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Given the growing interest in social movements as policy agenda setters, this paper investigates the contexts within which movement groups and actors work with political elites to promote their common goals for policy change. In asking how and why so-called outsiders gain access to elites and to the policymaking process, I address several contemporary theoretical and empirical concerns associated with policy change as a social movement goal. I examine the claim that movements use a multipronged, long-term strategy by working with and targeting policymakers and political institutions on the one hand, while shaping public preferences – hearts and minds – on the other; that these efforts are not mutually exclusive. In addition, I look at how social movement organizations and actors are critical in expanding issue conflict outside narrow policy networks, often encouraged to do so by political elites with similar policy objectives. And, I discuss actors’ mobility in transitioning from institutional activists to movement and organizational leaders, and even to protesters, and vice versa. The interchangeability of roles among actors promoting social change in strategic action fields points to the porous and fluid boundaries between state and nonstate actors and organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse how elite politicians in opposition in the Norwegian parliament use information when responding to government propositions and investigate if Chatman’s small world conception can explain the socially and economically highly privileged groups’ approach to information.

The qualitative analysis of the data consisting of eight interviews with seven members of parliament (MPs) and one political advisor is based on a selective coding grounded to Chatman’s six propositions on life in the round.

The overall findings indicate that elite politicians’ information practices concentrate in mastering the flow of information and admitting attention selectively, but on broad topics. Whereas MPs information practices within an intentional approach (i.e. to be used in political responses and debates) aligned with the small world idea, the nebulous approach (i.e. keeping updated on societal issues) breaks the boundaries of their “small worlds”.

The study provides a glimpse into information practises of a little studied group, elite politicians. Moreover, it applies Chatman’s conception of small world in a novel manner.

Discussion about the actual nature of political action is unusual in the literature about the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Examines the treatment of politics in the US standard setting context and this analysis results in the conclusion that despite widespread recognition that standard setting is political, what this means is greatly underappreciated. Moving knowledge about financial accounting policy towards a more adequate realization of its political nature is furthered by a discussion of the roles of power, ideology and rhetoric.

To stimulate debates about the creation of corporate governance mechanisms and processes which would help to secure an equitable distribution of income and wealth for workers.

The paper builds on a political economy of income and wealth inequalities. It argues that corporate governance mechanisms and processes are rooted in particular politics and histories. The state is a key actor. It provides a brief history of the UK corporate governance debates relating to income distribution, industrial democracy and disclosures. It provides social data about the extent of income inequalities.

The paper shows that the UK lacks institutional structures and processes and mechanisms to enable workers to secure a higher share of the firm's income.

The study primarily focuses on some aspects of the corporate governance structures, practices and income/wealth inequalities in the UK. Its implications could also be relevant to market‐oriented liberal states with “consensus” or “majoritarian” electoral systems.

To encourage debates, the paper puts forward a number of suggestions for changing electoral and corporate governance practices together with disclosures that could give visibility to income and wealth inequalities.

The paper links corporate governance debates to broader political choices.

Interpersonal trust between supervisors and subordinates plays an important role in management. The impact of trust from management is through employees’ perception and more specifically their perception of being trusted, termed feeling trusted or felt trust. Politics is associated with the level of trust of organizational members. So far, little is known how employees respond to feeling trusted with regard to political behaviour resulting in employee outcomes. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

The paper develops a conceptual model to examine the double-edged sword effect of political behaviour on employee outcomes.

The authors designed a two-wave survey to test the model. The analysis of 286 supervisor–employee dyads found that feeling trusted is associated with supervisor-rated organization citizenship behaviour (OCB) and overload reported by employees. Furthermore, political behaviour partially mediates the relationship between feeling trusted and supervisor-rated OCB, which may be desired by both the supervisors and employees. It also mediates the relationship between feeling trusted and employee perceived overload, which is undesired by employees.

The current research aims to fill in the gap and answer this question: what is the role of political behaviour in the relationship between feeling trusted and employee outcomes? Guided by an “antecedents–behaviours–consequences” framework (Ferris et al., 1989), the paper develops a conceptual model to examine how feeling trusted directly and indirectly influences employee outcomes, with the latter being mediated by political behaviour.

The paper applies two core theoretical frameworks of budgetary change-incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium theory-to a new database of Hungarian final accounts data for the period 1991 through 2013. Based on our analysis trends in Hungarian budgeting are in line with available comparative evidence suggesting that yearly changes of budget outlays in policy domains are best characterized by a punctuated equilibrium model. The most significant variable in predicting whether an observation would fall into the equilibrium or punctuated group was the share of the given policy domain of total outlays. However, alternative explanatory variables, such as the electoral cycle, the fiscal cycle and the business cycle had no effect on the results.