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This paper forms an e-commerce supply chain that include a manufacturer providing products and an online platform providing service. The reselling platform mode and the agent platform mode are considered through an exploration of the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), vertical Nash (VN), platform Stackelberg (PS) power structures. The purpose of this paper is to explore the pricing and platform service decisions under different platform selling modes and channel power structures.

Based on the game theory models, this paper investigates the interaction between the manufacturer and the online platform under four different scenarios. The optimal solutions of four models are provided. Through comparison analyses, this paper evaluates the impacts of platform selling mode and channel power structure on the pricing and platform service decisions and the members’ profits.

The manufacturer prefers the MS power structure in any platform mode. The online platform prefers the PS (MS) power structure under a low (high) service cost efficiency in the reselling platform mode, while prefers the PS and VN power structures in the agent platform mode. Moreover, the manufacturer prefers the agent (reselling) platform mode under a low (high) service cost efficiency in any power structure. The online platform prefers the reselling platform mode in the MS and PS power structures, while prefers the reselling (agent) platform mode under a low (high) service cost efficiency in the VN power structures.

The analysis result provides important managerial implications that help the supply chain members develop a better understanding of the selection of the platform selling mode and the effect of the channel power structure in the presence of platform service.

This paper aims to study the preferences of the supply chain (SC) members on various power structures under demand information asymmetry considering competing retailers.

A two-level SC with one manufacturer and two retailers is designed. The retailers are in Bertrand competition. The manufacturer who holds the confidential demand information chooses the appropriate information sharing (IS) format. Three IS formats are provided, i.e. no IS (the manufacturer never shares with the retailers), partial IS (the manufacturer shares with one retailer), full IS (the manufacturer shares with all retailers). In addition, the authors model two power structures based on the decision sequences in the SC, i.e. retailers or manufacturer-dominant SC. The authors characterize the equilibrium solutions and payoffs and then investigate the members’ preferences for IS formats.

It is shown that in retailers (manufacturer)-dominant SC, the retailers prefer full (no) IS, but the manufacturer prefers no (full) IS. Moreover, the authors analyze the members’ preferences on power structures under demand information asymmetry, which has a relationship with the degrees of demand uncertainty and competition intensity.

The analysis regarding the preferences of the SC members on power structure under demand information asymmetry provides valuable managerial insights to enhance cooperation and achieve a win-win result.

This paper considers carbon abatement in a competitive supply chain that is composed of a manufacturer and two retailers under vertical shareholding. The authors emphasize the equilibrium decision problem of stakeholders under vertical shareholding and different power structures.

A game-theoretic approach was used to probe the influence of power structure and retailer competition on manufacturers' carbon abatement under vertical shareholding. The carbon abatement decisions, environmental imp4cacts (EIs) and social welfare (SW) of different scenarios under vertical shareholding are obtained.

The findings show that manufacturers are preferable to carbon abatement and capture optimal profits when shareholding is above a threshold under the retailer power equilibrium, but they may exert a worse negative impact on the environment. The dominant position of the held retailer is not always favorable to capturing the optimal SW and mitigating EIs. In addition, under the combined effect of competition level and shareholding, retailer power equilibrium scenarios are more favorable to improving SW and reducing EIs.

This paper inspects the combined influence of retailer competition and power structure on manufacturers' carbon abatement. Distinguishing from previous literature, the authors also consider the impact of vertical shareholding and consumer preferences. In addition, the authors analyze the SW and EIs in different scenarios.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the pricing decisions and earning potential of the software supplier and the smart device manufacturer in different software promotion strategies.

Based on game theory, the authors formulate two promotion models, that is, the supplier implements software promotion activities individually (SP model) or outsources the promotion activity to the manufacturer under profit-sharing contract (MP model) when taking different channel power structures into consideration. Besides, in order to test the robustness of the conclusions, the authors also extend the basic model to the following situations: (1) the customers have different price elasticity toward service fee and product price; (2) the revenue sharing contract is employed by the supply chain members; and (3) the manufacturer's product promotion practice is taken into consideration.

The optimal service fee (product price) of the supplier (manufacturer) under SP model is always lower (higher) than that under MP model. Surprisingly, if the supplier is the channel leader and the profit sharing ratio exceeds certain threshold, the manufacturer's profit decreases in profit sharing ratio, which remains robust in three extension models. Moreover, the supply chain's profit in supplier-led game is always lower than that in Nash game irrespective of the promotion strategy in profit sharing context. When revenue sharing contract is adopted, the result holds only when the revenue sharing ratio is relatively low.

The authors originally explore two promotion strategies of the software supplier when taking the channel power structures into considerations, which has not been explored in the literature to the best of the authors' knowledge.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the affective and cognitive dimensions of satisfaction that impact the buyer-supplier relationship (BSR) from the supplier's perspective and to consider satisfaction within the context of power-dependency theory.

Qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted with 20 Chinese apparel supply professionals who regularly interact with apparel buyers. Audio or video interviews were conducted via WeChat (the most popular social media platform in China).

A thematic analysis of the interview data revealed that both affective and cognitive dimensions of satisfaction impact the BSR. A model of supplier affective and cognitive satisfaction in a collaborative BSR was developed to illustrate the connections between the two dimensions.

Due to intense competition in the market, supplier satisfaction is essential for building relationships in the apparel industry. Existing studies have focused on satisfaction from the perspective of the buyer rather than the supplier because in a BSR, the buyer tends to hold more power. Moreover, research has primarily considered cognitive evaluations of satisfaction with the BSR. This study offers new insight on both cognitive and affective satisfaction from the perspective of suppliers within the context of power-dependency theory.

The purpose of the study is to examine the relation between board structure and firm performance variability in an international setting. The authors further explore the effect of national culture in shaping such relations.

The authors’ international sample contains 4,911 firms across 49 countries over the 2002–2017 period. The authors use national culture values on individualism and power distance developed by Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2011). The authors focus on within-firm, over-time variability of firm performance and estimate multivariate linear regressions with fixed effects. The authors address the endogeneity concern using the instrumental variable approach, and the authors’ results are robust to alternative measures of variables and different subsamples.

The authors find that firms with larger board size, greater board independence and less powerful CEOs have less variable performance. Individualism has a magnifying effect while power distance has a mitigating effect in shaping such relations.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the first to answer the call of Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) for research on corporate boards in an international setting. It is also one of the few studies which examine the variability of firm performance, while the majority of existing literature focuses on the level of firm performance. Most importantly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the role of national culture in shaping boardroom interactions that affect the decision-making process of corporate boards, which, in turn, affects firm performance variability.

This study aims to explore how managers exercise agency in strategic investment decisions (SIDs) by drawing on their knowledgeability of the strategic context. Specifically, the authors address the role of position–practice relations and irresistible causal forces in this conduct.

The authors examine SID-making (SIDM) practices in four case organisations operating in highly competitive markets, conducting interviews with managers at various levels and analysing company documents. Drawing on strong structuration theory, the authors show how managerial decision makers draw upon their knowledge of organisational context when exercising agency in SIDs.

The authors provide insights into how SIDM behaviour, specifically agents’ conduct, is shaped by a combination of position–practice relations and the agents’ comprehension of their organisation’s context.

The authors extend the SIDM literature by surfacing the issue of how actors’ conjuncturally-specific knowledge of external structures shapes the general dispositions they draw on in exercising agency in practice.

The authors extend the SIDM literature by surfacing the issue of how actors’ conjuncturally-specific knowledge of external structures shapes the general dispositions they draw on in exercising agency in practice. Particularly, the authors contribute to this literature by identifying irresistible causal forces and illuminating why actors might not resist in SIDM processes, despite having the potential to do so.

This research aims to develop a blockchain smart contract–enabled framework to resolve power imbalance problems in construction payment.

This research adopts a design science research method to develop the blockchain smart contract–enabled framework. The authors then develop a prototype system. Finally, the authors evaluate its performance in solving power imbalance-induced payment problems.

The results show that the prototype system can resolve power imbalance problems in construction payment by allowing project participants to make transparent and decentralized decisions that are self-enforceable by blockchain smart contracts.

This study provides theoretical explanations for how blockchain smart contracts can resolve power imbalances in construction payment; based on that, it proposes a novel blockchain smart contract–enabled method to rebalance the power of stakeholders in construction payment. Thus, it contributes to the body of knowledge on blockchain technology and construction payment.

This study moves beyond a conceptual framework and develops a practical blockchain smart contract system for resolving power imbalances in construction payment, strengthening construction project members' confidence in using blockchain technology.

The proposed blockchain smart contract–enabled solution helps mitigate negative social impacts associated with late payment and non-payment. Furthermore, the research maximizes trust among participants in payment processes to inspire collaborative culture in the construction industry.

This paper introduces a novel blockchain smart contract integrated method, allowing project stakeholders to resolve power imbalance problems in construction payment through decentralized decision-making.