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Research addressing the impact of tacit and explicit pay secrecy policies on organizational climates is fairly limited. While researchers desire to explain the impact of such policies on individuals' pay satisfaction, a direct effect has not been supported. This study seeks to better explain how these policies are related to ethical climates and pay satisfaction.

This study draws on ethical climate theory to show the influence of ethical climate types on job satisfaction and a moderating effect of explicit and tacit pay secrecy policies on this relationship. This is accomplished through designing this study by using existing scales from the literature in a survey methodology. A pilot study of 246 undergraduate students was used to validate the measures. Then, a sample of 217 adults was obtained to test the proposed relationships. Linear regression is employed to analyze the data and to test the existence of direct and moderating effects.

The five empirically tested ethical climates each have a direct effect on pay satisfaction. Explicit pay secrecy policies has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between rules, law and code ethical climates, and pay satisfaction. Tacit pay secrecy policies moderate the relationship between caring, rules, law and code, and independence ethical climates and pay satisfaction.

The findings strengthen the literature by demonstrating a stronger relationship between ethical climates and pay satisfaction. While some of the moderating effects were significant, others were not. This was surprising, but present avenues to further test ethical climate theory and the impact of pay secrecy policies.

This study presents practical implications for managers. Understanding how these policies may be viewed differently, depending on the type of climate that is experienced within an organization may help managers evaluate using them. Trying to protect employees or the organization itself by enacting these polices may backfire and create additional problems. Managers may want to evaluate the manner that they communicate these polices through formal or informal means, depending on the type of climate experienced within the workplace.

This study is the first to examine the influence of explicit and tacit pay secrecy policies on the relationship between ethical climates and employees' satisfaction with pay. It leads to a number of directions for further research that may continue to build upon this study in order to further advance scholarly understanding of the importance of ethical climates and pay secrecy policies.

This study aims to explore how individual-level and organizational-level factors interact to influence pay information (PI) seeking and PI sharing preferences in PI conversations (i.e. the face-to-face communications context). The authors examine how an individual’s judgment of their pay relative to others – or pay equity perception – affects their PI seeking and PI sharing preferences and how those relationships are affected by organizationally created pay transparency policies and pay transparency practices.

Using a 2 × 2 × 2 experimental design on the MTurk platform, the authors used a scenario-based prompt method to manipulate employee perceptions of pay equity and organizational pay transparency and tested those effects on employee pay disclosure preferences. The authors consider both pay policy and pay practice dimensions of pay transparency and both PI seeking and PI sharing dimensions of pay disclosure preferences. The final sample had 597 participants.

The authors find employees’ pay equity perceptions are negatively related to PI seeking behaviors and are even more so when organizations have restrictive pay transparency policies. Also, both pay transparency policy and pay transparency practice increase PI sharing preferences.

The authors provide insight into how individual perceptions drive pay disclosure motivations and the role of organizational policy and practice in influencing pay disclosure preferences within PI conversations. The authors provide insight into the antecedents that shape pay disclosure preferences, which lead to a both PI conversations among coworkers and an increase in one’s pay understanding. This study shows the contextual nature of PI seeking and PI sharing preferences, which are a motivational antecedent to pay-related sensemaking behaviors.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which corporate board characteristics influence the level of dividend pay-out ratio using a sample of UK small- and medium-sized enterprises from 2010 to 2013 listed on the Alternative Investment Market.

The data are analysed by employing multivariate regression techniques, including estimating fixed effects, lagged effects and two-stage least squares regressions.

The results show that board size, the frequency of board meetings, board gender diversity and audit committee size have a significant relationship with the level of dividend pay-out. Audit committee size and board size have a positive association with the level of dividend pay-out, whilst the frequency of board meetings and board gender diversity have a significant negative relationship with the level of dividend pay-out. By contrast, the findings suggest that board independence and CEO role duality do not have any significant effect on the level of dividend pay-out.

This is one of the first attempts at examining the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy in the UK’s Alternative Investment Market, with the analysis distinctively informed by agency theoretical insights drawn from the outcome and substitution hypotheses.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

The authors study and compare the effects of three CEO compensation restricting policies issued by the Chinese government in 2009, 2012 and 2015. This paper aims to shed light on the conditions under which CEO compenstation can be effectively regulated without negatively affecting firm performance.

These policies targeted state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). Using these policies as natural experiments, the authors investigate how their effects differ on CEO compensation, firm performance and two known performance-decreasing mechanisms: perk consumption and tunneling activities.

The authors show that restricting CEO pay does not necessarily backfire in terms of deteriorating firm performance. This non-decreasing firm performance can be achieved by restricting perk consumption and tunneling activities while introducing CEO pay regulations.

The authors exploit a powerful experimental setting in the context of China. The evidence contributes to the literature on CEO pay regulations and is relevant to the managerial decisions of policy makers and boards of directors.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether corporate dividend policy changed during the financial crisis.

For this study, a life‐cycle model is used to predict the probability that a firm pays a dividend. The data sample for this research follows that of Fama and French and of DeAngelo et al., for the time period of 2006‐2009. The panel logistic regression analysis considers the firm cluster effects and the autoregressive correlation of the firm clusters.

This study shows evidence that the probability that a firm paid a dividend declined in 2008 and 2009, even after taking the firm's financial condition into account. Furthermore, the analysis also shows that dividend policy did shift during the financial crisis.

The results of this study show that dividend policy did shift during the financial crisis. The research provides evidence that firms placed additional emphasis on financial viability after the financial crisis.

The purpose of the study is to analyse the influence of board composition and ownership structure on the dividend pay-out policy of selected listed Indian companies.

The top 30 companies listed on National Stock Exchange were examined for a period of three financial years from 2019 to 2021. Due to the cross-sectional and time-series character of the data, fixed effect panel model is used as the primary analytical approach.

The results revealed that there is a significant and positive association between board size and dividend policy. The results confirm that the firms with higher Indian ownership and non-institutional ownership distribute higher levels of dividend. No significant association was found between board independence and dividend decisions of ratios. Finally, it is observed that there is a positive impact of return on assets on dividend policy.

Future studies can confirm the impact of ownership determinants and board characteristics on dividend distribution policy by taking stock dividends into account and enlarging the sample size of developing market businesses. They can also investigate ownership factors including management ownership and international ownership, in addition to other board attributes like qualification, tenure and age. This will offer a more thorough comprehension of how these variables relate to dividend policy.

Because they are better able to assess the financial position and make educated judgments, a diverse and independent board of directors may result in more strategic and cautious dividend policies. The dividend policy of a firm is also influenced by its ownership structure and strategic objectives; small or primary shareholders may exert pressure for larger payments. By focusing on long-term strategic goals rather than immediate requirements, managers may guarantee that interests are aligned. The findings of this study offer significant guidance to management and regulators about the dividend policy of publicly listed corporations.

According to agency theory, the link between ownership structure, board composition and dividend policy may be explained by agency conflicts. Independent directors are necessary for the board to make decisions that effectively balance the interests of management and shareholders, particularly when it comes to paying dividends. According to studies, companies with non-executive directors have greater interest alignment and fewer agency issues. In addition, the ownership structure and makeup of the board are important factors in lowering agency conflicts and enhancing corporate governance procedures. Companies may improve their governance procedures and increase value for shareholders by resolving conflicts of interest.

The research paper contributes to the existing body of knowledge by analysing and uncovering significant and unknown relationship between board composition, ownership structure and dividend policy. The paper explores the relationship between specific ownership structures and dividend policy in context of a developing country where limited research exists and addresses a research question that has not been extensively studied before.

Looks at the 2000 Employment Research Unit Annual Conference held at the University of Cardiff in Wales on 6/7 September 2000. Spotlights the 76 or so presentations within and shows that these are in many, differing, areas across management research from: retail finance; precarious jobs and decisions; methodological lessons from feminism; call centre experience and disability discrimination. These and all points east and west are covered and laid out in a simple, abstract style, including, where applicable, references, endnotes and bibliography in an easy‐to‐follow manner. Summarizes each paper and also gives conclusions where needed, in a comfortable modern format.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides: