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In every industry there are resources. Some are moving, others more fixed; some are technical, others social. People working with the resources, for example, as buyers or sellers, or users or producers, may not make much notice of them. A product sells. A facility functions. The business relationship in which we make our money has “always” been there. However, some times this picture of order is disturbed. A user having purchased a product for decades may “suddenly” say to the producer that s/he does not appreciate the product. And a producer having received an order of a product that s/he thought was well known, may find it impossible to sell it. Such disturbances may be ignored. Or they can be used as a platform for development. In this study we investigate the latter option, theoretically and through real world data. Concerning theory we draw on the industrial network approach. We see industrial actors as part of (industrial) networks. In their activities actors use and produce resources. Moreover, the actors interact − bilaterally and multilaterally. This leads to development of resources and networks. Through “thick” descriptions of two cases we illustrate and try to understand the interactive character of resource development and how actors do business on features of resources. The cases are about a certain type of resource, a product − goat milk. The main message to industrial actors is that they should pay attention to that products can be co-created. Successful co-creation of products, moreover, may require development also of business relationships and their connections (“networking”).

We assess the impact of labor litigations on the ex post performance of firms. Using a sample of 44 French labor litigation cases, our empirical results confirm that the compensation amount requested by an employee has a significant and negative influence on the firm financial performance. Although that effect fades over time, it still remains significant four years after the employee has initiated the legal procedure. In addition, firms that have opted for a trial rather than a conciliation procedure improved their financial performance only in the first two years following the triggering of the litigation. That effect can be mainly explained by the long delays in the judgment of French labor courts. Our results contribute to the debate on the labor litigation impacts by assessing the financial opportunity of enacting pro-worker labor legislation dealing with employment redundancies.

The Scandinavian penal exceptionalism literature has focused largely on imprisonment but has yet to explore other aspects of the penal field in detail. This chapter provides an overview of the penal field in Norway and how community sanctions and measures have evolved within it. The author uses the work of Wacquant and Bourdieu to argue that there are three important levels within the Norwegian penal field: political, policy and practice. The author also discusses how drivers from the political and policy levels are affecting community-based penal practice. Using McNeill’s dimensions of mass supervision, the author discusses the implications of these changes for three less-explored aspects of punishment in Norway: the serving of short sentences at home on electronic monitoring, supervision of people under 18 and ‘punishment debt’ enforcement.

This chapter seeks to explain the effects of actions in investment treaty tribunals against states in the European Periphery. The chapter examines the case of Spain and the multiple actions brought against it due to changes in support structures for the production of solar electricity. The aim of this analysis is to test whether investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) can further the cause of environmental sustainability.

In its opening part the chapter employs a ‘socio-legal’ methodology, showing the links between legal frameworks and the evolution of social and political norms. The chapter then adopts a ‘law and economics’ approach in presenting recent developments seeking to tease out the dynamic between legal changes, economic effects, policy reactions and dispute resolution.

While there is significant uncertainty over the strength of the legal arguments of claimants, it seems possible that they will be successful in claiming compensation from the Spanish government. Nonetheless, a win for the investors is unlikely to reverse the Spanish policy of ending support for renewables due to fiscal constraints. The conclusion is that such actions have a negative impact in terms of promoting the spread of renewables and they inhibit recovery in crisis hit nations.

The chapter offers context on the use of ISDS against the background of the European crisis. This analysis has wider connotations for policy design as it feeds directly into concerns about multilateral agreements under negotiation, such as TTIP.

This is the first comprehensive academic study of the changes in Spanish regulatory frameworks regarding clean energy incentives. It is also the first comprehensive presentation of the actions brought against Spain as a result of these changes.

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This chapter puts practices of everyday violence at the center of its analysis of colonial order. It examines the micro-mechanisms and manifold forms of threatening and hurting people. While a quotidian part of colonial life, such practices – accepted and normal within the colonial moral economy – are not normally seen as state actions. However, they reveal the workings of a powerful state: one that was built in an improvised fashion by low-level state representatives.

Based on an analysis of everyday police work in German Southwest Africa, this chapter offers a theoretical reframing of the colonial state that aims to provincialize the modern European state. It shifts the perspective away from the legal and institutional aspirations and structures of the state, instead turning attention to less rationalized processes: the idiosyncratic, makeshift, affective procedures of low-ranking officials. On this plane, everyday violence played a key role in generating a new social order. Ultimately, it had constructive effects which were a fundamental and inherent part of the colonial state’s power.

Willard A. Hanna's astute observation above about the institutionalization of corruption in Indonesia was published in August 1971, five years after President Soeharto assumed power. The origins of corruption in Indonesia can be traced to the Dutch colonial period as bribery was rife among the lowly paid personnel of the Dutch East India Company (Day, 1966, pp. 100–103). However, corruption became institutionalized during President Soeharto's 32-year reign as his cronies and family “made an art form of creaming off many of Indonesia's most profitable ventures … while being protected by monopoly regulations and their relationship to the president” (Kingsbury, 1998, p. 202). Raymond Bonner (1988, p. 80) has used the euphemism “the family business” to describe “the corruption surrounding members of the Suharto family,” which was “a public secret” in 1988.