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In his work Dr Rugina mentions several times his affinity and indebtedness to the German economist, Walter Eucken (1891–1950). He does so most outspokenly in the following quotation:

The purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive behavior of market agents.

To consider dynamic competitive markets, the authors focus on a differential game theory in oligopolistic structures, using analytical models to illustrate how advertising effort, good differentiation and price stickiness interact simultaneously in the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibria. The comparative assessment of these equilibria obtains some significant results.

An optimization model that enriches the continuous time is presented. Under the open-loop and the closed-loop, Nash equilibrium showed an increase in the total output, advertising in price stickiness and promotional efficiency, while there was a decrease in product differentiation and advertising promotional efficiency. However, the open-loop equilibrium levels are larger than the closed-loop equilibrium. Under the closed-loop information, the long-run equilibrium was faster than the opened-loop in a dynamic oligopoly. The graphical illustration was used to present the behavior of the model parameters.

This study helps managers to choose an appropriate price and advertising adjustment to maximize profit. The obtained results may help firms to make the smart decision and may provide managers the valuable tool for making decisions in the competitive market environments.

This is a first attempt to analyze a dynamic oligopoly in the differentiated market environment. It considers a joint action of the output and advertising in shaping the closed-loop and the open-loop equilibria with N competitors in a dynamic competitive setting.

As the pharmaceutical industry is one of the key sectors of the health-care system, the identification of its structure is of particular importance. This paper aims to determine the structure of the pharmaceutical industry in Iran to provide appropriate solutions for pricing and regulation by policymakers. Iran is a growing pharmaceutical market with over $4bn in sales, so the supply side needs to be examined to meet the domestic consumption.

This research is a descriptive and retrospective analytical study which examines the Iranian pharmaceutical industry through library studies and using pharmaceutical data of the country’s Food and Drug Administration during 1992-2016. Due to data availability in firm level, the concentration ratio of N leading firms and the Herfindahl–Hirschman index are used to measure the concentration of the pharmaceutical market in 2014 and 2016.

The results show that pharmaceutical manufacturing, importing companies and distributing companies play roles in monopolistic competition market, loose oligopoly market and oligopoly market, respectively. For all companies, the magnitudes of Herfindahl–Hirschman indices indicate non-competitive settings. As a result, these companies set their own prices, and market demand affects their sales. In addition, demand for medicines is shaped in the form of supply-induced demand.

This research was accomplished with no computational limitation. However, it was confined to only one country, one industry and the mentioned period of study.

The pharmaceutical manufacturers have no influence on medicine prices, and government pricing regulations lessen the market power of such market agents. However, the easy entry to and exit from market stimulate producers to participate in manufacturing activities. The pharmaceutical importers may expand their imports in response to entry new actors; however, the new entrants weaken the coordination on pricing decisions.

As pharmaceutical distributers act in an oligopoly market, they can collude, reduce competition and lower the welfare of pharmaceutical consumers. In such conditions, high investment requirements and economies of scale may discourage the entry of new firms.

Although there are various studies on market structure in non-pharmaceutical industries, this study is a new effort to measure concentration in the Iranian pharmaceutical market and to determine its structure.

This study aims to analyse the effect of competition on retail fuel prices in a small European Union (EU) country with high market concentration.

The researchers use a panel data set to estimate a fuel price equation that includes supply and demand factors as well as time-fixed effects.

The study finds that more competitors in the local market decrease prices, whereas the high market share of oligopoly brands does not condition this effect. Additionally, independent brands set lower prices than wholesalers, and gas stations located near the borders of almost all neighbouring countries are associated with higher prices.

The study suggests that Slovenia’s retail fuel market maintains competitive pricing despite high oligopolistic shares because of historical regulatory influences that shaped firm behaviour and pricing strategies, along with geographical and economic factors such as Slovenia’s role as a transit country. External competitive pressures from neighbouring countries and high levels of traffic, combined with the remnants of regulatory structures, help prevent market abuses and keep fuel prices lower than in other EU countries.

It also indicates that policy should encourage fiercer competition in the local market by increasing the density of gas stations, especially from independent brands.

These findings may be associated with specific country characteristics. This paper introduces unique findings that shed light on the impact of a small market on competition, with a particular focus on highlighting the effect of oligopolistic brands.

Tries to assess the place of Da Empoli’s Theory of Economic Equilibrium, a book on the development of thinking on market structures and price theory. It is an early and important, though almost neglected, contribution. Neglected because the main developments in the 1930s and later on were on market classifications and theories of pricing within these market structures, as developed by Chamberlin, Robinson, Stackelberg, Triffin, and de Jong. Chamberlin and Robinson who knew the study either did not pay attention to and/or did not understand the true nature of the work. The approach was too different from theirs. Da Empoli’s work is on the process of competition. In this he has affinity to work of Knight and Clark written in the 1920s. This approach had some later defenders in the 1940s in Clark, Eucken and Hayek. Around 1960 it got a more prominent place in the work of Clark, Hayek, de Jong and Stigler. At almost the same time the other approach petered out, casu quo came to a close.

This paper first attempts to analyze the issue of brand proliferation by a monopolist allowing transfer pricing as a channel to bridge headquarters and brand divisions, and then to view how the headquarters uses transfer pricing as a strategic device to encounter intra‐brand competition, inter‐brand competition and cross‐border profit‐shifting under an oligopolistic market.

This paper models cross‐country interactions in a Cournot‐Nash framework, and characterizes equilibrium that involves both transfer pricing and output decision. MNE's behavior is based on a two‐stage process in which the centralized headquarters' prior action on setting transfer pricing is to backup the decentralized subsidiaries in their output decision‐making.

It is demonstrated that MNEs have the incentive to manipulate their transfer prices in order to shift profit cross‐border. Higher transfer pricing enables brand divisions to collude easier in the intra‐brand competition model, and the level of transfer price hinges upon the strength of intra‐brand competition and inter‐brand competition. In addition, transfer pricing is affected by tax differences between two countries.

This paper provides the theoretical underpinning to see how headquarters may use transfer pricing as a strategic device to face intra‐ and inter‐brand competition that is visibly evident in many diverse industries.

This study aims to disclose how the nature of corporate ownership, stock efficiency and wage level affect the optimal proportion of employee stock.

This paper studies three duopoly markets: two private enterprises, two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and a private enterprise and an SOE. The competitions between the two parties are taken as a two-stage dynamic sequential game and studied through back-induction.

The results reveal that the enterprise ownership has a directly bearing on the optimal proportion of employee stock and determines whether to implement the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and the specific level of the plan. The optimal proportion of employee stock is positively correlated with its contribution to enterprise efficiency. There are many influencing factors on the effect of wage level on the optimal proportion of employee stock, namely, the ownership nature of ESOP implementer and efficiency difference of different nature stocks.

The results of this study provide policy recommendations for companies preparing to implement ESOP.

The research findings provide policy implications for enterprises to prepare a suitable ESOP and the reform of national equities, especially the mixed-ownership reform in China.

This paper aims to examine how the rise of financial technology (Fintech) lending affects bank competition. Moreover, this study also identifies the structure of Indonesian commercial banking sector and the different behaviour of competition among bank groups (based on their size, type and ownership) and the joint impact of COVID-19 due to the rise of Fintech lending.

Using an unbalanced panel data set of 118 commercial banks in Indonesia over the period 2018–2022, both static panel and 2SLS/IV data analysis were used and found that random effect model is the best model.

The results show that the Indonesian commercial banking sector can be considered as monopolistic competition. Moreover, using the Lerner index reveals that the entry of the Fintech lenders increases bank competition. Furthermore, there were different responses to the impact of Fintech lending on bank competition among state-owned banks, private banks, regional development banks and foreign banks. Greater efficiency and stability lead to greater market power. In the meantime, higher level of asset growth, capitalisation and cost-to-income ratio increase the competition. Lastly, higher bank credit growth and lower inflation boost overall bank competitiveness.

This study highlights some policy recommendations for commercial banks to be aware of the coming of Fintech lenders because they have started to increase the market competition. The government should create a more collaborative ecosystem between banks and Fintech lending to anticipate unhealthy competition.

This study will contribute to the literature by expanding the determinants of bank competition by considering the rise of Fintech lending in the market.

Balancing interfirm relationships is important for firms’ long-term superior performance. However, prior studies mainly focus on interfirm competition or interfirm cooperation separately, ignoring the balance of interfirm relationships. To bridge this gap in knowledge, this study aims to develop a framework to evaluate the balance of interfirm competition and interfirm cooperation and propose strategies to optimize a firm’s interfirm relationships.

After an in-depth literature review, a framework was developed for evaluating and optimizing the interfirm relationships. Taking the high-speed railway industry as an example, the proposed framework was implemented.

The results of the case confirm that the balancing of interfirm relationships can lead to more superior firm performance. Also, rather than mutual suppression, the interfirm competition and interfirm cooperation present a roughly positive relationship.

This study would contribute to the existing knowledge body by developing a framework for balancing interfirm relationships. Also, this study can aid practitioners in evaluating and optimizing their interfirm relationship structures.