Search results

The purpose of the present study is to discuss the combined effect of predation risk and firms' market power on cash holdings.

The authors tested hypotheses by using consolidated financial data in Japanese firms.

The authors find that firms' cash holdings increase with a rise in predation risk faced by firms. However, the higher the firm's market power, the weaker the above interplay becomes. Moreover, the authors find that even when firms' investments are decreased at the industry level, firms with larger cash holdings seek to mitigate predation risk by funding strategic investments with the potential to steal rivals' market share.

The authors recognize the importance of a firm's market power. Take a firm's market power into consideration to analyze the mechanism of a firm's cash holdings, there is a possibility that the mechanism of a firm's cash holdings as presented by the previous studies will be changed.

This chapter develops a growth model of a country under a Hobbesian environment with international conflicts in which national defense is the only way to prevent external predation. The long run growth path is determined by the equilibrium of a dynamic game with three players: the external predator, the government, and the family. The equilibrium growth path has three phases: submissive equilibrium, tolerant equilibrium, and full-protected equilibrium. Different defense strategies result in different growth prospects, and sustainable growth will endogenously induce adjustment of defense strategies.

In this paper, we propose that the “powerful and privileged” sustain their way of life through greed and they sustain the lives of others through trickledown sharing. Greed provides the powerful and privileged a buffer against famine. Trickledown sharing provides them a buffer against predation or war. The inspiration for this integration of greed and trickledown sharing as self-preservation strategies is a multi-selection model called skew selection. According to skew selection, when perennial organisms are subjected to cycles of famine and predation, greed and trickledown sharing increases the organism’s survival relative to a greed-only strategy. Skew selection is extended to explain greed and trickledown sharing among humans through the introduction of mogul games. The results of mogul games reported herein suggest that inequality is an emergent property of self-organizing systems and potentially an essential precursor to the evolution of social behavior. In the future, it is our hope that mogul game simulations will be employed by others to explore the effect of variation in cycles of predation and resource abundance on the rules of greed (resource acquisition) and trickledown sharing (resources redistribution).

The stereotypes of the dodgy businessman and businessman gangster are established typologies in both the criminology and family business literature, but nevertheless, there is still an evident dearth of substantive studies on the topic. Family business scholars have begun to acknowledge the limited nature of such explorations of criminality in family firm businesses. The purpose of this article is therefore to review, synthesise and solidify existing research on this under-researched area of family business management.

This perspective article explores and synthesises the links between acquisitive crime, criminal predation and family business to address an identifiable research gap in the literature of criminology, entrepreneurship and family business. It examines the overlap between criminal activities and business practices, shedding light on how individuals in the family business community may become involved in criminal activities due to various factors, including coercion, addiction and financial gain.

This perspective highlights emerging research trends that have the potential to increase the knowledge about the “dark side” of family business.

Being a perspective paper this brief exploration of the literature can only cover a small cross section of the literature. A conceptual model emerges, which illustrates shared aspects of crimino-entrepreneurial identity between authentic entrepreneurs and criminals.

This perspective article scopes the extant literature covering the links between acquisitive crime, criminal predation and family business to help guide the direction of future research. The piece presents new perspectives on the intersection of acquisitive crime and family business, and its novelty lies in its synthesis of the disparate elements from the diverse literature to contribute to the said literature.

The diet of spotted hyenas (Curocuta curocuta) was studied in Endrta Woreda, southern Tigray, Ethiopia from September to December 2009. Hyena scats were collected throughout the study period from all areas and the samples were washed and hairs were extracted. Hair was analyzed on form, length and color with the naked eye as well as on a scale patterns using a microscope at 10 x magnifications and was compared with a prey species hair reference collection. Faecal analysis revealed that the diet of the spotted hyena contains only prey item of domestic livestock. Frequencies of prey remains of donkey, sheep, goat and cattle were highest with sheep being by far the most common prey species. Household survey of livestock depredation of spotted hyenas revealed that a total of 364 spotted hyena attacks were reported of which donkeys were significantly more likely to be reported as lost to hyena predation, representing 31.87 per cent, followed by goats (14.56 per cent) and sheep (10.71 per cent). It seems most likely that carnivores deepened entirely on domestic prey species for their dietary requirements. Detailed information on the population size and density of spotted hyena is needed to give a better picture of the status of this carnivore species in Tigray, northern Ethiopia and to help resolve conflicts with livestock. Further investigations into the seasonal variation of predation are recommended

The purpose of this paper is to look at human interdependence and its significance in project management.

The paper focuses solely on human interaction in the context of a short-term project consisting of preparing a small “international” fair in Gatineau, Québec (Canada). For this purpose, an established questionnaire was used which aimed to evaluate the predator-prey dynamic between team members (as described by Mesly in a recent paper).

Human interdependence indeed plays a key role in the functioning of short-lived projects (and, this paper assumes, of long-term projects as well).

The paper places emphasis on considering the human power-game factor (predator-prey) more strongly in future project endeavors.

The publication of the Coalition Government's NHS White Paper seems to be proposing a revitalised relationship between adult social care and the NHS. This article explores these proposals and concludes that, although they hold promise, they may be insufficiently robust to overcome the priority the White Paper gives to competition rather than collaboration. It is suggested that social care is in danger of becoming a handmaiden to health care in an increasingly privatised market that could move towards an insurance‐based model of funding.

This chapter proposes three different definitions for the market power in the antitrust case, such as dynamic monopoly power, static monopoly power and market power.

The chapter presents simple economic models to analyse which definition of the three market powers is consistent with predatory pricing or tying.

The prerequisite market power is simply market power in the predatory pricing case or static monopoly power in the tying case.

Dynamic monopoly power defined as the market power from an antitrust perspective by the Antitrust Modernization Commission should not be the prerequisite market power in the case of the abuse of dominance or the violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

A possession of substantial market power or monopoly power is typically understood as a prerequisite in abuse of dominance in Korea and EU or violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the United States. However, the antitrust law does not clearly indicate the meaning of market power or monopoly power. This chapter proposes three different definitions for the market power in the antitrust case and analyses which definition of the three market powers is consistent with predatory pricing or tying.

The lens used by the courts and much of the antitrust literature on predatory selling and/or buying is based on partial equilibrium methodology. We demonstrate that such methodology is unreliable for assessments of predatory monopoly or monopsony conduct. In contrast to the typical two-stage dynamic analysis involving a predation period followed by a recoupment period, we advance a general equilibrium analysis that demonstrates the critical role of related industries and markets. Substitutability versus complementarity of both inputs and outputs is critical. With either monopolistic or monopsonistic market power (but not both), neither predatory overselling nor predatory overbuying is profitably sustainable. Two-stage predation/recoupment is profitable only with irreversibility in production and cost functions, unlike typical estimated forms from the production economic literature. However, when the market structure admits both monopolistic and monopsonistic behavior, predatory overbuying can be profitably sustainable while overselling cannot. Useful distinctions are drawn between contract versus non-contract markets for input markets.