Corporate governance: what about the workers?

Abstract

Purpose

To stimulate debates about the creation of corporate governance mechanisms and processes which would help to secure an equitable distribution of income and wealth for workers.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper builds on a political economy of income and wealth inequalities. It argues that corporate governance mechanisms and processes are rooted in particular politics and histories. The state is a key actor. It provides a brief history of the UK corporate governance debates relating to income distribution, industrial democracy and disclosures. It provides social data about the extent of income inequalities.

Findings

The paper shows that the UK lacks institutional structures and processes and mechanisms to enable workers to secure a higher share of the firm's income.

Research limitations/implications

The study primarily focuses on some aspects of the corporate governance structures, practices and income/wealth inequalities in the UK. Its implications could also be relevant to market‐oriented liberal states with “consensus” or “majoritarian” electoral systems.

Practical implications

To encourage debates, the paper puts forward a number of suggestions for changing electoral and corporate governance practices together with disclosures that could give visibility to income and wealth inequalities.

Originality/value

The paper links corporate governance debates to broader political choices.

Citation

Sikka, P. (2008), "Corporate governance: what about the workers?", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 21 No. 7, pp. 955-977. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513570810907438