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This study examines whether dividend payout, an internal corporate governance mechanism, is a substitute for or an outcome of product market competition, an external corporate governance mechanism. The sample includes firms in six of the world’s most prominent economies. We find that firms in more competitive industries pay less in the way of dividends to their shareholders, which is consistent with the notion that dividends and competition are substitutes. We also determine that the above negative relationship is weaker in countries with stronger regulation protecting minority shareholders against corporate self-dealing. Furthermore, the relationship has attenuated following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that increased regulation and enhanced governance standards. Collectively, our findings provide consistent evidence across countries that the two corporate governance mechanisms examined in the study are substitutes, and greater regulation weakens the substitution effect. Our empirical findings are robust to alternative measures of dividend payout, industry definition, and shareholder protection.

The manner in which publicly traded companies’ management teams handle their firm’s free cash flows (FCF) has been an issue for many decades, because it is difficult to determine whether these management teams work for their own benefit or for that of their shareholders. Recent financial scandals have heightened mistrust of management. This mistrust, in turn, may have increased the pressure to reduce the portion of FCF left under management’s control. Boards of directors control dividend payout decisions, thus determining the portion of FCF available to corporate management. This paper examines whether the 2002 legal response to corporate financial reporting scandals, which came in the form of many new initiatives and requirements imposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on all publicly traded firms, was relevant to dividend payouts. This question is investigated by noting that the impact of these new requirements differed among firms. Some firms had already introduced the use of independent directors and fully independent committees prior to SOX making them compulsory in 2002. This paper examines whether these “pre-adopters” experienced less change in their dividend payout policies than those firms that were forced to change the composition of their board and committees.

This investigation examines the effect on dividend payouts for listed firms attributable to the SOX and concurrent changes in stock exchange regulations that compelled increased use of independent directors and fully independent committees. To study the impact of SOX and the associated, required, changes in the composition of boards of directors for many firms, the difference-in-differences methodology is employed to overcome the endogeneity concerns that have consistently challenged prior governance studies. This was accomplished by examining the effects on dividend payouts associated with the exogenously forced addition of independent directors to the boards of publicly listed firms. The results reveal that there is a significant positive relationship between firms that were compelled by law to change their boards and increases in average changes in dividend payouts and percentage changes in dividends paid, when compared to firms that had pre-adopted the Sarbanes–Oxley corporate board composition requirements. A further exploratory analysis showed that the same significant positive relationship is detected for increases in average changes in total dollars distributed, where stock repurchase dollars are combined with dividend payouts. These findings imply that these board composition changes led to decisions that increased dividend payouts in percentage terms, as well as dividend payouts and total dollars distributed in aggregate dollar amount terms.

Prior studies document increased share repurchase activity after the temporary tax holiday under the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004. Our study examines the moderating effect of financial statement readability on share repurchases in response to a temporary reduction in repatriation tax. Building on prior literature, we argue that firms with excess cash overseas, despite the lack of investment opportunities, produce less readable financial statements to hide bad news. We find that firms with less readable financial statements initiated higher levels of share repurchases after the AJCA. Our results contribute to the existing literature showing (1) firms hold excess cash overseas mainly for tax reasons rather than for nontax reasons such as precautionary motives or empire-building concerns and (2) firms return excess funds to investors rather than squander the funds once the tax cost of repatriation is reduced. Firms that suffer from the overinvestment problem using hard-to-read financial statements to hide the bad news of a lack of investment opportunities are more likely to benefit from the tax cut. Our study provides timely evidence of potential firm response to the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act, which permanently removes the repatriation tax.

In practice, it is increasingly common for companies to use NON-COMPETITION covenants in employment contracts that put restrictions on post-employment activities. Making use the variation of legal enforcement of NON-COMPETITION agreements in different states (NON-COMPETITION index) across the U.S., this chapter empirically examines whether and to what extent labor market concern will affect firm payout policy when managers are bound to their firms by NON-COMPETITION agreements. We find that the likelihood for a firm to pay DIVIDEND or conduct repurchasing is positively related to NON-COMPETITION index. We directly measure PAYOUT RATIO and find a significant positive relation between firm PAYOUT RATIO and NON-COMPETITION index. Our results indicate that managers with increased stability and reduced job opportunity in the external labor market are more likely use cash payout as a pre-commitment device and send a signal that they will not entrench themselves.

The Indian Companies Act (2013) mandates the appointment of at least one woman director for large publicly listed companies in India in order to increase gender diversity on corporate boards. The study analyzes the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, board gender diversity, and ownership structure on dividend payout decisions in an emerging economy like India. The study uses data collected for nonfinancial firms listed on NSE (National Stock Exchange) 500 in India from the period 2008 to 2020. Contrary to the evidence from developed economies, the study finds that increased female representation and greater proportion of female independent directors on the board are associated with lower dividend payout decisions in the Indian context. As it stands, the female representation on corporate boards in India is woefully low and appears to be mere tokenism. The study explores the role of regulation in increasing gender diversity on corporate boards and offers insights from an emerging economy where such a regulation is in place.

This study investigates whether corporations consider shareholder-level taxes when setting corporate distribution policy. I investigate the relation between the tax-rate differential on dividend and capital gains income and its effect on firms’ distribution policies. I find that firms consider shareholder-level taxes and that this association varies with the percentage of the firm owned by individual shareholders. Hence, firms increase share repurchases and decrease the percentage of total corporate payout in the form of a dividend as the tax-rate differential increases. Thus, an increased substitution effect occurs as capital gains become relatively more tax-advantaged compared to dividends. Furthermore, I find a positive association between the percentage of the firm owned by individual investors and the percentage of total corporate payout distributed as a repurchase. These findings are consistent with personal income taxes influencing managerial decisions regarding the payout of excess corporate funds.

The internal factors that influence the decision to change dividend growth rates include two competing models: the earnings and free cash flow models. As far as each of the components of each model is considered, the informative and efficient dividend payout decisions require that managers have to focus on the significant component(s) only. This study examines the cointegration, significance, and explanatory power of those components empirically. The expected outcomes serve two objectives. First, on an academic level, it is interesting to examine the extent to which payout practices meet the premises of the earnings and free cash flow models. The latter considers dividends and financing decisions as two faces of the same coin. Second, on a professional level, the outcomes help focus the management’s efforts on the activities that can be performed when considering a change in dividend growth rates.

This study uses data for the firms listed in two indexes: Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA30) and NASDAQ100. The data cover quarterly periods from 30 June 1989 to 31 March 2011. The methodology includes (a) cointegration analysis in order to test for model specification and (b) classical regression in order to examine the explanatory power of the components of earnings and free cash flow models.

The results conclude that: (a) Dividends growth rates are cointegrated with the two models significantly; (b) Dividend growth rates are significantly and positively associated with growth in sales and cost of goods sold only. Accordingly, these are the two activities that firms’ management need to focus on when considering a decision to change dividend growth rates, (c) The components of the earnings and free cash flow models explain very little of the variations in dividends growth rates. The results are to be considered a call for further research on the external (market-level) determinants that explain the variations in dividends growth rates. Forthcoming research must separate the effects of firm-level and market-level in order to reach clear judgments on the determinants of dividends growth rates.

This study contributes to the related literature in terms of offering updated robust empirical evidence that the decision to change dividend growth rate is discretionary to a large extent. That is, dividend decisions do not match the propositions of the earnings and free cash flow models entirely. In addition, the results offer solid evidence that financing trends in the period 1989–2011 showed heavy dependence on debt financing compared to other related studies that showed heavy dependence on equity financing during the previous period 1974–1984.

This chapter investigates the relationship between financial measures and dividend payout policy choices of firms. We examine why firms choose to pay dividends continuously, intermittently, or not pay them. Specifically, the findings provide evidence that firms with relatively larger debts tend to pay dividends less frequently than firms with smaller debts.

The results also suggest that good financial performers are more likely to pay dividends more regularly. Additionally, the results of this study indicate that highly leveraged firms tend to make less frequent payouts than lowly leveraged firms.

Overall, this research adds to our understanding of firms’ dividend payout policy choices. First, evidence on the relationship between the various types of financial measures and firms’ choice of dividend payout frequencies should be useful to investors. Second, the findings of this study provide financial statement users with useful information about the firm’s dividend payout patterns. Third, in general, it also adds to the accounting and finance literature on dividends.

The chapter examines whether the lowering of dividend taxes as part of the US Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) resulted in an increase in dividend payouts at the expense of research and development (R&D) spending. Using 1,206 US firm-years data, we find that R&D investments responded negatively to higher levels of dividend payout in the post-JGTRRA of 2003 tax regime compared with the pre-regime. We also find that R&D intensity and financial constraint moderate this negative relation. That is, this relation only holds for firms in low R&D-intensity industries and firms facing high levels of financial constraint. From a tax policy perspective, even though the tax cut on dividend receipts has the benefit of lowering the cost of equity capital, the benefit appears to have come at the expense of R&D investment.

The main objective of this study is to examine whether firms follow the financing hierarchy as suggested by the Pecking Order Theory (POT). The External Funds Needed (EFN) model offers a financing hierarchy that can be used for examining the POT. As far as the EFN considers growth of sales as a driver for changing capital structure, it follows that shall firms plan for a sustainable growth of sales, a sustainable financing can be reached and maintained. This study uses data about the firms listed in two indexes: Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA30) and NASDAQ100. The data cover quarterly periods from June 30, 1999, to March 31, 2012. The methodology includes (a) cointegration analysis in order to test for model specification and (b) causality analysis in order to show the generic and mutual associations between the components of EFN. The results conclude that (a) in the majority of the cases, firms plan for an increase in growth sales but not necessarily to approach sustainable rate; (b) in cases of observed and sustainable growth of sales, firms reduce debt financing persistently; (c) firms use equity financing to finance sustainable growth of sales in the long run only, while in the short run, firms use internal financing, that is, retained earnings as a flexible source of financing; and (d) the EFN model is quite useful for examining the hierarchy of financing. This study contributes to the related literature in terms of utilizing the properties of the EFN model in order to examine the practical aspects of the POT. These practical considerations are extended to examine the use of the POT in cases of observed and sustainable growth rates. The findings contribute to the current literature that there is a need to offer an adjustment to the financing order suggested by the POT. Equity financing is the first source of financing current and sustainable growth of sales, followed by retained earnings, and debt financing is the last resort.