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This chapter proposes a sociological reconstruction of the emergence of citizenship as a source of legitimacy for political institutions, and it focuses on examining the historical processes that first gave rise to this concept. It explains how citizenship has its origins in the transformation of feudal law, a process that culminated in patterns of military organization that characterized the rise of the early modern state in Europe. On this basis, it describes how the growth of constitutional democracy was integrally marked by the militarization of society and explains that military pressures have remained palpable in constitutional constructions of citizenship. In particular, it argues that, through the early growth of democracy, national citizenship practices were closely linked to global conflicts, and they tended to replicate such conflicts in national contexts. It concludes by showing how more recent processes of constitutional norm formation, based largely in international human rights law, have acted to soften the military dimensions of citizenship.

What has happened, after 50 years of persistent (deepening, expanding) European integration, to the domestic politics of the nation states involved in this increasingly dense institutional net (whatever its ambiguous nature, inter-governmental or supra-national or both at the same time) is a question of growing importance. This environment, within which the politics of European nation states takes place, has undoubtedly gained a growing importance in itself and a stronger relevance for crucial aspects of domestic political life. More precisely, it must be asked what has been altered in the traditional “setting” within which domestic politics used to develop, how domestic political actors bring into their political calculations the new conditions and how they are affected by them.

Recent scholarship in neo-evolutionary sociology has rejected stage-models in favor of multilinear theories that shift the study of sociocultural change away from teleological arguments toward those that emphasize selection pressures and macrodynamics. The paper below adopts a neo-evolutionary frame to revisit one of the most epochal moments in human sociocultural evolution, the urban revolution (about 5,000 years ago in Mesopotamia, China, Egypt, and perhaps the Indus Valley) and the rise of the first political units. Shifting the analysis from conventional perspectives, this paper asks the question why the polity was the first autonomous institution besides kinship and what consequences did this have on the trajectory of the human societies, and more generally, human sociocultural evolution. By doing so, a slightly different historiography is presented in which institutional autonomy corresponds not with stages, but rather an historical “phasing” that emphasizes the role that institutional entrepreneurs have played in driving institutional evolution via structural opportunities and historical contingencies.

A number of commentators have noted significant changes in the American polity over the last half century. More interest groups with more issues are active in the polity now (Dahl, 1994). There is more ideological polarization among political elites (DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson, 1996, 2004). Participation in voluntary associations has declined among the post 1945 generations, weakening civil society (Putnam, 2000). The new organizations in the polity are more hierarchical in structure, unlike the older voluntary associations that were built on lateral ties (Skocpol, 1996, 1999). Rising education levels have produced lower voter participation rates (Brody, 1978; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Berry, 1996). Finally, a number of observers have noted that public opinion, constructed in part by extensive polling, has become a significant force in the polity and this has helped fuel the rise of a media centered politics (Herbst, 1993; Schudson, 1991). This is not an exhaustive list of changes that observers have noted, but it is enough to suggest that the older Tocquevillian polity and the civic culture of the U.S., portrayed so effectively by Almond and Verba (1963), have been transformed in significant ways.

This paper aims to identify between polity similarities and differences of “brand‐personality traits” projected by corporate‐slogans of corporations operating in Greater China (CGCs) to see if Greater China is a cultural unit, and to examine CGC bilingual corporate‐slogans to see if patterns are in evidence and if certain ways of crafting the slogans are more effective.

Corporate‐slogans are collected from web sites of major CGCs. The sample is analysed using Aaker's Brand Personality Scale and relevant rhetorical concepts.

The sample shares more commonalities than differences, suggesting Great China is a cultural unit; and the majority of the slogans are crafted by direct translation and parallel drafting, and the latter is deemed more effective.

This is a heuristic and hypothesis‐generating study and is entirely based on linguistic data. Studies with an empirical design are required to see if the findings have psychological validity.

If Greater China is a cultural unit, it should have bearing on corporate‐communication professionals in CGCs in terms of the adoption of corporate‐slogans, corporate names and artefacts related to corporate identity and image.

Hitherto studies of corporate‐slogans are mostly based on corporations operating in the West. This is the first study of CGC corporate‐slogans that cover four polities that succeeds in identifying patterns in methods of bilingual corporate‐slogan crafting and in “brand‐personality traits” projected by these slogans. The latter indicates that CGCs are operating not simply in a region, but in a cultural region.

In recent times there have been attempts by well known economists towards integrating the questions of ethics and values in the body framework of economic theory. Yet their pursuits have remained subservient to one or the other of received economic doctrines. This has proven to be a drawback in the development of an independent inquiry into the possibility of treating the problem of ethical integration as an endogenous phenomen of the system. The idea of ethical endogeneity here means, that society is not merely a reflection of the social policies undertaken by the collective of members of a democratic and decentralized polity. It must also reflect multiple rounds of social transformation realized by the impact of the reverse relation of the ecological environment on the polity itself. Contrary to this concept, the view on ethics and values in the social system presented by the contemporary school of economists and philosophers has the essence of exogeneity. That means ethics and values are made to impact upon the economy but from outside the system. In the system itself they become irrelevant. Vickrey has the following words on the treatment of values by economists in the area of normative economics: “But it is only recently that economists have begun to probe into the systems of values that underlie their discussions, and indeed in many cases the judgements are implicit, rather than explicitly stated.”

The concept of internal control is just as relevant to churches as it is to profit seeking organizations. Inadequate internal controls can hinder the management responsibilities of church officers and employees and place them in a position where they may be tempted to engage in questionable activities and accounting practices, or could subject individuals to unwarranted accusations of such activities. This study was designed to evaluate the effects of church size as well as the polity and hierarchical structure of denominations on systems of internal control. A questionnaire was used to collect data regarding internal controls currently in place in churches. The internal control evaluation scores were found to be significantly different based on church size. Three major denominations with different types of church polity and differing hierarchical structures were included in the study. The internal control evaluation scores were found to be significantly different based on denomination. This suggests that the polity and hierarchical structure of a denomination affect the quality of a local church’s system of internal control.

Entangled Political Economy, the idea that the economy and the polity are a nexus of interrelations often with unplanned outcomes, is close to the concept of economics that Adam Smith presents, a concept which was not shaped by strict discipline barriers. I show that Adam Smith analyzes the nature and causes of the wealth of nations by analyzing the interaction of the economy with politics, ethics, and the law. In particular, Smith presents each of these systems as a network of relations with all the other systems: the economy is entangled not just with the polity, but also with other systems of behavior such as the law and morality. Adam Smith may help expand the horizons of the entangled political economy analysis and the explanatory powers of economics.

This paper explores the interface between institutional theory and Austrian theory. We examine mainstream institutionalism as exemplified by D. C. North in his work with Wallis and Weingast on the elite compact theory of social order and of transitions to impersonal rights, and propose instead an Austrian process-oriented perspective. We argue that mainstream institutionalism does not fully account for the efficiency of impersonal rules. Their efficiency can be better explained by a market for rules, which in turn requires a stable plurality of governance providers. Since an equilibrium of plural providers requires stable power polycentricity, the implication goes against consolidating organized means for violence as a doorstep condition to successful transitions. The paper demonstrates how to employ Ostroms’ Bloomington School Institutionalism to shift, convert, and recalibrate mainstream institutionalism's themes into an Austrian process-oriented theory.

Post-conflict economies are characterized by high, and often growing, levels of debt. At the same time, peace is particularly fragile in the aftermath of a conflict. This chapter studies how debt affects the risk of war in the 10 years that follow the end of a previous conflict. After controlling for per-capita income and other economic, political, and geographical factors, external debt is found to increase the risk of war. Conversely, the effect of domestic debt is negligible. The policy implication for the international community is clear: debt relief helps stabilize peace in war-torn economies.