Search results

Power is central to inter-organizational relationships. The literature distinguishes between structural power (i.e. dependence) and behavioral power (i.e. use of power), yet few studies considered them simultaneously. Opportunism is generally linked to use of power, but it remains unclear whether use of power deters or invites opportunism. In this study, the authors treat dependence as a driver of use of power and opportunism as its outcome, and empirically test relationships among dependence, power, and opportunism from both buyer and supplier perspectives. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This study examines how buyer and supplier dependence influence the other’s and their own use of coercive and non-coercive power, which lead to opportunism of two parties, based on data from 240 companies in China on their perceived relationships with major suppliers.

Results show that buyer/supplier dependence is positively related to supplier’s/buyer’s use of coercive and non-coercive power. Buyer’s and supplier’s use of coercive power also positively influences their opportunism. Buyer’s use of non-coercive power is negatively related to both partners’ opportunism, whereas supplier’s use of non-coercive power is not significantly related to either partner’s opportunism.

This study contributes to literature in two ways. First, the authors distinguish the structural aspect of power from its behavioral aspect and demonstrate that dependence, which represents structural power, generates different patterns of influence on use of coercive and non-coercive power when considered from buyer’s and supplier’s perspectives. Second, the authors reexamine relationships between use of power and opportunism and show that buyers and suppliers react differently to use of different types of power.

This paper aims to propose an integrated model based on buyer and supplier opportunism to show the mechanism through which current and competing suppliers influence buyer market competitiveness.

Questionnaires were distributed to purchasing staff in listed electronics firms in Taiwan to collect empirical data. Structural equation modeling was used to analyze these data and examine the fitness of the proposed model.

The findings show that current and competing suppliers influence buyer market competitiveness through supplier opportunistic behaviors and buyer commitment. The alternative attractiveness of competing suppliers affects buyer market competitiveness through the influence of asset specificity. Supplier opportunism negatively and indirectly influences buyer market competitiveness through buyer commitment. Nevertheless, buyer opportunism does not influence buyer commitment and market competitiveness.

The investigation focused on only one industry in one country. Future research could investigate other industries and countries to increase the generalizability of the findings.

The results suggest that buyers can focus on utilizing the pressure of alternative suppliers to improve market competitiveness through increased specific investments by the current supplier.

On the basis of buyer–supplier opportunism, this study shows the mechanism through which the asset specificity of current suppliers and alternative attractiveness influence buyer market competitiveness.

In this paper, the authors seek to contribute to the supply chain digitalisation literature by investigating a potential dark side of supply chain digitalisation from the viewpoint of the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) suppliers, namely digital capability asymmetry and the partner opportunism of more digitally capable large buyers against SME suppliers. The authors seek to contribute further to the governance literature by investigating the effectiveness of the governance mechanism (legal contracts and relational contracts) in suppressing partner opportunism of this nature.

Using survey data collected from 125 Korean SMEs, the authors employed a hierarchical regression method to test a set of hypotheses focussing on the dark side of supply chain digitalisation and the effectiveness of the governance mechanism.

The study’s findings suggest that supplier-perceived digital capability asymmetry, wherein a buyer has a superior digital capability than its SME supplier, increases the SME supplier's dependence on the more digitally capable buyer, with the result that it is more exposed to buyer opportunism. Moreover, the results suggest that only relational governance is effective in protecting SME suppliers from buyer opportunism of this nature.

So far, the overwhelming majority of supply chain digitalisation research has debated its “bright side”. On the contrary, from the resource dependence theory perspective, this paper explains its dark side by providing empirical evidence on (1) the links between supplier-perceived digital capability asymmetry and a buyer's opportunism through an increased supplier's dependence and (2) the effectiveness of different types of governance in opportunism suppression.

Firms often struggle with opportunistic behavior from supply chain partners. Relying on Transaction Cost Economics and its extensions, this study developed a conceptual model theorizing the antecedence, consequences and conditional factors of opportunism within a buyer–supplier–supplier triadic relationship.

This study employed a cross-sectional survey data collected from 200 U.S. firms. The collected data were analyzed with SPSS and AMOS, the two statistical software, for reliability, validity, confirmatory factor analyses and structural equation modeling.

First, opportunism negatively influences operational performance and business performance, and such an effect is fully mediated by relationship stability. Second, this study classified power asymmetry as asymmetrical power discrepancy and asymmetrical power advantage with these two forms playing different roles in influencing opportunism. Results indicate that asymmetrical power discrepancy induces opportunism while asymmetrical power advantage strengthens the negative influence that opportunism has on relationship stability. Additionally, the mediated moderating effect of asymmetrical power advantage by relationship stability is confirmed.

The results provide significant academic and managerial insights that can guide managerial efforts in distinguishing types of power asymmetry, controlling opportunism and further mitigating the consequences of opportunism within a triadic relationship.

This study examines how unilateral supplier transaction-specific investments (TSIs), directly and indirectly, influence international buyer opportunism and the extent to which detailed contracts enable suppliers to safeguard against international buyer opportunism. The study also examines whether relationship length affects the efficacy of detailed contracts in cross-border outsourcing relationships.

The hypotheses are tested by using data collected from multiple informants working for 229 manufacturing suppliers in China. Multiple regression with a three-way interaction is used to test the hypotheses.

Unilateral supplier TSIs encourage international buyer opportunism through increased supplier dependence. Contract specificity negatively moderates the effect of supplier dependence on international buyer opportunism. This moderating effect is stronger in long-term cross-border buyer–supplier relationships than in short-term ones.

The current study extends the cross-border outsourcing literature by examining how emerging-market suppliers in a weak power position can proactively safeguard against international buyer opportunism by using detailed contracts. Our findings show that supplier dependence mediates the relationship between unilateral supplier TSIs and international buyer opportunism; detailed contracts, however, can help dependent suppliers safeguard against international buyer opportunism. In particular, the findings highlight the importance of long-term buyer–supplier relationships that enhance the efficacy of detailed contracts.

In light of increasingly tight buyer–supplier relationships, opportunism is a problem of increasing relevance. So far, opportunism has mainly been researched as a detrimental action by suppliers and interpreted with an institutional economics lens. Recent conceptual work, however, has argued more for a behavioral approach to operations management, suggesting benefits of taking a social capital perspective on opportunism. Based on a large empirical sample of buyer–supplier relations, this paper aims to provide an empirical study using social capital as theoretical lens. Further, it analyzes both supplier and buyer opportunism at the same time.

The paper, through following a quantitative approach, considers the interacting dyad of buyer and supplier opportunism, its antecedents as well as its performance implications.

Findings did not support the expectation that supplier opportunism will be countered by buyer opportunism in a single relationship. However, social capital in the form of cognitive and relational capital has been found as a good predictor of opportunism. This study proposes new measures for structural capital. Further the study confirms the detrimental effect of opportunism on performance of the buyer–supplier relationship, highlighting the mediating role of innovation as building block of relational competitive advantage.

Previous studies on opportunism in buyer–supplier relations were mostly transaction cost-oriented, thus neglecting the behavioral aspects of exchange processes. Introducing social capital theory revealed to be a rewarding amplification of the perspective. Next, most research up till now was focused on explaining supplier opportunism only. This study contributes by analyzing both sides of the interacting dyad. Finally, this research closes a research gap by not only explaining the occurrence of opportunism but by also testing its performance outcomes. Accordingly, this study contributes to the opportunism literature, social capital theory development and to the management of buyer–supplier relations.

Building up cognitive and relational capital is likely to be a tool to reduce the danger of opportunism – both with the partner firm, as well as inside the own organization. As such, firms need to make sure that both forms of social capital are present to a higher extent. If this is not the case, opportunistic actions on both buying and supplying side might occur which have damaging impacts on the generation of innovation as well as the achievement of strategic advantages.

While previous studies have focused on explaining supplier opportunism, an analysis of both sides of the interacting dyad between buyer and supplier opportunism is missing. Not only does this research provides further insights with regard to the latter, but further considers the role of social capital as underlying factor explaining both buyer and supplier opportunism. Also, this research answers the call on more research about the relation between opportunism and performance, specifically focusing on innovation and strategic advantage generation.

Interorganizational dependence is considered as a liability for each firm and needs to be managed properly. Rather than exploring the opportunistic outcome of dependence, the authors focus on the moderating role of supply chain boundary spanners' guanxi. This study tends to uncover the way and the conditions under which boundary spanners' guanxi influences dependence-opportunism relationships.

Using a survey of 380 buyer–supplier exchanges in China, this study first examines the relationship between dependence and opportunism, then assesses the contingent role of boundary spanners' guanxi and further tests how unfairness perception and legal inefficiency alter the role of guanxi in managing dependence.

This study finds that buyer dependence increases supplier opportunism while supplier dependence lowers supplier opportunism. Boundary spanners' guanxi weakens the opportunism-facilitating impact of buyer dependence and mitigates the opportunism-restricting effect of supplier dependence. However, unfairness perception would attenuate the value of guanxi in restricting depended sides' opportunism but strengthen the value of guanxi in motivating depending sides' opportunism; legal inefficiency would amplify the value of guanxi in facilitating depending suppliers' opportunism.

First, the study enriches supply chain dependence studies by incorporating interpersonal guanxi into the investigation of dependence-opportunism relationships. Second, the study adds to the supply chain management literature by uncovering a contrasting role of guanxi in influencing the dependence-opportunism relationship. Third, the study incorporates an agency view to uncover two boundary conditions under which guanxi is mobilized for personal interest seeking or for organizational purposes.

Based on a survey study of 138 software buyers in Turkey, this study examines conditional indirect effects of requirements uncertainty on supplier opportunism where buyer dependence, a proxy for relation-specific investments, undertakes a mediator role. The authors consider a two-level moderation effect of trust and contract in buyer–supplier relationships throughout the software project lifecycle.

A survey-based empirical study was conducted, and conditional process analyses were run using PROCESS macro in SPSS. The present study tests a two-stage moderated mediation model in which competence-based trust with a detailed contract setting moderates the mediational path from requirements uncertainty to buyer dependence.

The data obtained from the buyer side in the Turkish software industry showed that a relationship in which the buyer is structurally dependent begins at a high level of trust. On the other hand, the authors found that contractual rigidity fosters supplier opportunism ex-post in evolving process of the relationship.

This study contributes to project management literature by testing a two-level moderation effect of governance and the mediator role of buyer dependence in the relationship between requirements uncertainty and supplier opportunism. Moving differently from the previous studies, this study integrates contributions of both economic perspectives, such as resource dependence theory and transaction cost analysis, and relational perspectives into the information processing view.

The authors argue that the supplier’s perspective in managing buyers using relationship commitment is incomplete. The primary reasons for incompleteness are that: the effects of the two types of relationship commitment (i.e. affective and continuance) on buyer behaviors (i.e. individualized consideration and opportunism) are largely ignored from a supplier’s perspective; there is quandary regarding the effects of the two relationship commitment types in a relationship, whether they are favorable or not; and there is also ambiguity regarding the conditions under which relationship commitment types might serve as effective relational governance mechanisms. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

The authors employ survey data obtained from 207 suppliers to test the hypotheses using structural equations modeling.

The authors extend contemporary knowledge on supplier relationship commitment by revealing that at high-levels of buyer-leverage, supplier affective commitment can induce buyer opportunism and supplier continuance commitment can induce buyer individualized consideration. Furthermore, buyer-leverage positively moderates the interaction effect of supplier commitment types to promote buyer opportunism.

The authors do not examine a buyer’s perspective, but from a supplier’s perspective, suppliers can maximize their benefits from their relationship commitment by embracing affective commitment while ensuring that buyers do not have excessive leverage.

The study presents a significant contribution to the extant literature on relationship commitment by probing the dual nature of supplier relationship commitment; albeit for specific configurations of commitment types and buyer-leverage.