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The European Union's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) has existed for over 40 years and it aimed to promote the export growth in the developing countries. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the evolution and characteristics of the EU's GSP regime and examine the effectiveness of the EU's GSP in promoting the export growth of ten ASEAN beneficiary countries.

The authors analyse the trade flows between the EU and ASEAN beneficiary countries under the GSP scheme by referring to trade data (1990‐2007) at the aggregate level, the sectoral level and individual beneficiary country level.

The authors find that using the EU's GSP to promote the exports growth of the ASEAN countries has very limited effectiveness. Although the total EU imports from the ASEAN countries experienced a significant increase during the period 1990‐2007, the preferential imports under the GSP scheme remained stagnated at the same period. However, the least developed ASEAN members reported very high utilization rates and successfully exploited GSP preferences for pushing up their exports to the European market.

This work provides new evidence on whether the EU's GSP really works and to what extent the EU's GSP enhances the export growth of ASEAN beneficiary countries. The empirical findings may provide trade policymakers with some guidance in making EU trade policy.

Regional trading arrangements are proliferating at a rapid pace in the Asia-Pacific region, although the architecture that will eventually emerge remains uncertain. In this chapter we explore the economic implications for both China and its trading partners of the current crop of preferential arrangements and potential future developments in the Asia-Pacific region, using computable general equilibrium simulations. By doing so the chapter aims to identify factors that are likely to weigh heavily in the economic interests of the different participants in some of the alternative ways in which the trade architecture of the region might develop, and the extent of convergence or divergence in these interests.

Economists along with policy makers are generally viewing trade agreements as a “second best” process for trade expansion and economic growth on a global scale. The current surge of preferential trade arrangements on a bilateral basis, particularly in Asia, is somehow challenging such common view. The following paper is based on updated rough facts and put forward that the standard economic approach is a bit flawed. Obviously, the outcomes and prospects for Asian countries seem much more problematic insofar as power asymmetry and discrimination are embedded in these agreements.

At its inception, the Doha Round offered the hope of a more inclusive World Trade Organisation (WTO); one where developing countries in particular envisioned would allow them the policy space to enable their socio‐economic advancement even as they carried out their obligations as Member States of the rules‐based international trade system. While the rewards of this novel development round are awaited, WTO Member States are making a marked shift away from the foundation principles of multilateralism on non‐discriminatory treatment, and pursuing independent trade deals outside the rules. An emerging acceptance of this shift comes with an idea that countries can converge after divergence – that alternatives to multilateralism can still yield agreements that will operate in a multilateral rules‐based framework, post Doha. To this end, this article reviews the challenges facing the Doha negotiations as it pertains to developing country concerns and the shortcomings of the existing development framework. It critically examines the issues arising from the stalemate of the Doha negotiations and the efforts of the international trading system to continue engaging in trade in the face of globalisation, increasing unemployment, decreased wages and living standards in the backdrop of a global recession. It examines the emerging convergence theory which recognises departures from the uniform trading arrangements under multilateralism, without recognising this as a tacit acceptance of a return to protectionism with its consequences. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Reference is made to primary and secondary research material on the subject including WTO rules and agreements.

The article finds that the stalemate in this Doha Round reveals more than just dissatisfaction between Member States on the nature and scope of the rules that must guide their global trading activities. It reveals the fragility of rules and the potential inefficacy of a system that attempts to regulate nebulous activity – trade in the face of divergent needs and concerns.

The research is library/desk based.

This work is an original contribution and is not under consideration elsewhere.

The aim of this paper is to critically analyse the trade preferences offered by the European Union (EU) to developing countries under the Cotonou Agreement and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in relation to trade in sugar. There is a need for a timely examination of this area, given the context of the ACP‐EU Economic Partnership Agreements and the recent termination of the ACP‐EU Sugar Protocol (SP).

The paper focuses on the Caribbean region as a whole with a particular focus on two non‐least developed ACP Caribbean countries, Guyana and Jamaica which held the largest sugar quotas among ACP Caribbean which benefited from the SP.

The EU trade regime changes have affected the value of the African‐Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) sugar trade regime and could have a serious impact on the amount of sugar available for purchase on the global market. The paper argues that ACP Caribbean countries could find more profitable to grow sugarcane as an agricultural commodity to produce biofuel, which is currently in high demand.

The analysis in this paper is limited to the arrangements pertaining to developing countries and therefore excludes those relating to least developed countries. Trade in more highly processed sugars such as fructose or glucose, together with the growing trade in biofuel refined from sugar beet and sugar cane are also outwith the scope of this discussion.

The paper deals with an intricate issue. It discusses the socio‐economic impact of the trade regime changes on the selected Caribbean countries and includes a section on recommendations given the economic weight of sugar for these countries.

This article offers an economic analysis of the main policy issues surrounding the proposed preferential trade area (PTA) between Japan, China, and South Korea. This initial assessment is done within the normative framework of customs union theory. Already, intra-regional trade between the three countries constitutes a high proportion of their total trade and is, in fact, cited as one of the main reasons for the PTA. As a consequence, trade creation following the PTA may not result in much new trade. However, it is expected that the PTA would lead to a vigorous growth of intra-industry trade, particularly in manufactured goods and components. Possibilities of trade diversion are real, but not insurmountable if the resulting preference structure is designed with a view to minimize disruption of trade with the rest-of-the-world.

The purpose of this paper is to show how the pattern of trade relations between the USA and African countries is gradually shifting toward reciprocity. It therefore demonstrates that the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was conceived to be a building block toward future bilateral trade agreements.

This paper adopts a historical approach to the USA’s policy toward Africa in general and in trade matters in particular. It critically reviews the chronology of US involvement in the continent.

Although it was designed as a preferential trade arrangement, AGOA was intended to evolve into reciprocal trade agreements. This is what the USA started doing even prior to the entry into force of the AGOA, by entering into Trade and Investment Framework Agreements with individual countries or blocs. It also transpires that the deployment comes as a response to the European Union which is already engaged in the redefinition of its own trade relations with Africa since 2004.

The paper is important in many respects. Not only it is a study of the US practice as preference-granting country, but it is also interested in the typology of trade agreements concluded by the USA in other regions of the world. This is important to indicate and analyze the types of provisions African countries should be expected to face when the time of entering into reciprocal binding trade treaties arrives.

This chapter reviews the evolution of thinking about regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the policy developments reflected in three waves of RTAs during the last half century. Desirable and undesirable features of RTAs can be identified, but the central message concerns the ambiguity of outcomes. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of the nation state and of multilateral institutions and the scope for intermediate levels of organization created by RTAs.

Since the First Yaoundé Convention (1963‐1969), the European Union (EU) has been implementing its development policy in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the trade and financial flows between the EU and the ACP countries and attempt to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the EU's development policy during the pre‐Cotonou era (1970‐2000).

Extensive trade, governance, and external financing data are gathered about 79 ACP countries during the period 1970‐2004. Using the index of standardized trade performance, diversification indices, and regression analysis, the effectiveness of trade preferences and financial assistance in the ACP countries is quantified.

The results indicate that the preferential trade arrangements between the EU and the ACP countries had neither substantially increased the ACP countries' exports to the EU nor diversified these countries' export structure. Additionally, even though the ACP countries received substantial external financing, these countries continued suffering from the lack of development‐enhancing political and judicial institutions. The empirical results suggest that governance characteristics such as higher corruption and lower democratic accountability have adversely affected the ACP countries' growth rates.

This paper focuses on the effectiveness of the economic cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries during the pre‐Cotonou era. The Cotonou agreement that went into effect in 2000 has changed the EU's approach to the ACP countries significantly. However, the recent nature of this agreement imposes restrictions on data availability, which forces us to exclude the Cotonou era from most of our empirical evaluation.

The empirical results of the paper demonstrate the relevance of governance‐related factors or institutions in developing countries. Neither preferential trade nor financial assistance seems to enhance the growth performance of these countries if they lack political transparency and accountability.

This paper provides empirical evidence that the change in the EU's approach to its economic partnership with the ACP countries is warranted. Because the empirical results suggest that the pre‐Cotonou economic cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries did not contribute to the ACP countries' economic growth, the EU's decision of shifting the focus from trade preferences to governance‐related issues in the ACP countries can be viewed as justified.

We have used the Michigan computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of World Production and Trade to calculate the aggregate welfare and sectoral employment effects of the menu of U.S.–Japan trade policies. The menu of policies encompasses the various preferential U.S. and Japan bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated and in process, unilateral removal of existing trade barriers by the two countries, and global (multilateral) free trade. The U.S. preferential agreements include the FTAs approved by the U.S. Congress with Chile and Singapore in 2003, those signed with Central America, Australia, and Morocco and awaiting Congressional approval in 2004, and prospective FTAs with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Thailand, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The Japanese preferential agreements include the bilateral FTA with Singapore signed in 2002 and prospective FTAs with Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, and Thailand. The welfare impacts of the FTAs on the United States and Japan are shown to be rather small in absolute and relative terms. The sectoral employment effects are also generally small in the United States and Japan, but vary across the individual sectors depending on the patterns of the bilateral liberalization. The welfare effects on the FTA partner countries are mostly positive though generally small, but there are some indications of potentially disruptive employment shifts in some partner countries. There are indications of trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on nonmember countries for some of the FTAs analyzed. Data limitations precluded analysis of the welfare effects of the different FTA rules of origin and other discriminatory arrangements.

In comparison with the welfare gains from the U.S. and Japan bilateral FTAs, the gains from both unilateral trade liberalization by the United States, Japan, and the FTA partners and global (multilateral) free trade are shown to be rather substantial and more uniformly positive for all countries in the global trading system. The U.S. and Japan FTAs are based on “hub” and “spoke” arrangements. We show that the spokes emanate out in different and often overlapping directions, suggesting that the complex of bilateral FTAs may create distortions of the global trading system.