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Pay-what-you-want (PWYW) is a pricing strategy implemented in a variety of settings like supermarkets and museums, in which consumers determine the price they are willing to pay for a product or service based on their perceived utility. The authors propose an analytical model to investigate the impact of PWYW delivery pricing on the online food delivery (OFD) platforms.

Using a game-theoretic model, the authors characterize the equilibrium as a function of the platform's average delivery cost and the consumer's social preferences parameters like fairness and reciprocity. The authors derive the parametric conditions under which PWYW generates higher profits for the platform compared to the traditional pay-as-asked delivery pricing.

For the PWYW strategy to be profitable, the average delivery cost to the platform should be low. Therefore, OFD platform managers should focus on reducing delivery costs. The authors also identify the feasible region in which the platform managers need to maintain the consumer's social preferences.

Under PWYW, the authors recommend that the platform managers impose a minimum delivery fee which consumers can use as a benchmark to minimize zero delivery fee payments and consumers' free-riding tendencies simultaneously. This allows OFD platforms to extract online orders from highly price-conscious consumers.

This is one of the first studies to explore the innovative application of PWYW to a particular segment of delivery pricing in OFD platforms. The authors establish that the overall consumer surplus and social welfare are higher under the PWYW strategy, forming a solid ground for its implementation in OFD platforms.

The paper attempts to discuss the impact of reference price effect on pricing decisions.

With the growth of the Internet and e-commerce, more and more customers purchase products in through online channels and choose products by comparing different prices and services, and the reference price effect has an impact on pricing decisions. To investigate the impact of consumers' reference price effect on the dual-channel supply chain, the authors establish a basic model consisting of a single dominant manufacturer and a single downstream retailer, and analyze the optional decisions under different situations and discuss the influence of reference price effect. Finally, a number case verifies the validity and rationality of the proposed model.

The results show that (1) the reference price effect has varying effects on the price, channel demand and income of manufacturers and retailers in the channel depending on the role of customers' channel preferences. (2) The manufacturer's online channel demand and profits always increase with the reference pricing effect, whereas the retailer's offline demand and profits always decline. (3) When the proportion of consumers preferring offline is higher, the manufacturer's network price and wholesale price increase with the reference price effect, while the retailer's retail price decreases with the reference price effect; when the proportion of consumers preferring offline is lower, the opposite is true, and the centralized decision results are consistent with the decentralized decision results.

This paper can clarify the impact of consumer reference price effects on the operation of dual-channel supply chains, and help inform pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers in dual-channel supply chains.

The proposed approach can well analyze the impact of consumer reference price effect and give channel their optional decisions.

The purpose of this research is to investigate how to introduce a financing scheme to tackle the manufacturer's capital constraint problem, discuss the effects of data-driven marketing (DDM) quality, cross-channel-return (CCR) rate and financing interest rate on the members' pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions and optimal performances, and analyzes `how to achieve the coordination within a dual-channel supply chain (DSC) by contract coordination.

This work establishes a DSC model with DDM, and the offline retailer can provide internal financing to the capital-constrained online manufacturer. The demand under the price is determined based on DDM quality, customer channel preference and delivery lead time. Then, combined with the Stackelberg game, the optimal pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions are discussed under the inconsistent and consistent pricing strategies with decentralized and centralized systems. Furthermore, it designs a manufacturer-revenue sharing contract to coordinate the members under the two pricing strategies.

(1) The increase of DDM quality will reduce the delivery-lead-time under the inconsistent or consistent pricing strategy and will push the selling prices; (2) The growth of the CCR rate will raise selling prices and extend the delivery-lead-time under the decentralized decision; (3) Under price competition, the offline selling price is higher than the online selling price when customers prefer the offline channel and vice versa; (4) The retailer and the manufacturer can achieve a win-win situation through a manufacturer-revenue sharing contract.

This paper contributes to the studies related to DSC by investigating pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions based on DDM, CCR, internal financing and supply chain contract and proposes some managerial implications.

CAS ONLINE is a unique searching system with an innovative pricing structure. This paper provides a description of the service and discusses the pricing options CAS considered prior to introducing CAS Online, including users' reactions to the chosen pricing structure. Alternatives for extending this pricing method to new online services from Chemical Abstracts Service are also considered.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework to help business marketers with a mixed online and traditional retail channel (multi‐channel company) to find the optimal pricing strategy and market structure in order to maximize their profits.

A game theory model is developed to determine the optimal pricing strategy for the multi‐channel company.

It was demonstrated that an optimal pricing strategy exists under different market structures for a multi‐channel company. When a company uses multiple channels to sell its product, the optimal pricing strategy is to use a low‐high pricing strategy if the online marginal cost is equal to or less than the traditional marginal cost, or a high‐low pricing strategy if the online marginal cost is far larger than the traditional marginal cost. Furthermore, in order to maximize its profit, the company using multiple channels should adopt channel integration as the optimal market structure.

The present study assumed that all consumers have perfect information. However, information with the consumers could be incomplete. It is recommended that future research explore the pricing strategy under incomplete information settings.

The paper provides a very useful model framework, pricing strategy, and market structure for business managers who are using or planning to use multiple channels to sell their products.

This paper fills a conceptual and practical gap for a structured analysis of the current state of knowledge about multi‐channel pricing strategies. It provides practical and solid advice and examples demonstrating the application of the different types of pricing strategies for business managers.

The uncertainty of consumers' perceived value makes online education enterprises face great challenge in developing the pricing strategy. So the purpose of this paper is to research the pricing strategies of online education products by considering knowledge consumers' characteristics.

Considering consumer matching degree and price comparison, this study establishes the utility functions of consumers in normal sales period and discount selling period. On this basis, the research builds pricing models of the online education enterprise under the strategy of price undertaking and intertemporal pricing strategy. It further discusses the impact of consumer matching degree, consumer price sensitivity and different types of consumers on the product price and profit of online education enterprises, and reveals the optimal pricing strategy of the enterprise.

Consumer matching degree and price sensitivity coefficient have positive effects on product price and enterprise profit, but they have different effects on product demand; there are differences in the perceived value of the three types of consumers, and matching consumers are the optimal consumer group; the intertemporal pricing strategy is better than the strategy of price undertaking only when the price sensitivity coefficient is greater than a critical value.

This study enriches the literature on the pricing model of online education products and owns a practical significance to guide the online enterprise to make marketing strategies to increase profit.

The paper attempts to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a two-part tariff coordination mechanism.

To deal with this pricing conflict problems of dual-channel supply chain consisting of dominant manufacturer and a retailer, considering the fact that online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions, the authors establish some basic models and exploit them to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a profit-sharing coordination mechanism.

The results show that the optimal online direct selling price is positively correlated with product perceived quality obtained from online reviews and negatively correlated with the in-sale service. The traditional retail price is positively correlated with the in-sale service and weakly correlated with online reviews. For the manufacturer and retailer, whether decentralized decision or coordination contract, their profits increase with the increase of the in-sale service in a certain range and quality perceived from spontaneous online reviews. Online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions. Positive in-sale services and online reviews can provide consumers with a better shopping experience, thereby promoting their enthusiasm for shopping and improving their quality of life. The two-part tariff coordination mechanism improves the profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer, respectively, through the transfer fee.

The proposed approach can well analyze the channel conflicts and pricing problems between retailers and manufacturers with respect to product offline price and online price. The analysis and results can inform decision-making for manufacturers and retailers.

Conventional theories suggest that the Internet will drive down prices and lead to perfectly competitive prices. However, there is contradictory evidence indicating that online prices are not absolutely lower than offline stores. Regardless, the Internet gives rise to many opportunities for leveraging pricing strategies, in research and testing capabilities, customer segmentation, dynamic pricing, product differentiation, developing brand loyalty, including shipping and handling in the profitability analysis, offering multiple versions, and creating or participating in electronic marketplaces. The trading platform of eBay, Priceline’s reverse auction, and price comparison Web sites are examples of novel Internet pricing models that are helping create a new pricing paradigm.

Examines the phenomenon of online auctions. Begins by developing a theoretical base for understanding how online and in‐person auctions should differ in terms of consumer risk. Online auctions with seller reserve prices are compared to in‐person auctions without seller reserve prices using data from 60 paired sales of collectible figurines. Online auctions are found to exceed in‐person auctions in both mean initial bid prices and mean final sales prices.

The purpose of this paper is to research the price strategies of online knowledge payment product by considering network externality in the C2C sharing economy.

Considering the characteristics of online knowledge goods and the social network externality of consumers, this study establishes a consumer utility function. On this basis, a multistage game pricing model of online knowledge products is established based on three kinds of network price strategies under a completely competitive market structure. It also analyzes the influence of consumer social network structure and consumer utility on online knowledge product pricing and producer profit, as well as the influence of consumer quantity and discount rate on pricing strategy.

The consumer social network and consumer utility affect the pricing of online knowledge product under different price strategies. In the growth period of the platform, adopting the price discrimination strategy, the profit of producers is significantly higher than that of other price strategies, and producers should choose effective price strategies for reasonable pricing in combination with their own sales objectives.

This study enriches the literature on the pricing model of online knowledge payment product and owns a practical significance to guide the knowledge producers’ marketing strategies to increase profit.