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This study develops an empirical framework to address how large third-party sellers (TPSs) can apply customer acquisition strategies to improve their performance in consumers’ person-goods matching process and how the platform firm’s similar strategies moderate the effects of TPSs’ strategies.

Using data collected from the top ten TPSs from a Chinese e-commerce platform, the fixed effect model is used to validate the conceptual model and hypotheses.

The study results show that both market detection strategy and matching optimization strategy can help large TPSs improve their sales performance. Moreover, the similar market detection strategy applied by the platform firm weakens the effect of large TPSs’ customer acquisition strategies, while the similar matching optimization strategy applied by the platform firm strengthens the effect of large TPSs’ customer acquisition strategies.

This study provides firsthand evidence on the performance of large TPSs’ and the platform firm’s strategies. It demonstrates the effectiveness of large TPSs’ market detection strategy and matching optimization strategy, which can be adopted to meet consumers’ search and evaluation motivations in their person-goods matching process respectively. Moreover, it identifies the role of platform firms by showing the moderating effect of similar strategies adopted by the platform firm on the effect of large TPSs’ customer acquisition strategies.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the pricing strategies for knowledge payment products, taking into account the quality level of pirated knowledge products, in the context of platform copyright supervision.

This study abstracts the knowledge payment transaction process and aims to maximize producer's revenue by constructing a pricing model for knowledge payment products. It discusses pricing strategies for knowledge payment products under two scenarios: traditional supervision and blockchain supervision. The analysis explores the impact of pirated knowledge products quality level and blockchain technology on pricing strategies and consumer surplus, while providing threshold conditions for effective strategies.

Deploying blockchain technology in platform operations can significantly reduce costs and increase efficiency. In both scenarios, knowledge producer needs to balance factors such as the quality of pirated knowledge products, the supervision level of platform, and consumer surplus to dynamically adjust pricing strategies in order to maximize his own revenue.

This study enriches the literature on the pricing models of knowledge payment products and has practical significance in guiding knowledge producer to develop effective pricing strategies under copyright supervision.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

Although green logistics has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises under environmental constraints, how local governments formulate subsidy policies to effectively guide the green transformation of regional logistics and how to facilitate the reasonable cost-sharing are rather critical. This paper will deeply explore the dynamic process of the tripartite participation (government, platform, and logistics enterprises) in the selection of regional green logistics strategy, and reveal the evolutionary game relationship of the three parties.

To explore the dynamics involving the government, platform and logistics enterprises for the green logistic transformation, and reveal the evolutionary gaming among the three parties, based on the bounded rationality premise, this study constructs the tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game models, uses the stability theorem of differential equation to explore the evolution and stability strategy of the system in different cases and explicates the paths of influence on the tripartite behaviors via simulations.

Results of this study indicate that there exist stable equilibrium strategies among the three parties regarding the regional green logistics, and they are affected by different factors. The government's subsidy, subsidy intensity and the platform's cost-sharing proportion can generate positive effects, but the latter two can also impact negatively beyond the effective ranges. The findings provide a theoretical basis for local governments, platforms and logistics enterprises to formulate justifiable subsidy intensity and determine reasonable sharing proportion.

Firstly, considering the significant relevance of local government, it is included in the evolution model, and the tripartite game (among government, platform and enterprises) is explored; Secondly, by comparing the equilibrium results under different game conditions, this paper analyzes the evolution of each party's game strategy to achieve the optimal return under bounded rationality and the important factors determining the strategic selection; Finally, the key factor of platform cost sharing is involved, and to what extent the change of platform cost sharing ratio will influence the systematic stability is explored.

Platform ecosystem governance is a decisive issue for orchestrators, as the motivation and behaviors of the complementors in an ecosystem can be distinctly different, shaped by the specific arrangements they have within the ecosystem. However, knowledge about adaptation in the governance of platform ecosystems is quite limited. First, the authors hardly know which obstacles are arising for orchestrators due to typical governance settings and their consequences. Second, the authors know less about governance strategies by orchestrators that help deal with these obstacles.

The authors follow an inductive, multistep case-study-based approach with multiple cases using guidelines proposed by Yin (2018). Based on predefined criteria, the authors selected 41 platform ecosystems with a “hub and spoke” system within and across several industries and collected a wide range of data. The authors conducted 14 interviews with executives of these platform ecosystems to gain further insights, transcribed and/or summarized all interviews, and analyzed the data.

Based on the dataset, the authors identify four significant obstacles and ten strategies of orchestrators in platform ecosystems. This approach allows us to gain insight into innovative approaches orchestrators conduct to cope with these challenges.

The authors already have a broad range of studies on ecosystem governance in the literature. However, research dealing with the dynamics of governance regimes is quite rare. The study examines how orchestrators of platform ecosystems react to emerging obstacles they are confronted with during the evolution of their platform ecosystems. Partly, these strategies might be expected, but mostly they show innovative approaches for handling these obstacles that have not been reported in research so far.

In recent years, private brands for e-commerce platforms have experienced rapid growth. However, whether these platforms developing private brands should share their demand information with others and how such information sharing affects the sales format selection of national brand manufacturers have puzzled firm managers in practice. This paper aims to investigate the information-sharing strategy for the e-commerce platform and its influence on the sales format selection in the presence of the private brand.

The authors use a game-theoretical model to examine the interaction between the information-sharing strategy and sales format selection in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a platform that operates a private brand.

The equilibrium results show that when the commission rate is low, the manufacturer favors agency selling, and the platform shares demand information with the manufacturer; when the commission rate is high, the manufacturer prefers reselling, and the platform does not share the information. This preference is affected by information forecasting accuracy; as the information forecasting accuracy increases, the manufacturer prefers to adopt agency selling, and the platform tends to share the information. Interestingly, under agency selling, sharing information with the manufacturer can increase the platform’s profit from selling the private brand and achieve a win-win situation for them. Furthermore, we show that the manufacturer can inspire the platform to share the information with himself by adopting agency selling, whereas the platform sharing the information improves the probability that the manufacturer adopts agency selling. Moreover, the manufacturer may have a first-mover advantage. In particular, the manufacturer moving first increases the likelihood that the manufacturer chooses agency selling and the platform shares the information.

This paper contributes to sales format literature by exploring the effect of information sharing strategy on sales format selection in the presence of the private brand and can help manufacturers and platforms to make suitable decisions regarding information sharing and sales format selection.

This study aims to focus on a key unanswered question about how digitalization and the knowledge processes it enables affect firms’ strategies in the international arena.

The authors conduct a systematic literature review of relevant theoretical and empirical studies covering over 20 years of research (from 2000 to 2023) and including 73 journal papers.

This review allows us to highlight a relationship between firms’ international strategies and the knowledge processes enabled by applying digital technologies. Specifically, the authors discuss the characteristics of patterns of knowledge flows and knowledge processes (their origin, the type of knowledge they carry on and their directionality) as determinants for the emergence of diverse international strategies embraced by single firms or by populations of firms within ecosystems, networks, global value chains or alliances.

Despite digital technologies constituting important antecedents and critical factors for the internationalization process, and international businesses in general, and operating cross borders implies the enactment of highly knowledge-intensive processes, current literature still fails to provide a holistic picture of how firms strategically use what they know and seek out what they do not know in the international environment, using the affordances of digital technologies.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal competition or cooperation decision between technology service platforms and governments in the context of fierce competition within urban agglomerations.

Based on the cooperation and competition game model, this study builds a two-level model for government and technology service platforms considering three cases: perfect competition, platform cooperation and government-led cooperation.

By analyzing the optimal strategies of the government and a platform in three cases, the research shows that choosing appropriate cooperation in a competitive situation is beneficial to both the government and the platform. Government-led cooperation is conducive to increasing social welfare. From the perspective of the platforms, if they actively seek cooperation, they can obtain higher subsidies and profits. The more intense the competition is, the higher the profits and social welfare generated from the platforms' active cooperation.

The contribution of this study relates to the development of technology service platforms in urban agglomerations. As local governments and platforms continuously undertake decision-making processes, this study constructs quantitative models to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of competition and cooperation. It is worth noting that relying on government subsidies to maintain the sustainable development of technology service platforms is not a long-term solution. Government subsidies play a vital role in the initial development of technology service platforms. The analysis results are in line with Guo et al. (2016), Jung and Feng (2020) and Li (2021) conclusions. Furthermore, long-term government subsidies will make platforms dependent on these subsidies. These are the contributions to the scientific literature.

Instead of focusing on vertical relationships, this study emphasizes the horizontal cooperation and competition relationship between platforms and local governments in an urban agglomeration. Thus, the vertical effects of government subsidies on platforms can be investigated. Another innovation is the social welfare policy goal, which is an important index for the development of urban agglomerations.

We explore the driving forces behind the channel choices of the manufacturer and the platform by considering asymmetric selling cost and demand information.

This paper develops game-theoretical models to study different channel strategies for an E-commerce supply chain, in which a manufacturer distributes products through a platform that may operate in either the marketplace channel or the reseller channel.

Three primary models are built and analyzed. The comparison results show that the platform would share demand information in the reseller channel only if the service cost performance is relatively high. Besides, with an increasing selling cost, the equilibrium channel might shift from the marketplace to the reseller. With increasing information accuracy, the manufacturer tends to select the marketplace channel, while the platform tends to select the reseller channel if the service cost performance is low and tends to select the marketplace channel otherwise.

All these results have been numerically verified in the experiments. At last, we also resort to numerical study and find that as the service cost performance increases, the equilibrium channel may shift from the reseller channel to the marketplace channel. These results provide managerial guidance to online platforms and manufacturers regarding strategic decisions on channel management.

Although prior research has paid extensive attention to the driving forces behind the online channel choice between marketplace and reseller, there is at present few study considering the case where a manufacturer selling through an online platform faces a demand information disadvantage in the reseller channel and sales inefficiency in the marketplace channel. To fill this research gap, our work illustrates the interaction between demand information asymmetry and selling cost asymmetry to identify the equilibrium channel strategy and provides useful managerial guidelines for both online platforms and manufacturers.

We investigate the extended service strategy choices of competing manufacturers and examine their impact on the retail platform.

We construct a supply chain model with a retail platform as the leader and manufacturers as the followers. Manufacturers face differential consumer preferences on the same agency retail platform, and they can sell a bundled extended service product and sell a separate product without any extended service.

The sale of extended warranty services on the retail platform leads to lower pricing of the manufacturers' products and changes in the product market structure in response to differences in consumer preferences. The retailing platform tends to provide an extended warranty conditionally. The sale of extended warranty services on a retail platform would be detrimental to the interests of the manufacturer who sells products with extended warranty services and in favor of the manufacturer who sells products without them.

The equilibrium results of the retail platform’s non-sales and sales of extended warranty services for the no-extended warranty product under the same commission rate and differential commission rate models are discussed, and the product structure of the market is investigated, respectively.