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Agency theory motivated this study, posing that leverage mitigates the agency problem. The aim was to examine whether leverage influences the relationship between executive-employee pay gaps (EEPGs) and firm performance. The study was conducted in the mining and retail sectors between 2012 and 2021.

Two EEPGs were featured based on their executive fixed pay and variable incentives accumulation. Proxies of firm performance were headline earnings per share; return on assets; earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation; and return on stock price. Data were collected from 76 JSE-listed firms in the retail and mining sectors and analysed using the two-step generalised method of moments.

The results revealed the hybrid implication of the pay gap for firm performance in the retail and mining sectors of South Africa, depending on the performance measures emphasised. More importantly, the study shows that with the moderating effects of leverage, firms can improve their performance while shrinking the pay gap.

The results have implications for policy addressing income inequality, debt management, executive compensation and regulatory reforms in South Africa concerning productivity and remuneration decisions.

The article provides specific literature for retail and mining industries on pay gaps, shows that it is possible to reduce the pay gap without compromising performance and suggests a new measure of performance that is more attuned to pay gap effect measurement.

The authors study and compare the effects of three CEO compensation restricting policies issued by the Chinese government in 2009, 2012 and 2015. This paper aims to shed light on the conditions under which CEO compenstation can be effectively regulated without negatively affecting firm performance.

These policies targeted state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). Using these policies as natural experiments, the authors investigate how their effects differ on CEO compensation, firm performance and two known performance-decreasing mechanisms: perk consumption and tunneling activities.

The authors show that restricting CEO pay does not necessarily backfire in terms of deteriorating firm performance. This non-decreasing firm performance can be achieved by restricting perk consumption and tunneling activities while introducing CEO pay regulations.

The authors exploit a powerful experimental setting in the context of China. The evidence contributes to the literature on CEO pay regulations and is relevant to the managerial decisions of policy makers and boards of directors.

The aim of the paper is to explore within-firm vertical pay inequality and its relation to firm size and firm performance.

Using firm-level microdata for Kazakhstan, the authors measure within-firm pay inequality as the wage differential between the top- and the bottom-level job occupations. The authors carry out their analysis based on panel regression models.

The authors find that within-firm pay inequality increases as firms grow. Further, they identify that this trend is mainly driven by top-occupation workers receiving more significant wage increases compared to lower-level workers as firms expand. Once the authors address concerns about endogeneity, they find that pay inequality is negatively associated with firm performance.

Developing strategies and policies that prioritize fairness and transparency in compensation practices is crucial during the expansion process of firms. By actively discouraging rent-seeking behavior, firms can create a work environment that promotes productivity and sustainability, ultimately leading to improved firm performance. The research findings highlight the importance of implementing context-specific interventions, recognizing that different environments may require tailored approaches to address pay inequality effectively.

This study contributes to the study of within-firm pay inequality, firm size and performance in an emerging economy, an area that has been largely overlooked in previous empirical research. The contrasting findings show the importance of the structural and industrial characteristics of emerging markets that contribute to broader and deeper impact of pay inequality compared to developed economies.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of governance mechanisms and firm performance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in relation to the Jordanian business environment. This study also examines the moderating role of gender diversity.

The sample is drawn from the annual reports of 68 Jordanian firms between 2015 and 2019. This paper uses the ordinary least square regression. It also uses the generalised method of moments approach to control any endogeneity issue and analyses the data in depth. In addition, it uses a dynamic model to address concerns regarding causality in the study’s models.

The results show that governance mechanisms and firm performance have an impact on CEO compensation. Furthermore, the outcomes indicate that gender diversity significantly and positively moderates the association between firm performance and CEO compensation. These findings enhance and support agency theory in the context of Jordan.

The study’s results have significant implications for policymakers, shareholders, investors, academicians and the public in the developing Jordanian market. The findings also support more monitoring and inspection to prevent the occurrence of opportunistic management behaviour and ensure that CEO remuneration packages are appropriately designed.

This study provides a unique understanding by explaining the impact of governance and performance on CEO compensation in a developing country such as Jordan. Besides that, the current study extends prior studies in Jordan significantly.

The purpose of this viewpoint is to comment on the implications of the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) Review and Consultation Documents expected to update regulation governing the determination/reporting of executive remuneration in UK stock market listed companies. Practical points from actors involved in executive remuneration decision-making/reporting are presented, set within the context of neo-institutional theory.

This qualitative research systematically analyses UK Corporate Governance Codes, the FRC’s recent Review/Consultation and peer-reviewed published studies of executive pay determination based on in-depth interviews with non-executive directors, institutional investors, executive pay advisers and human resources (HR) professionals.

Further regulation, while providing coercive influence over executive remuneration decision-making, is likely to lead to only limited change in processes and reporting due to benchmarking, the make-up of Remco membership and shareholders' preferences. Mimetic and normative isomorphic forces work against coercive isomorphism leading to resistance to change as decision-makers strive to safeguard their social status/reputations.

Reviewing executive remuneration package components and paying attention to company strategy, sustainability and values in pay determination are welcomed but recognised as difficult to achieve. Drawing upon a wider range of information sources/voices can assist in broadening the discussion. HR professionals can help widen stakeholder input to executive remuneration decision-making.

The authors’ viewpoint is grounded in peer-reviewed empirical data that draws directly upon the views/experiences of executive remuneration decision-makers to identify problems in adhering to FRC recommendations for change. The authors extend the meta-theoretical perspective of neo-institutional theory – specifically institutional isomorphism – as providing explanatory and predictive power to understand executive pay decision-making.

The authors' work aims to identify the employer-specific drivers of the college (or university) wage gap, which has been identified as one of the major determinants of the dynamics of overall wage and income inequality in the past decades. The authors focus on three employer-level features that can be associated with asymmetries in the employment relation orientation adopted for college and non-college-educated employees: (1) size, (2) the share of standard employment and (3) the pervasiveness of incentive pay schemes.

The authors' establishment-level analysis (data from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS), 2005–2018) focusses on Japan, an economy characterised by many unique economic and institutional features relevant to the aims of the authors' analysis. The authors use an adjusted measure of firm-specific college wage premium, which is not biased by confounding individual and establishment-level factors and reflects unobservable characteristics of employees that determine the payment of a premium. The authors' empirical methods account for the complexity of the relationships they investigate, and the authors test their baseline outcomes with econometric approaches (propensity score methods) able to address crucial identification issues related to endogeneity and reverse causality.

The authors' findings indicate that larger establishment size, a larger share of regular workers and more pervasive implementation of IPSs for college workers tend to increase the college wage gap once all observable workers, job and establishment characteristics are controlled for. This evidence corroborates the authors' hypotheses that a larger establishment size, a higher share of regular workers and a more developed set-up of performance pay schemes for college workers are associated with a better capacity of employers to attract and keep highly educated employees with unobservable characteristics that justify a wage premium above average market levels. The authors provide empirical evidence on how three relevant establishment-level characteristics shape the heterogeneity of the (adjusted) college wage observed across organisations.

The authors' contribution to the existing knowledge is threefold. First, the authors combine the economics and management/organisation literature to develop new insights that underpin the authors' testable empirical hypotheses. This enables the authors to shed light on employer-level drivers of wage differentials (size, workforce composition, implementation of performance-pay schemes) related to many structural, institutional and strategic dimensions. The second contribution lies in the authors' measure of the “adjusted” college wage gap, which is calculated on the component of individual wages that differs between observationally identical workers in the same establishment. As such, the metric captures unobservable workers' characteristics that can generate a wage premium/penalty. Third, the authors provide empirical evidence on how three relevant establishment-level characteristics shape the heterogeneity of the (adjusted) college wage observed across organisations.

While much of the literature testing for shirking by professional athletes have used performance metrics, some works have quantified shirking in dollar terms by comparing salary to estimated marginal revenue product (MRP). However, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approaches to measuring shirking by comparing salary to MRP have an endogeneity problem, as salary and contract length are determined simultaneously. We test for shirking in Major League Baseball (MLB) using an MRP approach, addressing this potential endogeneity.

This paper uses instrumental variables regression to address potential endogeneity using MLB season-level player and team data from 2010 to 2017.

Using OLS regression, the impact of an additional year of guaranteed contract on shirking is estimated at approximately $1m in 2010 US dollars, and the impact of having a long-term contract is estimated at $5m, estimates comparable to those in the literature. Using instrumental variables regression, these impacts increase to $1.6m and over $9m in 2010 dollars.

Given large, causal shirking estimates, profit maximizing sports organizations should take caution when negotiating long-term contracts. These findings also have important implications for other labor market settings where workers feel job security.

To our knowledge, this is the first work testing for shirking in sports using an MRP approach which uses instrumental variables regression to address potential endogeneity.

The purpose of this paper is to understand how those involved in executive pay determination in large publicly quoted UK businesses see the role of diversity within remuneration committees (Remcos) as enabling the input of different perspectives, which can enhance their decision-making and potentially improve pay outcomes.

Qualitative, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 18 high-profile major-enterprise decision-makers and their advisers, i.e. non-executive directors (NEDs) serving Remcos, institutional investors, executive pay consultants and internal human resources (HR) reward specialists, together with data from three focus groups with 10 further reward management practitioners.

Remco members recognise the benefits of social category/demographic diversity but say the likelihood of increasing this is low, given talent pipeline issues. The widening of value diversity is considered problematic for Remcos’ functioning. Informational diversity is used as a proxy for social category/demographic diversity to improve Remcos’ decision-making on executive pay. While the inclusion of members from wider social networks is recognised as potentially bringing a different informational perspective, the social character of Remcos, reflecting their elite nature and experience of wealth, appears ingrained.

Our original contribution is to extend the application of upper echelons theory in the context of Remco decision-making to explain why members do not welcome widening informational diversity by appointing people from different social networks who lack value similarity. Instead, by drawing views from employees, HR acts as a proxy for social network informational diversity. The elite, upper-echelons nature of Remco appointments remains unchanged and team functioning is not disrupted.

This paper investigates the effect of counter-cultural human resources (CCHR) practices on firm performance. Specifically, it investigates the impact of national culture [future orientation (FO), in-group collectivism (I-GC), performance orientation (PO), power distance (PD) and uncertainty avoidance (UA)] on the calculative and collaborative HR practice–firm performance relationship.

This study uses data from the CRANET and GLOBE studies to conduct a multi-level analysis of the impact of national culture on the calculative/collaborative HR–firm performance relationship.

It finds support for both the CCHR and societal-culture fit (SCF) perspectives of national culture, with FO and I-GC supporting the CCHR perspective and the other culture dimensions aligning more closely with SCF.

These findings empirically validate that CCHR practices can help supplement behaviors lacking in the cultural environment in which organizations operate.

Excessive borrowing significantly contributes to pushing businesses towards default and their transition into zombie enterprises. Despite government efforts to implement deleveraging policies and guide bank credit flows, it’s essential to delve into the internal dynamics that steer the borrowing behavior of these zombie enterprises at a micro level. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the issue, this study focuses on examining the incentives that drive corporate executives of zombie enterprises to consistently engage in large-scale borrowing from banks.

In this study, panel data analysis is utilized, incorporating firm-, industry- and year-fixed effects. Drawing from data pertaining to listed companies in China spanning from 2007 to 2020, we employ a one-by-one identification method to pinpoint zombie enterprises. Ultimately, a total of 2,533 samples of zombie enterprises were obtained.

The results indicate that as bank loans to zombie enterprises increase, executive monetary compensation decreases, while on-the-job consumption by executives increases, and they are less likely to be forced into rotation. Mechanism testing reveals that corporate performance partially mediates the relationship between bank loans and executive monetary compensation, but this mediation is ineffective for on-the-job consumption and job rotation. Further investigation suggests that the property rights nature of central enterprises and modified audit opinions can exacerbate the adverse impact of bank loans on the monetary compensation of zombie corporate executives, without significantly affecting on-the-job consumption or job rotation. Conversely, executive power does not enhance the positive effects of bank loans on monetary compensation or on-the-job consumption, but it diminishes the negative impact of bank loans on the forced rotation of zombie executives.

These results indicate that while bank loans may have a negative impact on corporate value, they function as safeguards for the positions and interests of executives. As a result, bank loans serve as incentives for executives of zombie enterprises.

This study holds theoretical significance as it explores the motivations behind non-performing loans in high-borrowing enterprises, sheds light on corporate governance challenges encountered by zombie enterprises and provides policy insights aimed at addressing the underlying causes of persistent non-performing loans in high-borrowing enterprises, including zombie enterprises.