Search results

The effects of ownership concentration on firm performance usually considers two conflicting perspectives: monitoring and expropriation hypotheses. Past studies have produced mix findings. This study aims to shed light on this relationship by focusing on a specific measure of firm performance, firm growth. The moderating effect of industry growth in the aforementioned relationship is also considered, which advances knowledge on the role of moderators.

This study resorts to data from a sample of 21,476 Portuguese firms, which is examined using hierarchical linear modelling. This approach is adequate because the data has a hierarchical structure: the firms are nested within industries.

The results show that equity ownership concentration has a positive effect on firms’ growth and that industry growth amplifies this relationship. Ownership concentration can spur effective monitoring, thereby alleviating principal–agent conflicts of interest and speeding up decision-making, enabling timely competitive actions that promote growth.

The research conceives ownership structure in two groups. However, equity ownership concentration often acquires more complex shapes. In addition, the data used is from a single country.

The results show that firms pursuing growing strategies and operating in growing industries benefit from equity concentration.

Different from past studies, this study focuses on firm growth performance and considers the moderating effect of industry growth.

This study aims to elaborate on how firms manage research and development (R&D) activities by examining the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate R&D investment, as well as the moderating role of stock options in this relationship.

The study sample comprised 354 Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2019, and the Tobit model and the system GMM test are used to check robustness.

The results reveal that ownership concentration and R&D investment have an inverted U-shaped relationship. In the presence of stock options, this inverted U-shaped relationship is significantly weaker.

The results have important managerial implications for firms that aim to grant stock options and improve the impact of ownership concentration on R&D investment strategies.

This paper has a dual purpose: to produce a clear panorama of microfactors behind the implementation of environmental, social and governance (ESG) in emergent economies, and to identify long-term versus short-term implications of ESG and its impacts on sustainable transformation. In particular, the paper investigates the moderating role of ownership concentration on ESG performance and firm value relationship in Southeast Asia during 2010–2022 and COVID-19 period 2020–2022.

By adopting stakeholder and agency theory lenses, this study analyzes 591 nonfinancial listed companies in Southeast Asia from 2010 to 2022 with 2,673 firm-year observations. Data has been collected from Refinitiv and companies' annual reports. Ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimators are main strategies.

During 2010–2022, the links between ESG performances and firm value are negative. Ownership concentration negatively moderates the nexus between governance pillar and firm value in both short and long run. In COVID-19, ownership concentration also plays an antagonistic moderating role in ESG combined score-firm value association. The results show a crucial role of blockholders in Southeast Asian firms and their strong support to ESG in conquering crisis period, suggesting that managers develop balancing mechanisms in making ESG-related decisions; policymakers and regulators improve effective control instruments with strong legal systems and enhanced law enforcement to protect minority shareholders.

This is the first study to test the connection between ESG performance, ownership concentration and firm value in Southeast Asia that has: (1) utilized different proxies of firm value and ownership concentration in robustness tests, (2) controlled heteroskedasticity defects, (3) eliminated companies in the Banking and Finance sector from the sample to avoid distorting the conclusions and (4) empirically verified the driven role of governance pillar in ESG performance and ownership concentration reversely moderated the impact of governance pillar on firm value.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the ownership concentration and cost of equity of firms in Pakistan context. Moreover, this study also investigates how the presence of disclosure quality and governance quality affects the relationship between ownership concentration and the cost of equity of firms.

Data are collected from six non-financial sectors listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange during the period of 2015–2019. This study uses pooled ordinary least square (OLS) method to validate the proposed hypothesis in STATA.

The study found a positive and significant relationship between ownership concentration and cost of equity. The results also show that better disclosure and governance quality negatively moderates the relationship between ownership concentration and cost of equity.

The findings of this study will help firm managers to implement a high level of disclosure and governance quality in firms to reduce agency problems which will further help a firm in reducing the firm's cost of equity. Furthermore, this study is valuable for practitioners regarding thinking about the process of designing ownership structures to protect minority shareholders' rights, especially in emerging markets.

The novelty of this study is having better disclosure quality and more board independence members helps firms with higher ownership concentration in reducing the cost of equity.

The study analyzes the influence of corporate governance and ownership concentration levels on the cost of equity. Further, the authors extend the literature by investigating the moderating effect of ownership concentration levels (i.e. at 5%, 10% and 20%) on the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity.

The study applies several robust panel regression techniques to a sample of 114 active non-financial companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2016. Corporate governance was measured through a unique index comprising 30 governance attributes. The cost of equity was measured through the capital asset pricing model. Further, the authors construct three variables for ownership concentration levels, i.e. at 5%, 10% and 20%. To address the endogeneity problem, the one-lagged variable model and GMM approaches were also applied.

The results indicate that better corporate governance reduces the cost of equity, while ownership concentration at high thresholds would increase the cost of equity. Further, the authors find that ownership concentration at the 20% threshold moderates the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity. Thus, the authors argue that firms can minimize the risk faced by shareholders by implementing substantive corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, effective corporate governance mechanisms at high ownership concentration levels are imperative for managing the cost of equity.

The study reports novel evidence that ownership concentration at a high threshold moderates the effect of corporate governance on the cost of equity.

“The latest available cross-country data presented in the PEPPER V Report (Lowitzsch and Hashi, 2024) can be viewed by examining EFP in and of itself as an isolated subject or it can be viewed in a much wider set of contexts. Widening the lens in order to examine EFP in the context of the concentration of capital ownership and the concentration of capital income can help observers establish EFP’s span of relevance. In particular US data on capital income show that policy makers need to be aware that EFP can have an important role in narrowing the income and wealth gap for the working middle class when the concentration of capital ownership and capital income is high and when real wage growth is low.”

“Against this background, this article makes a very straightforward observation that the relevance of EFP in an economic system, in a country, and for the average employee in a country is related to the trend in the concentration of capital ownership and capital income. Interest in the idea is potentially increased or decreased by trends in real wages. Atkinson, who many consider the founder of modern wealth concentration scholarship, “focuses on the increasing share of capital incomes a source of income inequality among individuals” (Cirillo et al., 2017, p. 1). Indeed, we consider the difference between labour’s share and capital’s share to be a critically important fundamental problem of political economy. This essay asserts that when this concentration is high and real wages are flat, other things being equal, EFP may be more relevant. When the concentration of capital ownership and capital income is high, this means that ownership and income on that ownership is thinly spread in the population. When real wages are flat, this means that the rate at which fixed wages can replenish wealth is decreasing. As a result, both trends would make EFP more relevant.”

The conceptual model suggested for this article asserts that the relevance of EFP can be viewed as a function of narrowing income and wealth options for the working middle class when the concentration of capital ownership and capital income is high and when real wage growth is low. Does this relevance change across economic systems? There is no question that the future understanding of these issues requires adding metrics to the statistical methodologies of different regions and countries and adding to existing reports and analyses that focus on both the dynamics of and trends in capital income (property income in the EU) and on the EUR and USD value of EFP at the mean and at the median for different income levels of the population

This article presents – for the first time – a society-wide measure of the impact of EFP on one economy, namely, the US For further research, it makes sense to build on the comparable data available on the distribution of capital ownership and have similar research on the distribution of capital income for both the EU and the US along with measures of the EUR and USD values of EFP.

The primary objective of this study is to determine how concentrated ownership affects stock returns by country and scale (by market capitalization), like large, medium, and small-cap firms in selected developed economies of the world.

Using a dataset comprising 12,751 annual observations from 850 listed companies from developed economies from 2004 to 2018, the study employs panel data models and instrumental variable estimation to mitigate endogeneity bias.

The findings reveal a significant and positive correlation between ownership concentration and expected returns on corporate equities in developed economies. Furthermore, the study categorizes firms into distinct size categories and finds nuanced differences in the relationship between ownership concentration and stock returns across large, medium, and small-cap enterprises. The results of the study reveal that ownership concentration (by country) and scale (Large, medium, and small) have a significant and positive impact on the stock returns of firms in developed economies.

the practical implications of this study extend to investors, firms, policymakers, regulators, and other stakeholders involved in the financial markets. By considering these implications, stakeholders can make informed decisions to enhance market efficiency, investor protection, and overall market integrity.

To the authors' understanding, this study is the first to examine the impact of concentrated ownership on excessive stock returns across countries and scales, with an explicit focus on large, medium, and small companies in select developed economies worldwide.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of board characteristics (board size, board independence and duality) on the performance of takaful insurance providers with distinguishable muamalah contracts (wakalah and hybrid) moderated by ownership concentration.

The sample consists of 30 takaful insurances. The authors divided it into two subsamples: 18 insurance companies using wakalah contracts provided by Southeast Asia and 12 insurance companies using hybrid contracts provided by the Gulf Cooperation Council over the period 2010–2020. For data analysis, the authors used the partial least squares path modeling method.

The results show that the larger the board of directors and the higher the number of independent directors, the greater the takaful performance in both the wakalah and hybrid subsamples. Nondual functions improve the takaful performance in both the wakalah and hybrid subsamples. The results also reveal that a highly concentrated ownership structure positively (negatively) moderates the relationship between board size and takaful performance in the wakalah (hybrid) subsamples. Moreover, highly concentrated ownership insignificantly (negatively) moderates the relationship between independent directors and takaful’s performance in the hybrid (wakalah) subsample. Furthermore, a highly concentrated ownership structure insignificantly (negatively) moderates the relationship between the nondual structure and takaful performance in the wakalah (hybrid) subsample.

This study contributes to the understanding of the moderating role of a highly concentrated ownership structure between the characteristics of the board of directors and the performance of takaful insurance, which applies wakalah and hybrid contracts. In addition, this study contributes to takaful insurance by determining the appropriate board characteristics that must be adopted to achieve oversight and improve performance. Regulators should appreciate this contribution to the formulation of suitable approaches for efficiently supervising takaful insurance activities.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the largest shareholder's voting stake on the firm's capital structure decision.

To empirically analyze the influence of the voting stake on leverage, a large sample of 814 exchange-listed firms is applied. The baseline regression analysis is complemented by several robustness tests and a difference-in-difference regression analysis to mitigate endogeneity concerns.

The authors find a negative relationship between the voting stake of the largest shareholder and leverage, consistent with the notion that large, undiversified shareholders have the incentive to reduce risk. Additionally, results reveal that family control has a positive moderating effect, indicating that the negative relationship is less pronounced for family controlled firms.

The authors contribute to the research by suggesting ownership concentration as another determinant of capital structure. Further, the authors add to the literature by showing how the association between ownership concentration and leverage is moderated by family control and that the identity of the largest shareholder is of great importance.

The paper provides important insights to the current debate on the proposal of the European Commission to reintroduce shares with multiple votes as part of the Listing Act. The authors expect the regulation to exacerbate the concentration of voting rights, which results in lower leverage and thus limits corporate growth.

The authors differentiate from previous studies by focusing the largest shareholders' voting stake, instead of using the ownership stake, to assess the impact of ownership concentration on leverage.

The purpose of the study is to examine how operating efficiencies from incentive alignment compensate for rent extraction in family firms. The author asks whether ownership (1) improves operating efficiencies to increase firm value, (2) positively affects related-party transactions (RPTs), or (3) destroys firm value. Finally, the author assesses whether the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect.

This study employs a panel of 333 listed family firms (and 185 nonfamily firms) and handles endogeneity using a dynamic panel system GMM and panel VAR.

Ownership decreases discretionary expenses and increases asset utilization to add firm value. The efficiency gains generate more value in family firms, especially majority-held ones, than in nonmajority ones. However, ownership is also related to increased RPTs (especially dubious loans/guarantees), reducing firm value. RPTs destroy value more severely in the family (or group) firms than in nonfamily (nongroup) firms. It could be why ownership's positive impact on value is lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms. Overall, the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect and is robust to controlling private benefits of control in the dynamic ownership-value model.

(1) A family firm's ownership may not be optimal. (2) The firm's long-term commitment as a dynasty limits the scale of expropriation yet sustains impetus for long-term value creation. The paradox partly explains why large family holdings and firm-specific investments endure over generations. (3) This way, large ownership substitutes weak investor protection in India despite tunneling as skin in the game provides necessary investor confidence. (4) Future studies can examine whether extraction varies with family generations and how family characteristics affect the incentive effects.

(1) Concentrated ownership may not be a wrong policy choice in emerging markets to draw firm-specific investments. (2) Investors, auditors, or creditors must pay closer attention to loans/guarantees. (3) More vigorous enforcement, auditor scrutiny, and board oversight are needed.

Family firms are not necessarily a bad organization type that destroys investor wealth. They can be valuably efficient due to their ownership and wealth concentration, and frugality. They matter in the economic growth of a developing market like India.

(1) Extends ownership-performance research to family firms and shows that although ownership facilitates tunneling, the incentive effect dominates; (2) family ownership is not impacted by firm value; (3) family ownership levels reduce discretionary expenses and increase asset utilization to create added value, especially in majority-held family firms; (4) RPTs and loans/guarantees increase with ownership; (5) value erosion from RPTs is higher in family (group) firms than in other firms.