Search results

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005.

This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression.

This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality.

Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country.

The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China.

This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.

The purpose of this paper is to ask the following question: is there a link between being politically connected, the quality of governance and the company’s ownership structure?

The author then examined Canadian companies from the S&P/TSX index for the year 2015.

Political connectedness is significantly associated with lower quality of governance in relation to shareholders’ rights; ownership concentration is associated with lower quality of governance in relation to the overall governance, board of directors, shareholders’ rights and compensation structure indices; ownership structure does not mediate the relationship between political connections and quality of governance; and number of political connections through the executive is associated with less risky governance practices in relation to compensation structure; in other words, when members of the executive are politically connected, the firm adopts better compensation practices.

The time limitation is the main weakness of this study and probably the cause of observed mitigated results.

The author hope that the results will inform regulators on the need not only to further regulate the business-politics relationship, but also to consider the specific traits of concentrated ownership companies and the most critical aspects of corporate governance in politically connected firms, such as shareholders’ rights, particularly those of minority shareholders. For example, an intriguing case to investigate in the Canadian context would be Pierre Karl Péladeau’s foray into Quebec politics and the controversy ignited by his political bid in light of his position as majority shareholder (75 percent) in communications giant Quebecor Inc.

In fact, the results shown that concentrated ownership firms have lower governance quality than non-concentrated ones. Furthermore, in a concentrated ownership context, the minority shareholders’ rights could be threatened. In this sense, the results also shown that shareholders’ rights seem to be the most critical governance issue for the politically connected Canadian firms. These results are therefore the indication that Canadian financial market regulators must take action about politically connected and concentrated ownership firms in order to further protect minority shareholders’ rights.

This study makes a double theoretical contribution by enriching the literature on corporate governance and by providing one of the first investigations into the direct and comprehensive relationships between political connections, governance and ownership structure.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of product market competition and ownership structure on total factor productivity and the interaction between these two governance tools.

Using a sample of 90 Tunisian non-financial firms over the period 1998-2012, the authors use fixed effects and Generalized Method of Moments models to test the complementary/substitutability effect between family ownership and competition.

The authors find that product market competition boosts productivity in that it mitigates agency problems. Moreover, the authors show that large blockholders have a positive impact on firms’ performance. When considering ownership types, it seems that families play an important role in improving productivity. However, this ownership structure is less effective when firms operate in competitive industries. Thus, the results suggest that a substitution effect exists between internal governance mechanisms (particularly family ownership) and competition.

Tunisian politicians must review the investment code and remove barriers and restrictions in order to assure fair product market competition. Also, regulation must be changed to encourage foreigners’ shareholding and the creation of private equity firms. Moreover, large shareholders operating in a competitive environment should open up their capital to new shareholders in order to undertake more investments and to benefit from certain advantages.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of product market competition on the relation between corporate governance and productivity in the Tunisian context. Moreover, the complementary/substitutability effect between family ownership and competition has not been examined before in any context.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the moderating effect of ownership on the links between corporate governance and financial performance in the context of Ghanaian banks.

The current study used a sample of 23 banks and the multiple regression method to analyze a panel dataset of 414 from banks over an 18-year period.

The findings revealed that audit independence, chief executive officer (CEO) duality, non-executive directors and banks size have a positive impact on performance. The findings also revealed that foreign ownership has an interacting effect between corporate governance and profitability.

The practical implications of the current study demonstrated that good corporate governance creates value and must be invigorated for the interest of all stakeholders. Foreign ownership has an interacting effect between corporate governance and performance. Policymakers should formulate policies for attracting foreign investors.

Interestingly, this study is the first of its kind that exclusively chose ownership structure to interact between corporate governance and bank performance in Ghanaian perspective. Such new insights on this relationship provide useful information to the government, academics, policymakers and other stakeholders. The growing economies of African countries, and the inadequate governance–performance literature in African context, have created a demand to appreciate the governance parameters in these countries and its influence on firm's performance.

We analyze corporate governance mechanisms in Canadian and US firms. We show that despite similarities in governance practices in both countries, there are differences in the efficacy of these mechanisms. In particular, the performance of Canadian firms is less sensitive to ownership structure than that of US firms. Differences are also found in the performance implications of incentive pay. Our study suggests that country-specific governance trends persist among Canadian firms cross-listed in the United States. These findings may explain why Canadian firms which are cross-listed in the United States continue to trade at a discount compared to their US counterparts.

From a perspective of ‘critical performativity’, John Lewis is of special interest since it is celebrated as a successful organization and heralded as an alternative to more typical forms of capitalist enterprise.

Our analysis uses secondary empirical material (e.g. JLP documents in the public domain, histories of John Lewis and recent empirical research). Our assumption is that engagement and interrogation of existing empirical work can be at least as illuminating and challenging as undertaking new studies. In addition to generating fresh insights, stimulating reflection and fostering debate, our analysis is intended to contribute to an appreciation of how structures of ownership and governance are significant in enabling and constraining practices of organizing and managing.

The structures of ownership and governance at John Lewis, a major UK employee-owned retailer, have been commended by those who wish to recuperate capitalism and by those who seek to transform it.

JLP can be read as a ‘subversive intervention’ insofar as it denies absentee investors access to, and control of, its assets. Currently, however, even the critical performative potential of the Partnership model is impeded by its paternalist structures. Exclusion of Partners’ participation in the market for corporate control is reflected in, and compounded by, a weak form of ‘democratic’ governance, where managers are accountable to Partners but not controlled by them.

Our contention is that JLP’s ownership and governance structures offer a practical demonstration, albeit flawed, of how an alternative form of organization is sufficiently ‘efficient’ and durable to be able to ‘compete’ against joint-stock companies.

By examining the cooperative elements of the John Lewis structures of ownership and governance, we illuminate a number of issues faced in realizing the principles ascribed to employee-owned cooperatives – notably, with regard to ‘democratic member control’, ‘member economic participation’ and ‘autonomy and independence’.

The study analyzes the influence of corporate governance and ownership concentration levels on the cost of equity. Further, the authors extend the literature by investigating the moderating effect of ownership concentration levels (i.e. at 5%, 10% and 20%) on the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity.

The study applies several robust panel regression techniques to a sample of 114 active non-financial companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2016. Corporate governance was measured through a unique index comprising 30 governance attributes. The cost of equity was measured through the capital asset pricing model. Further, the authors construct three variables for ownership concentration levels, i.e. at 5%, 10% and 20%. To address the endogeneity problem, the one-lagged variable model and GMM approaches were also applied.

The results indicate that better corporate governance reduces the cost of equity, while ownership concentration at high thresholds would increase the cost of equity. Further, the authors find that ownership concentration at the 20% threshold moderates the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity. Thus, the authors argue that firms can minimize the risk faced by shareholders by implementing substantive corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, effective corporate governance mechanisms at high ownership concentration levels are imperative for managing the cost of equity.

The study reports novel evidence that ownership concentration at a high threshold moderates the effect of corporate governance on the cost of equity.

This study aims to investigate the impact of family management and ownership structure, including foreign ownership and business group ownership, on corporate performance.

Using an agency perspective and a quantitative research methodology, this study examines listed firms in Pakistan from 2009 to 2018.

The results suggest that family management and concentrated leadership constrain, whereas family leadership, foreign ownership and group ownership strengthen monitoring effectiveness and corporate performance. These findings imply that the shareholder governance logic offers optimal solutions in an emerging economy, as relational governance may activate agency problems.

The findings are consistent with the relevance of relational governance mechanisms in the form of family leadership. However, the results suggest that emerging economies require a hybrid governance model to address their unique agency problems, thereby underlining context relevance in corporate governance scholarship. Furthermore, this research adopts a thick view of institutions to clarify institutional embeddedness and corporate governance contextuality in an emerging economy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on corporate liquidity policy from a developing country perspective, Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE).

The authors adopt multiple regression analysis in estimating the relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance and corporate liquidity policy as well as the impact of corporate governance on insider ownership.

The authors find that foreign share ownership significantly predicts corporate cash holding on the GSE. The empirical result also portrays positive and statistically significant relationship between board size, financial leverage, firm size, profitability and corporate liquidity holding, and a negative and statistically significant relationship between board composition and corporate liquidity holding. The authors also document positive and statistically significant relationship between the various industry classifications namely manufacturing, distribution and the pharmaceutical industry and corporate cash holdings on the GSE but did not however find significant relationship between corporate governance and insider ownership on the GSE. The authors found positive relationship between Tobin's Q and inside ownership.

The main value of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance and corporate liquid policy from a developing country perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether internal attributes of corporate governance such as board size, outside directors, CEO duality, managerial ownership, and ownership concentration affect the performance of Pakistani firms.

Panel econometric technique namely pooled ordinary least squares is used to estimate the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and performance measures (i.e., return on assets, return on equity, earnings per share, and market‐to‐book ratio) using the data of non‐financial firms listed on the Karachi stock exchange Pakistan during 2004‐2008.

The empirical results indicate that board size is positively, whereas outside directors and managerial ownership are negatively related to the return on assets, earnings per share, and market‐to‐book ratio. Ownership concentration is positively related to all measures of performance used in this study. CEO duality is positively related to earnings per share only. As far as control variables are concerned, leverage is negatively related to the return on assets, return on equity, and earnings per share. Alternatively, firm size is positively related to all measures of performance. In sum, empirical results indicate that internal governance mechanisms have material effects on firm performance.

Empirical results provide support to managers to understand how internal governance mechanisms affect the firm performance. Moreover, results provide support to regulatory authorities for enacting laws to make internal governance mechanisms work more effectively in the country.

This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the effects of internal governance mechanisms on firm performance using the data of Pakistani firms. Moreover, empirical findings somehow proceed to confirm that theories of corporate governance surely provide some support to explain the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance.