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As a consequence of the global financial crisis and widespread disquiet over executive bonuses and other remuneration, in April 2009 the Financial Stability Forum enunciated principles for sound compensation as part of an effort to ensure the effective governance of compensation. The core problem this article seeks to address is the measurement of the contribution of corporate executives to the intrinsic value of the firm as part of an initial step in the process of implementing the Financial Stability Forum's principles. Unless the contribution of corporate executives can be measured in a manner that satisfies the requirements of sound research methodology, rigorous epistemology, and statutory requirements, it is doubtful whether these principles can be operationalized. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to show how the contribution of corporate executives can be estimated from audited financial statements. From the core problem and purpose of this article, its title is drawn.

Relevant sections of the report of the Financial Stability Forum 2009, the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2010, and the UK Companies Act of 2006, in conjunction with important reviews such as the Turner Review of 2009 and the Walker Review of 2009 were studied. Data inputs from audited financial statements were applied to appropriate well‐established non‐controversial valuation equations that are based on “first‐principles” of corporate finance, and the contribution of corporate executives to the intrinsic value of the firm was estimated in order to illustrate the validity of this approach.

The paper shows that contribution to the intrinsic value of the firm made by corporate executives can be measured in a non‐controversial and transparent way, and once done, can form the basis for quantifying executive remuneration on the basis of valued‐added. No attempt is made to address the fractional share of value‐added that should be placed in a bonus‐pool.

From an extensive survey of publicly available literature, there is no evidence to suggest that the measurement of the contribution of corporate executives to the intrinsic value of the firm, as part of an initial step in the process of implementing the principles of the Financial Stability Forum 2009, has yet been published.

This paper considers supranational initiatives ‐ particularly those emanating from the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development, the Financial Action Task Force and the Financial Stability Forum ‐ proposing changes in the regulation of offshore financial centres. The implications of the withdrawal of US support for elements of the initiative are reviewed. The underlying rationales for change are considered, as are the probable and appropriate response for the stakeholders in the offshore centres, including governments, financial institutions and clients.

The governance of financial markets is approached at various levels. National regulators are charged with the responsibility for maintaining a system of regulation for the purpose of ensuring stability and confidence in the financial markets. This has to be done according to ascertainable standards. Within the European Union, directives and regulations provide a framework for approximating practices within its member states. At the international level, organisations such as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have developed standards and guidelines with the view to harmonising practices among relevant states.

The purpose of this paper is to review the practicality and implications of capital controls in emerging economies in the international financial landscape subsequent to the 1997 Asian financial crisis (AFC) and the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC).

The doctrinal approach used in this study relies primarily on primary data from relevant statutes and regulations in the capital and financial markets, and secondary data from research findings of published sources available in the public domain. It also makes concurrent use of the case study approach.

The disdain over the use of capital controls by emerging economies such as Malaysia in the 1997 AFC by multilateral agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since then and particularly after the 2008 GFC and the 2011/2012 European financial crisis (EFC) has been quietly and gradually transformed into a viable policy option under defined circumstances, especially at the IMF and global forums like the G20. The 1997 AFC in particular induced East Asian economies and others to strengthen the macroeconomic and financial positions, such that they were not only able to withstand the impacts of the 2008 GFC and the 2011/2012 EFC but also contributed to their gradual recoveries through their participation as net lenders to the IMF. The enhanced confidence of these emerging economies to use various capital controls without seeking IMF support spawned new thinking at the IMF to result in the introduction of policy guidelines sanctioning the use of capital controls under particular circumstances.

The paper is constrained by the usual limitations connected with qualitative studies, but this is generally mitigated by triangulation of perspectives and so on.

This paper provides a critical overview of the pros and cons of capital controls. In particular, it analyses the implications of capital controls as a policy option for emerging economies when facing severe financial crisis. It also critically discusses how and why flowing from the aftermath of its application by Malaysia in the 1997 AFC and subsequent employment by other successful emerging economies in response to the 2008 GFC and 2011/2012 EFC, multilateral institutions such as the IMF and international forum like the G20 developed a more positive approach toward the use of capital controls.

Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.

Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.

Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.

The Dodd‐Frank Act of 2010 is the keystone policy response directed at reforming US financial system activities and oversight in the wake of the 2007‐2009 financial crisis. The USA also has financial system reform policy commitments in the international arena, including in particular by virtue of its membership in the G20. The purpose of this paper is to consider US policy initiatives related to a core dimension of financial system reform: risks posed by systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).

The paper provides a deta‘iled comparison of SIFI policy initiatives and timetables under both the Dodd‐Frank Act and the G20 agenda, as reflected in the ongoing work plan of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and poses the question “Are US domestic and international financial system reform commitments in sync?”

The study finds that, fundamentally, the answer is “yes.” However, the comparison yields two caveats with potential policy implications. First, the two agendas differ in their relative emphasis on the coverage of both banks and nonbanks. The G20/FSB focus, at least over the near‐term, is bank‐centric compared with the Dodd‐Frank Act, which consistently addresses both bank and nonbank financial firms. Second, implementation of Dodd‐Frank Act provisions is subject to long‐established US law mandating that there be sufficient opportunity for public input into the rulemaking process, whereas the G20/FSB process has been less systematic and transparent on public consultation and feedback.

These observations may be relevant to the current debate over the speed and scope of Dodd‐Frank Act implementation measures, and to the discussion about the future international competitiveness of US banks and nonbank financial firms.

This study is the first to present a detailed, comprehensive comparison of financial system reform initiatives and provisions in the Dodd‐Frank Act and the G20 agenda.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) governments recognise that the economic and social benefits of open markets for international trade, investment and capital flows can only be enjoyed fully in an environment of sound regulation and international cooperation. Criminal activity and other forms of financial abuse, including tax abuse, can impose high costs on economic and social development, distort resource allocation, challenge stability and integrity of the financial system and undermine confidence in democratic institutions. Growing interactions between national economies and markets and advances in communications and information technology have aided international financial abuses and raised new challenges for policy makers, regulators, supervisors and law enforcement authorities.

Over the last two years a number of initiatives have been brought to the attention of the financial regulators sectors of the global financial system most at risk from money laundering. The Durban Declaration called for the return of wealth plundered by corrupt leaders. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the OECD all identified countries with unregulated or poorly regulated financial systems which encourage money laundering and the US Senate identified problems with correspondent banking. This added attention has encouraged more countries to join the anti‐money laundering movement and there are now 116 member countries in anti‐money laundering groups in Europe, Asia, South America and Africa. However, until their legislation is effectively implemented and the remaining countries join the global anti‐money laundering movement there is unlikely to be any significant reduction in the amount of money being laundered.