive institutional investors (PSII).

The study used panel data regression methodology on a sample of 1,845 non-financial Indian firms from 2015 to 2021.

CSR creates market and sustainable value for non-financial Indian firms in line with stakeholder theory. The authors find a positive moderating role of governance represented by PSII on CSR and market value creation but not on sustainable value.

The study is based on secondary data. CSR, despite being a regulatory obligation, provided long-term benefits that increased their sustainable growth rate. The results highlight the importance given by financial markets to CSR activities. Other types of institutional investors can also be examined in future research. CSR can be embedded in the core operations of the firm, which can help in fostering a culture of sustainability and responsible business practices that benefit firms and society as a whole. Tax incentives can be provided to firms investing in CSR.

CSR provides long-term benefits to the firm, which enhances the goodwill and integrity of the firm in the market. The results reveal that besides capital market investors, firms are subject to the scrutiny of consumers, communities and the government as expectations rise and information spreads faster, which can have repercussions. CSR helps in meeting such expectations and the perceived value of the firms. Managers and chief executive officers (CEOs) can pay attention to the type of institutional investors like PSII, which can be formed as a part of the firm’s CSR strategy.

The positive impact of CSR on sustainable value expresses a long-term management orientation based on the improvement of stakeholder relations and the associated environmental impacts referring to cohesion and consensus, market opportunities and strengthened reputation and image. A sustainable company involves a conscious and continuing effort in the equilibrium between contrasting stakeholders’ expectations in an attempt to optimize value creation. Tax exemption can be provided for CSR activities.

The authors contribute to the scant literature on CSR and value creation, especially sustainable value, as most of the prior studies are not empirical on sustainable value in the Indian context. Managers and CEOs can pay attention to the types of institutional investors like PSII, which can be formed as a part of the firm’s strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the link between institutional ownership stability and dividend payout ratio.

First, the authors estimate the propensity of a firm to pay dividend. Next, the authors perform panel fixed-effect regressions of dividend payouts on institutional ownership stability variables. The authors also compare institutional ownership between dividend paying and non-dividend paying investee firms. The authors analyze the dividend preferences of different types of institutional owners. Finally, the authors examine the cross-sectional variation in the volatility of dividend payouts.

The authors find that stable and large institutional owners favor dividend paying companies. There also exists a positive association between ownership persistence and dividend payout. Conversely, firms that change their dividend payout frequently are associated with larger deviations in institutional ownership. Additionally, the presence of pressure-sensitive institutional investors (i.e. investors that also hold business ties with the investee firm) is significantly linked to dividend payout policy. Conversely, pressure-insensitive investors use alternative forms of monitoring instead of requiring investee firms to pay dividends, which serve to reduce agency conflicts.

This paper considers the preferences of long-term stable institutional investors in their selection of dividend paying firms.

This study examines the relationship between institutional investors and director remuneration in Malaysia against an important institutional backdrop of political connection. Our panel analysis of 434 firms from 1999 to 2003 finds a negative relationship between institutional ownership and director remuneration suggesting the effectiveness of institutional monitoring. Although we find no evidence to suggest a politically determined remuneration scheme, the negative relationship between institutional ownership and remuneration becomes less in politically connected firms. This suggests that political connections mitigate institutional monitoring in relationship-based economies.

The Indian Companies Act (2013) mandates the appointment of at least one woman director for large publicly listed companies in India in order to increase gender diversity on corporate boards. The study analyzes the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, board gender diversity, and ownership structure on dividend payout decisions in an emerging economy like India. The study uses data collected for nonfinancial firms listed on NSE (National Stock Exchange) 500 in India from the period 2008 to 2020. Contrary to the evidence from developed economies, the study finds that increased female representation and greater proportion of female independent directors on the board are associated with lower dividend payout decisions in the Indian context. As it stands, the female representation on corporate boards in India is woefully low and appears to be mere tokenism. The study explores the role of regulation in increasing gender diversity on corporate boards and offers insights from an emerging economy where such a regulation is in place.

Many emerging economy firms are under foreign owners' pressure to embrace the challenges of addressing corporate social responsibility (CSR) and consider adopting sustainability initiatives. However, it is not clear how foreign ownership plays a role to enable or inhibit these emerging economy firms from translating sustainability initiatives into improved financial performance. Utilizing neo-institutional theory, the authors argue that emerging economy firms that voluntarily report sustainability gain legitimacy in the eyes of shareholders and improve stock market performance. However, emerging economy firms may not have the resources to reconcile the internal stakeholders' various legitimacy requirements to promote sustainability practices, resulting in a negative association with accounting performance. Foreign ownership attenuates the relationship between sustainability reporting and firm performance due to the different legitimacy requirements in foreign markets.

To test the study’s hypotheses, the authors collected and analyzed a large sample of publicly listed firms between 2010 and 2016 in Taiwan where the types of foreign ownership include foreign trust funds, foreign financial institutions and other foreign legal entities. Regression analyses were conducted to investigate whether the firms that report their sustainable practices have better financial performance, including stock market performance and accounting performance. Additionally, a three-step procedure was employed to address the endogeneity issue with a binary explanatory variable.

The positive stock market reaction to the emerging economy firms' voluntary sustainability reporting supports legitimacy gained among investors. By contrast, sustainability reporting has a negative association with accounting performance due to the difficulty of reconciling different legitimacy requirements among various stakeholders in emerging economies. Further, foreign ownership, particularly the trust fund, exhibits a negative moderating effect on the relationship between sustainability reporting in aligning corporate practices with sustainable development goals (SDGs) and the company's stock market performance.

By examining the less tested contingent role played by foreign ownership in the emerging economy firms' sustainability reporting, the authors provide insights into the influence exerted by different types of foreign ownership on firms' financial performances beyond previous studies that focus on family ownership, state ownership, or managerial ownership in emerging economies. The findings shed light on corporate sustainability strategy and foreign direct investment policies for an emerging economy.