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Extensive empirical evidence suggests that procedural justice (PJ) and distributive justice (DJ) are key success factors for achieving durable peace negotiations. This paper aims to investigate how complexity affects these factors and the outcomes in negotiations.

The qualitative study is based on an examination of the peace negotiations that led to the 2016 agreement between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo and the Colombian Government. Based on document analysis, the authors examined in detail how and where in the process the principles of PJ and DJ were applied. The authors then examined the implementation progress after 2016 and placed the peace process in the overall context of the Colombian conflict.

The authors found that the principles of PJ and DJ were present in both the negotiation process and the agreement. The negotiations were successful and satisfactory solutions could be found for all issues. The complexity of the conflict is reflected in the limited coverage of the peace negotiations. Not all groups, interests and subconflicts could be included in the negotiations. This limits their contribution to a durable peace in Colombia. Conflicts that remain unresolved also have a negative effect on the implementation of the agreement.

For conflict management, this implies that the negotiations should not be viewed as “one-and-done” but rather as a progressive, ongoing process. The agreement is only the nucleus for achieving total peace. It must be actively advanced and defended.

This study offers new qualitative insights into how PJ and DJ function in negotiations. It also establishes a systematic connection between PJ and DJ and complexity, introduces the notion of coverage and, thereby, opens a new perspective on the management of conflict complexity.

The main thesis of the chapter is to introduce a new idea to the field of peace negotiations, which will require the development of a new model of negotiations to enforce peace. The existing models of peace negotiations highlight the existence of a positive peace dividend to parties involved in conflicts and peace negotiation. They, hence, usually highlight a gradual and dynamic adjustment, or movement, away from a conflict-ridden outcome towards a peaceful outcome that offers a positive peace dividend to all relevant stakeholders. In comparison with the status quo, peace brings additional economic returns and peace therefore offers a win–win situation. Despite the fact that a win–win situation does not ensure the enforcement of peace, as agents can easily get locked into what is commonly known as the prisoners' dilemma – yet the possibility of Pareto improvement makes negotiations for peace somewhat artificial. At least in the short run all agents involved in active conflicts are apprehensive of peace as they expect immediate (expected) returns from making peace can outweigh the expected returns from conflicts. An important work that sidesteps the win–win situation of peace dividends is by Isard and Azis (1999) who introduced the possibility of an immediate loss of economic returns from the peace process in their conflict management procedure (CMP). However, in the existing work on CMP, the long-run returns from peace outweigh that from conflicts. One therefore presumes that peace brings economic benefits to all. The existing CMPs therefore assume away any possibility of lower economic returns from peace. There are some important models in which peace negotiations are also modelled as a zero-sum game in which the gain of a party represents a loss to others, which is known as win–lose negotiations. In this work we introduce the possibility of bargaining and negotiations against the backdrop of potential immediate losses while peace is favoured simply for its intrinsic value and not for pecuniary returns. In the real world, there is evidence to believe that agents involved in conflicts are painfully aware of two things: first, the decision-making agents who choose between conflicts vis-à-vis peace are the leaders who get rarely affected by economic returns from conflicts or peace. It is usually the foot soldiers who bear the brunt of costly conflicts and can benefit from peace. Secondly, most people value peace for the sake of it as peace has an intrinsic value that ensures the protection of rights and their lives and protection from violence. Thus, peace is a collective good that provides little extra economic returns to actual decision-makers who choose between courses of conflicts or peace.

The purpose of this paper is to begin a conversation about the term “nondocument.” It analyzes this term’s possible concepts, components and contexts.

This conceptual paper draws upon the work of documentation studies scholars, including Michael Buckland, Bernd Frohmann and Niels Windfeld Lund, to begin an exploration of the term “nondocument,” framed within the context of the 2013–2014 Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations brokered by the USA. It is comprised of seven sections revolving around different questions regarding non-document.

The document at the center of the 2013–2014 Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations aimed to establish a framework for an eventual final-status peace agreement. There was skepticism, however, about the document’s proposed reservations inscription permitting either party to express reservations with any part of the framework. It was claimed that this reservation inscription made the document self-negating and therefore a non-document. This document was arguably a hybrid entity: a document-non-document. It was a document in the context of the negotiations. It became a non-document in the context of the collapse of the negotiations.

The 2013–2014 peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine, brokered by the USA, revolved around a diplomatic document outlining provisions for a final peace settlement. The two parties were skeptical of a proposed provision permitting reservations to be expressed over other provisions within the document. An official involved in the negotiations stated that this provision made the document a non-document. But what exactly is meant by this term? This paper takes the opportunity to begin exploring such a notion. The aim, however, is not to definitively define non-document but instead to raise questions and provoke further discussions of this term.

The concept of non-document is underdeveloped. This paper presents questions and conceptual tools to help develop this term whilst providing possible points of departure for further examinations of how documents are or might be non-documents. These questions and tools also point in directions for various other approaches to phenomena that could be regarded as documents in some respects but not in others, or the ways in which something could is “almost” but “not quite” a document, or even help determine what is “not document.” Ultimately, this term could help expand other “conventional” approaches to documentation.

Conflict resolution and peace building has acquired much significance in the last few years (Siddiqi, 2003).

This paper identifies meta‐level considerations long ignored in Sri Lanka's peace negotiations.

Variety absorption being at the heart of manoeuvres by the various parties of the negotiation, Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety informs the diagnosis. Also used are Beer's viable systems model, Maturana's structural coupling and Stokes sociological thinking on identity which encompasses the nature of identity, levels of identity, organisation of identity.

Whilst in Sri Lanka's conflict resolution parlance, identity has been pivotally limited to race, in socio‐cybernetic terms it denotes much more. This leads to the recognition that relationships between structurally coupled entities change as negotiations progress thus calling upon them (and others) to dynamically adapt their identity in their endeavour to retain viability.

The diagnosis shows the need to design negotiation processes capable of absorbing the variety needed to address the content of negotiations.

Linking identity to viability explains why stakeholder relations move through emergent properties/relations and why negotiations between static protagonist, as done in all previous Sri Lankan peace negotiations, are doomed to failure. This work is useful for those who formulate the modalities of Sri Lanka's peace talks and for cyberneticians and people involved in conflict resolution – particularly those bedevilling sovereignty.

Purpose – To answer two related questions, namely, why women in general are excluded from peace-building processes and why women in Israel are excluded from peace-building processes and have to create their own organizations?

Methodology/approach – This is narrative prospective research paper. First, the research focuses on international gender theories regarding participation of women in peace-building processes, and then on the particular situation of women in Israel and their need to form peace movements and organizations of their own.

Findings – The research revealed that Israeli women's absence from the official negotiations with the Palestinians as well as women's exclusion from other peace-building processes is part of a global phenomenon. Given the fact that women have been missing from the Israel's official negotiations with the Palestinians since 1987 when the first Intifada began, and their plight is not addressed, women need to create their own peace movements and organizations for voicing their unique value for the benefit of society at large.

Research limitations – An update of the research should be conducted every two years to check changes in findings.

Value of the paper – The chapter highlights the significance of women's inclusion in peace building. It describes women's exclusion from the peace process in Israel although they have been extremely active and were recognized internationally and stresses the need for a gendered society to end the Palestinian–Israel conflict.

This chapter uses the poliheuristic theory of decision-making to analyze the decisions of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The study examines a series of Netanyahu’s decisions regarding the peace process during 1996–2014. Using Applied Decision Analysis (ADA), this study demonstrates that Netanyahu ruled out alternatives that failed to satisfy alternatives on the non-compensatory decision dimension – his political survivability. The prime minister’s final choices were made from the remaining options according to their ability to maximize net benefits with respect to Netanyahu’s ideological concerns.

The main purpose of this paper is to propose a strategy to promote the culture of peace in the Palestinian‐Israeli struggle. The Bangladesh approach to peacemaking offers a dual strategy: conflict management in the Israeli‐Gaza situation and conflict resolution in the Israeli‐West Bank case. The first is designed to reduce the level of violence in intensified conflict. The second intends to build the foundations of a peaceful social order.

The paper develops and elaborates the second part of the Bangladesh approach. It offers a strategy to build the foundations for a peaceful social order in the Israeli West‐Bank situation. The paper includes theoretical background, examples from other cases of intractable conflict, and lessons from the “Minds of Peace Experiment” – a simulation of a potential Palestinian‐Israeli public negotiating congress – which was conducted at the University of Missouri‐St Louis.

The paper presents two competitive models of peacemaking and proclaims them complementary: the political élite and the public assembly. The first intends to reach a peace pact through interactions between political élites. The second intends to prepare the people for a reasonable peace process through the establishment of a major institution for conflict resolution – a public negotiating congress.

The public‐assembly model is new in the Palestinian‐Israeli experience. The paper offers a program to create the conditions for establishing a major Palestinian‐Israeli public assembly: a public negotiating congress. It is the first time in the history of the struggle where ordinary people are intended to be substantially involved in the negotiating and the peacemaking process.

This chapter examines the considerations weighed by armed actors in responding to civilian demands in three Colombian peace territories, where residents have engaged in civil resistance against armed violence and negotiated with armed actors to reduce such violence. It does so mainly on the basis of data from fieldwork, including interviews with former or current members of armed groups who operated in the areas under study, and other actors. We find that armed actors weighed political, security, economic and normative considerations when faced with civilian demands and that the armed actors’ relative dependence on civilians regarding these four aspects influenced these actors’ responses.