Search results

Integrating social network theory with signaling theory, the purpose of this research is to examine the impact of corporate political connections and executive’s international experience on Chinese firms initial public offerings (IPOs) performance in the USA.

This study used Securities Data Company (SDC) New Issues database to identify all Chinese firms that went public in the USA between 2003 and 2014. Consistent with previous research, IPO firms excluded from the sample include merger or acquisitions, spin-offs and initial stage listed firms. The final sample size is of 142 Chinese foreign IPOs in the US markets.

This study finds that firms with political connections perform significantly poor than firms without political connections. It shows that US stock markets react to the signals of political connections of Chinese foreign IPOs. In response, the Chinese foreign IPOs can signal international work experience of top executives to US investors. The results show that the executives’ international work experience has significant positive relationships on foreign IPO performance of Chinese firms. Moreover, this study finds that the interaction between corporate political connections and international experience pursues positive effects on the performance of foreign IPOs.

This research intends to extend the knowledge of how corporate political connections and international work experience affects the performance of Chinese firms attempting to access US capital markets. To date, scholars have not investigated the influence of corporate political connections on the amount of capital raised by foreign IPOs.

This study aims to examine how the political career concerns of top executives affect corporate environmental practices.

Based on rent-seeking theory, this work uses empirical analysis to investigate the impact of top executives’ political connection and political promotion on corporate environmental information disclosure (EID). Data were collected from Chinese listed firms in heavily polluting industries in the Shanghai Stock Market in 2014–2016.

The results reveal that the highly politically connected top executives are more likely to be promoted in their political positions than their counterparts. However, the firms under the management of these highly politically connected executives show low level of EID. The results suggest that the political motivations of top executives with political connection hinders corporate EID.

This paper extends literature system about the impact of executives' rent-seeking on corporate EID by examining the informal mechanisms in terms of political connection and political promotion. It provides insights for studies of corporate environmental strategies and governmental environmental responsibility.

The purpose of this paper is to ask the following question: is there a link between being politically connected, the quality of governance and the company’s ownership structure?

The author then examined Canadian companies from the S&P/TSX index for the year 2015.

Political connectedness is significantly associated with lower quality of governance in relation to shareholders’ rights; ownership concentration is associated with lower quality of governance in relation to the overall governance, board of directors, shareholders’ rights and compensation structure indices; ownership structure does not mediate the relationship between political connections and quality of governance; and number of political connections through the executive is associated with less risky governance practices in relation to compensation structure; in other words, when members of the executive are politically connected, the firm adopts better compensation practices.

The time limitation is the main weakness of this study and probably the cause of observed mitigated results.

The author hope that the results will inform regulators on the need not only to further regulate the business-politics relationship, but also to consider the specific traits of concentrated ownership companies and the most critical aspects of corporate governance in politically connected firms, such as shareholders’ rights, particularly those of minority shareholders. For example, an intriguing case to investigate in the Canadian context would be Pierre Karl Péladeau’s foray into Quebec politics and the controversy ignited by his political bid in light of his position as majority shareholder (75 percent) in communications giant Quebecor Inc.

In fact, the results shown that concentrated ownership firms have lower governance quality than non-concentrated ones. Furthermore, in a concentrated ownership context, the minority shareholders’ rights could be threatened. In this sense, the results also shown that shareholders’ rights seem to be the most critical governance issue for the politically connected Canadian firms. These results are therefore the indication that Canadian financial market regulators must take action about politically connected and concentrated ownership firms in order to further protect minority shareholders’ rights.

This study makes a double theoretical contribution by enriching the literature on corporate governance and by providing one of the first investigations into the direct and comprehensive relationships between political connections, governance and ownership structure.

The purpose of this paper is to test the political costs hypothesis in emerging economies characterized by interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights. The paper uses executives’ political connection and state control to measure firms’ political costs.

Based on a sample of Tunisian firms, univariate and multivariate analyses are used to test whether firms’ political costs have any impact on earnings management.

The empirical analysis indicates that the executives’ political connection is not directly related to earnings management. However, the interaction between executives’ political connection and the state control affects the firm’s sensitivity to political pressure and its earnings management practices. More specifically, this study provides evidence that non-connected firms and state-controlled firms attempt to use accounting policies to decrease their earnings especially during periods of the former government when they had to face high political costs. This finding is robust to comparing means of political cost indicators between different groups. Indeed, private firms with political connection enjoy a significantly lower insurance right, tax and donations and grants compared to other firms.

This study provides empirical evidence for the specific application of accounting theory in emerging economies.

Political influence may be an important criterion that will be used by auditors and investors to appreciate and detect specific manipulations of accounting earnings. Similarly, regulators should be aware of the political factors effect on discretionary behavior of managers to provide appropriate rules and standards.

The study is a pioneer in proving that a firm’s size is not always a suitable measure of its political cost. It extends the accounting literature on the role of political economy in the application of the political costs hypothesis. This hypothesis is confirmed in emerging economies by providing new and significantly measure of firms’ political costs

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

This study aims to examine how business executives' political connections are associated with government subsidies and strategic change, and how they, in turn, influence firm performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and market share.

Hypotheses were tested using the large firm-level dataset provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China for the period 2003–2013. This is one of the most comprehensive datasets of Chinese manufacturing companies and includes 321,722 firms on average per year, which spans over 37 industries.

The authors found that political connections, measured by senior executives' membership in the National People's Congress of China (NPC), were positively associated with government subsidies but were not associated with strategic change. Also, government subsidies, as the underlying mechanism, mediated the relationships between NPC membership and firm performance but strategic change did not.

By examining the possible mediators between corporate political strategies and firm performance, the authors confirmed the thought that the impact of political connections on firm performance is a complex phenomenon and goes beyond a simple direct effect. However, future research could explore other mediators in this relationship.

While the direct relationship between political connections and firm performance has been examined in management literature, the results are mixed. For the first time, the authors addressed the gap and opened the “black box” – the underlying mechanisms of this relationship. This study's findings contribute to the literature on corporate political activity, strategic change, and their influences on firm performance.

This paper aims to explore the impact of a firm’s political connections on its economic value added (EVA) performance while treating connection heterogeneity and product diversification as moderators.

Based on data collected from 1,143 Chinese manufacturing listed firms in China’s A-share market from 2012 to 2017, this study conducted panel data analysis to investigate proposed relationships.

The findings provide evidence that political connections promote EVA performance of enterprises and both connection heterogeneity and product diversification negatively moderate the political connections – EVA performance relationship.

Drawing sights from the resource-based view, this study investigates the influence of corporate political connections on EVA performance, considering contingent factors of connection heterogeneity and corporate strategy (i.e. product diversification). It, thus, contributes to the literature on political connections by providing additional evidence to explaining the inconclusive findings on the political connections–firm performance relationship and extending prior research by emphasizing the moderating roles of connection heterogeneity and corporate strategy. It also complements prior research on EVA performance by exploring its antecedents.

In China, private equity placement (PEP) has become the most important equity refinancing method because most listed firms issue new stocks in this method. However, previous literature has not paid much attention to the impact of political connections on PEP. In this paper, the authors aim to focus on the effect of ultimate ownership types and political connections on approval, approval time, approval results and proceeds of PEP. Besides that the authors also explore the influence of different types and levels of political connections on PEP.

This study investigates the impact of ultimate ownership and political connections of private firms on the approval of PEPs. The authors obtain a final sample of 1,651 private placement events of Chinese-listed firms. To test the hypothesis that the authors developed in this paper, the authors use empirical models from the existing literature about political connections and corporate finance. They establish multiple linear regressions to test Hypothesis 1 and 3 and introduce a logit model to test Hypothesis 2.

First, this study documents that state-owned firms have significant advantages over private firms in approval procedure. Second, political connections seem to help private firms obtain approval of placements from China Securities Regulatory Commission. Third, political connections through government officers are not useful for firms to obtain refinance resources, whereas the connections of being members of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and People’s Congress are the two valuable types of political connections to help private firms obtain approval.

This paper has three main contributions to the previous literature. The first contribution is to provide an evidence for the relation between political connections and PEP approval procedures. The second contribution is to provide a comparison between government officer’s connection and social title’s connection. The third contribution of this paper is to reveal the influence of non-disclosed political connection on PEP approval. All the three contributions are important for understanding the relation between political connections and firm refinancial policy.

This study aims to examine the effect of the chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on corporate performance in private listed firms in China.

Fixed effects regressions are used to explore the connection of CEO age, tenure, political connection, duality and gender with firm performance. The final panel data sample consists of 16,010 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2020, including A-share private firms listed in the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges.

Five hypotheses are proposed, and results show that certain CEO characteristics, such as age, tenure and political connection, are positively related to corporate performance. Contrary to expectations, CEO duality and gender do not affect firm performance.

Findings present implications for future research on corporate governance and political connections of private listed firms.

Using the evidence of Chinese outbound mergers and acquisitions (M&As) enacted between 2006 and 2014, this study aims to investigate the role played by home political connections on the cost implications of Chinese multinationals. It also examines whether home political connections – at different levels and of different configurations – impact the operational cost of Chinese multinationals.

The data were analysed using a multivariate regression model. To examine their heterogeneous effect on Chinese multinationals, the political connection data were further split into higher and lower level political connections and in chief executive officer (CEO) and chairperson political connections.

This study implies the negative effect of home political connections on the internationalisation of Chinese multinationals. At the same time, the impact of lower-level political connections is stronger than that of their higher-level counterparts. Moreover, CEO political connections have a stronger effect on the operational costs of Chinese multinationals than their Chairperson equivalents.

By unravelling the “black box” of Chinese internationalisation from the social exchange perspective, through the informal political connection networking ties between Chinese firms and the government, this study advances emerging market multinational theory, contributes to the understanding of the heterogeneous nature of political connections and sheds new light on social exchange theory from the perspective of the emerging phenomenon of Chinese internationalisation.