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The paper aims to highlight the relationship between money laundering and banking confidentiality in offshore financial centres – particularly following the recent publicity and BBC expose surrounding the criminal use of offshore financial centres. It proposes that there has long been concern over the illegitimate uses of offshore financial centres and that the continuing exploitation of them by criminals is, in part, attributed to the West's use of these financial hotspots. The paper outlines the previous attempts by global regulatory bodies to curb money laundering in offshore financial centres and explores some of the reasons for the continuation of money laundering in offshore financial centres.

The paper was compiled by accessing and analysing primary and secondary data which is publicly available. The analysed data were complemented by the author's new theory of the West's collusion with offshore financial centres as a possible reason for the superficial commitment to anti‐money laundering laws and guidelines.

The findings in the paper conclude that even though there have been global efforts to combat money laundering in offshore financial centres, there is little commitment from the offshore financial centres themselves, and the West, to effectively implement anti‐money laundering regulations.

This paper fulfils a gap in the literature by exploring the relationship between the West and offshore financial centres – more specifically the West's continued use of these centres acts as an incentive to avoid relaxing tight banking confidentiality laws. Further research in this area is needed to assess the full impact of the West's relationship with offshore financial centres.

Offshore financial centres are coming under increasing pressure from both the OECD and the European Union. They are seen by many bureaucrats and politicians in OECD countries as facilitating criminal activities such as laundering drug money as well as tax evasion and tax avoidance by residents of high‐tax welfare states. While there are good reasons for nation states to cooperate to suppress criminal activity, this is not true in relation to tax competition. The notion that by engaging in ‘harmful’ tax competition, offshore financial centres are damaging the legitimate interests of OECD nations has no sound foundation in economic theory. Competition in tax matters is beneficial and world welfare enhancing. Governments of offshore financial centres serve their own and the world's interests by providing zero or low tax environments for global business and investment and they are right to insist that treaties on criminal matters should not be used to enforce other countries' tax claims.

This paper considers supranational initiatives ‐ particularly those emanating from the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development, the Financial Action Task Force and the Financial Stability Forum ‐ proposing changes in the regulation of offshore financial centres. The implications of the withdrawal of US support for elements of the initiative are reviewed. The underlying rationales for change are considered, as are the probable and appropriate response for the stakeholders in the offshore centres, including governments, financial institutions and clients.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of economic development on culture and the significance of cultural change on the evolution of offshoring of services and knowledge‐based activities.

The paper offers a conceptual model that links economic development, national cultural predispositions, and the future of offshoring service and knowledge functions. It builds on a range of academic literatures within these core areas to derive a set of propositions that offer insights into the manner in which the relative success and evolution of offshoring service and knowledge work would be impacted by a country's economic development posture and its cultural roots and value systems. The model presented here is also well complemented by examples from real offshoring projects to offer the reader a comprehensive picture of the central propositions put forth.

Several propositions, formulated at the multidisciplinary intersection of service operations management, strategy, and international studies, provide ample opportunities for further discipline‐specific and cross‐disciplinary examination of complex interactions of economic development, culture, and offshoring approaches.

This form of conceptual research provides the basis for more rigorous theory development and testing. The aim of the conceptual analysis was to begin linking nascent research in the area of service and knowledge offshoring to an area of research that examines the links between economic development and culture.

Global operations managers dealing with extended service value chains that include offshore service providers must not only focus on dealing with cultural differences but they must also identify requisite cultural attributes for evolving service center roles.

By integrating perspectives from service operations management, strategy, and international studies, the paper provides new perspectives on offshoring of service and knowledge operations.

An offshore sector makes reference to financial services and non‐financial services frameworks in a country/territory. Clientele who make use of these services are non‐residents of the given jurisdiction. In these service frameworks assets can be diverted to, and business/financial affairs conducted in, an environment where a package of favourable regulatory incentives are in place to benefit clients who would ordinarily not be privy to such regulatory regimes in onshore jurisdictions. These regulatory incentives typically comprise incorporation mechanisms as regards commercial holding companies or overseas subsidiaries in client‐friendly fiscal and exchange control environments.

The Isle of Man, a British Isles offshore jurisdiction located in the middle of the Irish Sea, has experienced three separate bank collapses during a relatively brief 26 year period. These collapses have affected in excess of 20,000 depositors and inflicted significant damage on investor confidence in the Isle of Man as an offshore finance centre. The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of deposit protection during this time frame, teasing out the delicate balance required in small offshore jurisdictions between rigorous standards of investor protection on the one hand and the vital importance of remaining competitive with rival offshore finance centres on the other. It critically evaluates the recently enacted Isle of Man deposit compensation scheme (DCS) by reference to this organising principle.

The paper outlines the nature of the Manx jurisdiction and its offshore development. Focussing on the period 1982‐2010, it discusses the three separate bank collapses and insular regulatory and legislative responses. The focal point of the paper is a critical evaluation of the new Isle of Man DCS including comparisons where appropriate with deposit protection schemes in the Channel Islands offshore jurisdictions of Jersey and Guernsey and discussion of the extent to which the new Isle of Man DCS complies with specific features of recently formulated international best practice standards.

The paper reports that insular regulatory and government responses to bank collapses have tended to be distinctly short‐term and reactive. Despite being the first small offshore jurisdiction in the world to embrace the principle of deposit protection in 1991, there has been a conspicuous failure in the Isle of Man to develop related financial safety net policies, and the overriding motive for the introduction and indeed continuation of deposit protection has been to repair enduring reputational damage inflicted on its offshore finance centre by successive bank failures. The new Isle of Man DCS conforms to this model, reflecting insular anxieties regarding risks of lost banking business to rival offshore jurisdictions as opposed to rigorous standards of investor protection.

Analysis contained in this paper sheds light on the problem of effective deposit protection in small offshore jurisdictions, including tensions in policy terms between principled investor protection and finance centre reputational and competitiveness concerns. It also highlights, more broadly, the endemic problem of delivering optimum investor protection at (small) jurisdictional level in the context of international banking groups operating on a multi‐jurisdictional basis and deploying entrenched business models which operationalise offshore banking arms as essentially vehicles for the onward transmission of liquid funds to treasury functions located in parent groups' home jurisdictions.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute towards development of a management framework for offshore business process outsourcing (BPO).

This paper utilises longitudinal case studies to identify success factors in managing offshore BPO via the captive model (i.e. wholly‐owned subsidiary).

Success in offshore BPO is based on a combination of cost savings, technical service quality and strategic issues, is specific to business context and will change over time. Choice of engagement model (e.g. captive operation or arms‐length contracting) is an important success factor. Advantages of captive centers arise from higher levels of relationship quality, trust and collaboration effectiveness.

This paper focuses on two global companies in two industry sectors (airlines and telecommunications), and both have adopted one particular BPO model (i.e. captive operation).

The paper contributes to scarce literature on offshore captive BPO operations, the most common but also least researched engagement model. The findings have practical implications for managers designing offshore BPO strategy.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the unique contributions from social (i.e. trust climate, departmental integration) and organisational factors (i.e. managerial recognition, goal clarity and technology support) to work engagement and identification with the organisation in a human resource offshoring (HRO) context.

Participants were recruited from a large Australian financial institution with an HR centre located in the Philippines. Ninety-one members of the captive HR centre completed the anonymous online questionnaire consisting of quantitative items and open-ended fields. Regression analyses were conducted to ascertain the relationships hypothesised.

The findings suggest that goal clarity is a key predictor of both engagement and identification with the organisation, and that technology support and managerial recognition also influence offshore staff members’ motivation and workplace attitudes.

The cross-sectional, self-report nature of the study, along with the small sample obtained, are noted as limitations of the study. Nevertheless, the high response rate (91 per cent) and availability of qualitative data provide valuable insight into the key factors that impact HRO operations and performance.

The study uncovers social and organisational variables that affect staff motivation and attitudes in an HRO context, and offers a number of guidelines for practitioners operating in these settings, focussing on goal clarity, managerial recognition and technology support.

The study contributes to a growing body of research into the organisational and human capital factors that account for HRO performance and sustainability, and offers preliminary evidence for their unique contributions to key performance drivers. Guidelines for future research and business practice are proposed, namely, the consideration of multilevel and temporal approaches to the management and investigation of HRO operations.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the moderating influence of attitude toward offshore call centers (OCCs) and brand image of the service provider firm on the relationships among perceived service quality (SQ), customer satisfaction (CS), complaint (CI) and repeat purchase (RP) intentions.

A total of 285 adult shoppers with prior experience with OCCs were recruited using mall‐intercept approach in a large mid‐Western city in the USA. A structured questionnaire was used to record their perceptions about their service provider using OCCs. Structural equation modeling was used to test the measurement and basic structural model, along with multi‐group analysis to test the moderating effects. Multiple moderated regression analysis was also used to verify the moderating effects.

As expected, SQ was found positively associated with CS, and CS was negatively associated with CI but positively with RP. Moreover, attitude toward OCC positively moderated the link between SQ and CS; brand image negatively moderated the link between CS and CI and positively moderated the link between CS and RP. All the hypotheses were supported.

It was found that negative attitudes towards OCC result in feelings of dissatisfaction, increase in complaints and decrease in repeat purchases. However, customers are likely to complain less and continue to patronize for a more reputed service firm compared to a less reputed firm. This finding contradicts recent market reports, hence future research should investigate actual customer complaints and repeat purchases to confirm the moderating role of brand image.

Services firms using OCC should be aware that their customers have varying attitudes toward OCC. They should track these attitudes and their impact on customer complaint and repeat purchase behavior. They should also track and benchmark the service levels of their OCC with their own local call centers and those of the competitors. They could improve customer attitudes toward OCC by customer relationship management and improve the service standards through more training and empowerment of their OCC representatives.

This study is one of the first few empirical investigations of customer reactions to OCCs exploring the moderating influence of “Attitude toward OCC” and “Brand image” on the relationships among perceived service quality, customer satisfaction, complaint and repeat purchases. The findings provide useful insights to managers and researchers alike.

The purpose of this paper is to address two questions: first, what contracts, instruments and accounting activities constitute Australia’s offshore asylum seeker processing policy in practice? Second, how are notions of legitimacy and accountability mediated through the network constituted by this policy?

The paper is located in the critical interpretivist approach to accounting research. It is based on an exhaustive documentary analysis. Policy documents, contract documents, records of parliamentary inquiries (Hansard) and legislation were analysed drawing on a network policy perspective.

The paper finds that the Australian Government has sought to escape its accountability obligations by employing a range of approaches. The first of these approaches is the construction of a network involving foreign states, private corporations and non-government organizations. The second is through a watered down accountability regime and refusal to be accountable for the day-to-day life of asylum seekers in offshore processing centres through a play with the meaning of “effective control”. Yet while the policy network seems designed to create accountability gaps, the requirement within the network to remain financially accountable undermines the governments claims not to be responsible for the conditions in the detention camps.

The paper focuses largely on the period starting from when Kevin Rudd became Prime Minister to the death in Papua New Guinea of asylum seeker Reza Barati on 17 February 2014. Earlier periods are beyond the scope of this paper.

The paper will result in the identification of deficiencies inhuman rights accountability for extra-territorialized and privatised immigration detention and may contribute towards the formulation of effective policy recommendations to overcome such deficiencies. The paper also provides empirical data on, and academic understanding of, immigration detention outsourcing and offshoring.

The paper will inform debate regarding treatment of unauthorized maritime arrivals and asylum seekers generally.

The paper provides the first detailed and full understanding of the way Australia’s offshore asylum seeker processing policy is practiced. The paper also provides an empirical analysis of the way national policy and its associated accountability mechanisms emerge in response to the competing legitimacy claims of the international community and national electorate.