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Article
Publication date: 3 May 2018

Hashim Zameer, Ying Wang, Humaira Yasmeen, Amirhossein Akhavan Mofrad and Rashid Saeed

The purpose of this paper is to design a game theory based model that not only provide theoretical basis to control brand counterfeiting, but it also provide a mechanism…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to design a game theory based model that not only provide theoretical basis to control brand counterfeiting, but it also provide a mechanism to enhance brand revenue.

Design/methodology/approach

This study used the dynamic game theory of incomplete information to understand and encounter the brand counterfeiting issues. The study analyzed the economic relationship of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and consumers using mixed strategy of the dynamic game theory of incomplete information.

Findings

The results have indicated that brands those take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting earn maximum revenue, even when the legitimate brands and consumers are unaware from the actions of counterfeiting firms, the legitimate brands should take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting to earn maximum revenue, and there exists optimal anti-counterfeiting cost for the legitimate brand. Further, this study provides theoretical basis where brand managers can decide to adopt or not to adopt anti-counterfeiting strategy, and also indicate the consequences of each decision.

Practical implications

Based upon the findings, the study put forward valuable managerial implications. The study revealed that the legitimate brand must emphasize on the significance of taking countermeasures against counterfeiter and also, brand managers should focus on making product traceable, empowering the consumer and ensuring coordination with government officials to control the counterfeiting issues.

Originality/value

This paper incorporates the role of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and a consumer to establish the dynamic game theory model using mixed strategy to understand and address the counterfeiting issues in the global market.

Details

Marketing Intelligence & Planning, vol. 36 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-4503

Keywords

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Article
Publication date: 11 April 2016

Yuan Shi, Ting Qu and LK Chu

The purpose of this paper is to propose a portfolio procurement framework to response to uncertain customer demand and purchasing price volatility in a simultaneous…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to propose a portfolio procurement framework to response to uncertain customer demand and purchasing price volatility in a simultaneous manner. Then it aims to obtain optimal procurement and production decisions under the portfolio framework to maximize profit.

Design/methodology/approach

The portfolio procurement problem is modeled as a dynamic Stackelberg game and Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained. The portfolio procurement framework is analyzed in the settings, with both risk-neutral objective and downside risk constraints measure of contract prices.

Findings

By obtaining the Nash equilibrium solutions for both the buyer’s ordering decisions and the supplier’s optimum production decisions, Stackelberg game model for portfolio procurement is proved to be feasible. Additionally, downside risk constrains are proposed to help supply chain participants’ to evaluate the profitability and risk probabilities of the designed procurement contracts under the uncertain customer demand and spot market.

Research limitations/implications

This paper assumes the supplier is risk averse and the buyer is risk neutral, and it would be interesting to examine the performances of portfolio procurement strategy with different risk attitudes participants.

Practical implications

This research could help the buyer respond to not only demand uncertainty but also the volatile spot price in the procurement process. Related optimal portfolio procurement strategy can be carried out to improve the enterprise’ procurement plan by adjusting the order of long-term contract, option contract and the spot market. The proposed framework could also help suppliers design and evaluate contracts for buyers with different risk preference, and on the other hand help the buyers decide if she should accept the contracts from the supplier.

Social implications

This research should also increase awareness in both academia and industry on the opportunities of using the dynamic portfolio procurement approach to enhance flexibility and to mitigate the inventory as well as price risks in the procurement process. Effective downside risk constrains on contract prices could also help to protect the bottom line of companies with different risk preference.

Originality/value

The portfolio procurement framework proposed in this research can mitigate inventory and price risks simultaneously. Also, instead of solving the portfolio procurement planning problem in computational simulation experiments as in previous research, this paper proposed a dynamic game model for this portfolio-based procurement problem and obtained its Nash equilibrium solutions for both the buyer’s ordering decisions and the supplier’s optimum production decisions. Finally, an innovative and simple downside risk constraints has been designed to help the buyer evaluate supplier’s contract prices according to their individual risk preference.

Details

Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 116 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-5577

Keywords

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Article
Publication date: 29 October 2020

TianLong Ma and Huiping Zhang

This study aims to disclose how the nature of corporate ownership, stock efficiency and wage level affect the optimal proportion of employee stock.

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to disclose how the nature of corporate ownership, stock efficiency and wage level affect the optimal proportion of employee stock.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper studies three duopoly markets: two private enterprises, two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and a private enterprise and an SOE. The competitions between the two parties are taken as a two-stage dynamic sequential game and studied through back-induction.

Findings

The results reveal that the enterprise ownership has a directly bearing on the optimal proportion of employee stock and determines whether to implement the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and the specific level of the plan. The optimal proportion of employee stock is positively correlated with its contribution to enterprise efficiency. There are many influencing factors on the effect of wage level on the optimal proportion of employee stock, namely, the ownership nature of ESOP implementer and efficiency difference of different nature stocks.

Social implications

The results of this study provide policy recommendations for companies preparing to implement ESOP.

Originality/value

The research findings provide policy implications for enterprises to prepare a suitable ESOP and the reform of national equities, especially the mixed-ownership reform in China.

Details

Journal of Organizational Change Management, vol. 33 no. 6
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0953-4814

Keywords

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Article
Publication date: 9 November 2015

Darong Dai

The purpose of this paper is to study the problem of optimal Ramsey taxation in a finite-planning-horizon, representative-agent endogenous growth model including…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to study the problem of optimal Ramsey taxation in a finite-planning-horizon, representative-agent endogenous growth model including government expenditures as a productive input in capital formation and also with hidden actions.

Design/methodology/approach

Technically, Malliavin calculus and forward integrals are naturally introduced into the macroeconomic theory when economic agents are faced with different information structures arising from a non-Markovian environment.

Findings

The major result shows that the well-known Judd-Chamley Theorem holds almost surely if the depreciation rate is strictly positive, otherwise Judd-Chamley Theorem only holds for a knife-edge case or on a Lebesgue measure-zero set when the physical capital is completely sustainable.

Originality/value

The author believes that the approach developed as well as the major result established is new and relevant.

Details

Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 42 no. 6
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0144-3585

Keywords

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Book part
Publication date: 13 December 2013

Peter Arcidiacono, Patrick Bayer, Federico A. Bugni and Jonathan James

Many dynamic problems in economics are characterized by large state spaces which make both computing and estimating the model infeasible. We introduce a method for…

Abstract

Many dynamic problems in economics are characterized by large state spaces which make both computing and estimating the model infeasible. We introduce a method for approximating the value function of high-dimensional dynamic models based on sieves and establish results for the (a) consistency, (b) rates of convergence, and (c) bounds on the error of approximation. We embed this method for approximating the solution to the dynamic problem within an estimation routine and prove that it provides consistent estimates of the modelik’s parameters. We provide Monte Carlo evidence that our method can successfully be used to approximate models that would otherwise be infeasible to compute, suggesting that these techniques may substantially broaden the class of models that can be solved and estimated.

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Article
Publication date: 6 May 2014

Luke Muggy and Jessica L. Heier Stamm

The purpose of this paper is to summarize ways in which game theory has been or could be utilized within the humanitarian sector and to identify future research…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to summarize ways in which game theory has been or could be utilized within the humanitarian sector and to identify future research opportunities in this field. Game theory is a tool for modeling systems in which multiple decision makers act according to their own objectives and where individual choices affect system outcomes. Humanitarian logistics systems are often characterized by the presence of many such decision makers.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors synthesize literature from operations research, humanitarian logistics, and the political and management sciences that describes either game theory models or settings in which game theory has the potential to contribute practical insights. Papers are categorized based on the types of decision makers highlighted and the facets of humanitarian operations described.

Findings

The review of literature indicates that applications of game theory to humanitarian supply chain systems are limited to date but that many components of humanitarian operations can benefit from such study.

Research limitations/implications

The literature on game theory in humanitarian supply chains is still emerging. The findings imply opportunities for researchers to advance both theoretical and practical understanding in this area.

Practical implications

Current research provides some managerial insights to humanitarian practitioners, but future practice-driven research could increase the impact of game theory models in the humanitarian sector.

Originality/value

This work reviews past research contributions in the area of game theory and humanitarian operations and recommends areas for future research.

Details

Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, vol. 4 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2042-6747

Keywords

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Book part
Publication date: 13 December 2013

Yingyao Hu and Matthew Shum

In this article, we consider the nonparametric identification of Markov dynamic games models in which each firm has its own unobserved state variable, which is persistent…

Abstract

In this article, we consider the nonparametric identification of Markov dynamic games models in which each firm has its own unobserved state variable, which is persistent over time. This class of models includes most models in the Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Pakes and McGuire (1994) framework. We provide conditions under which the joint Markov equilibrium process of the firms’ observed and unobserved variables can be nonparametrically identified from data. For stationary continuous action games, we show that only three observations of the observed component are required to identify the equilibrium Markov process of the dynamic game. When agents’ choice variables are discrete, but the unobserved state variables are continuous, four observations are required.

Details

Structural Econometric Models
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78350-052-9

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Article
Publication date: 1 June 1997

Akhilesh Chandra, Brij M. Lall and Philip H. Siegel

This paper explores the role of neural networks for decision making in dynamic environments which are characterized by risks and uncertainties, and also provides…

Abstract

This paper explores the role of neural networks for decision making in dynamic environments which are characterized by risks and uncertainties, and also provides experimental evidence from a simulated data. Theoretical support is derived from theories of affective balance, and self‐organized criticality. The simulation is conducted for a two‐person‐constant sum game. The findings of the experiment are helpful in extending to managerial decision making which involves varying degrees of uncertainties. Such decisions are affected by forces both internal and external to the company, and making judgments in such a fuzzy future is highly probabilistic. It is suggested, therefore that neural networks are better able to capture the interactive dynamics of variables operating in a managerial decision environment. In sum, the findings indicate that decisions in general and business decisions in particular can greatly benefit from the parallel computational capabilities of neural networks.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 23 no. 6
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Abstract

Details

Cognitive Economics: New Trends
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84950-862-9

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Article
Publication date: 26 August 2020

Rohit Gupta, Baidyanath Biswas, Indranil Biswas and Shib Sankar Sana

This paper aims to examine optimal decisions for information security investments for a firm in a fuzzy environment. Under both sequential and simultaneous attack…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to examine optimal decisions for information security investments for a firm in a fuzzy environment. Under both sequential and simultaneous attack scenarios, optimal investment of firm, optimal efforts of attackers and their economic utilities are determined.

Design/methodology/approach

Throughout the analysis, a single firm and two attackers for a “firm as a leader” in a sequential game setting and “firm versus attackers” in a simultaneous game setting are considered. While the firm makes investments to secure its information assets, the attackers spend their efforts to launch breaches.

Findings

It is observed that the firm needs to invest more when it announces its security investment decisions ahead of attacks. In contrast, the firm can invest relatively less when all agents are unaware of each other’s choices in advance. Further, the study reveals that attackers need to exert higher effort when no agent enjoys the privilege of being a leader.

Research limitations/implications

In a novel approach, inherent system vulnerability of the firm, financial benefit of attackers from the breach and monetary loss suffered by the firm are considered, as fuzzy variables in the well-recognized Gordon – Loeb breach function, with the help of fuzzy expectation operator.

Practical implications

This study reports that the optimal breach effort exerted by each attacker is proportional to its obtained economic benefit for both sequential and simultaneous attack scenarios. A set of numerical experiments and sensitivity analyzes complement the analytical modeling.

Originality/value

In a novel approach, inherent system vulnerability of the firm, financial benefit of attackers from the breach and monetary loss suffered by the firm are considered, as fuzzy variables in the well-recognized Gordon – Loeb breach function, with the help of fuzzy expectation operator.

Details

Information & Computer Security, vol. 29 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2056-4961

Keywords

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