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Prior literature has established the theoretical and statistical linkages between monetary compensation and firm performance, yet little is known about how the association between monetary compensation and firm performance is moderated by companies’ engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Further, compared to executive compensation, non-executive compensation remains an underexplored topic. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how workforce-oriented CSR moderates: first, the association between non-executive compensation and firm performance; and second, the association between executive compensation and firm performance.

Using a sample of 181 from the largest 3,000 US companies for the years 1991-2011, the authors investigate how workforce-oriented CSR moderates the association between compensation and firm performance. Compensation is examined at two levels – non-executive versus executive compensation. The workforce-oriented CSR score is constructed as total strengths minus total concerns in Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini’s employee relations dimension.

The authors find an improvement in firm performance with increases in both non-executive and executive compensation. Further, workforce-oriented CSR positively moderates the association between non-executive compensation and firm performance, and negatively moderates the association between executive compensation and firm performance.

This study adds to the literature of the compensation-performance linkage by including both non-executive and executive compensation as important determinants of firm performance and incorporating workforce-oriented CSR as a moderator on the compensation-performance linkage. It also provides new angles for CSR scholars.

This study helps managers understand the importance of fulfilling employees’ social emotional needs and the potential of workforce-oriented CSR in shaping employees’ perceived distributive justice. The findings also help managers make critical decisions regarding the allocation of limited corporate resources and prioritization of investment options. In addition, the findings are also useful to boards of directors and human resources managers who are in charge of hiring executives, building top management teams, and deciding executive compensation.

This study helps advance our understanding of the compensation-performance linkage. The results suggest that the relationship between compensation and financial performance is contingent on other organizational factors. In addition, the findings provide practical implications on how CSR engagement moderates the association between non-executive compensation and firm performance differently than the association between executive compensation and firm performance and how to allocate corporate resources and prioritize strategic options effectively.

While there have been extensive empirical investigations of pay-performance sensitivity, the perspective of performance-pay has received less attention to date. While executive compensation is sensitive to firm performance, firm performance is also likely to be affected by executive compensation. Adopting multiple theoretical perspectives, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether executive compensation has a greater influence on firm performance or whether the latter has a greater influence on compensation.

Using data from a five-year period (2010-2014) for Financial Times and Stock Exchange 350 companies, the authors employ a set of simultaneous equation modelling to jointly investigate, after accounting for endogeneity problem, the mutual association of executive compensation and firm performance by employing four control variables (board size, non-executive directors, leverage and boardroom ownership).

The authors find strong evidence for the greater influence of executive compensation on firm performance than the pay-performance framework. This finding supports the tournament theory compared with the agency perspective.

Inevitably, there are limitations in a wide-ranging study of this nature that could be addressed in future research. As any empirical study utilising company data, there may be concerns to the effect of survivorship bias and the manner in which companies have reorganised, if there is any, themselves during the period under examination. There are also issues as to missing data, some measures relating to both executive compensation and corporate governance are not provided by the BoardEx database.

The study results provide evidence that using the tournament perspective by remuneration committees as a guide for determining executive compensation helps in achieving better performance. This helps in developing appropriate mechanisms for setting executive remuneration.

This paper combines an empirical investigation of the frameworks of pay-performance and performance-pay and develops a system of six simultaneous equations to examine the associations between executive compensation and firm performance.

This study aims to examine whether the pay gap between the chief executive officer (CEO) and non-executive employees affects the firm’s research and development (R&D) efficiency.

The dependent variable is the firm’s R&D efficiency, defined as a percentage increase in revenue from a 1-per cent increase in R&D spending. The main independent variable is the CEO-employee pay gap, defined as the ratio of annual total compensation for the CEO to the average of non-executive employees of the firm. The authors estimate fixed-effects models to examine the association between R&D efficiency and the pay gap between CEO and non-executive employees.

Results indicate a negative and significant association between R&D efficiency and CEO-employee pay gap, which suggests that a wider pay gap reduces employee motivation and effort, consistent with pay equity theory. We also find that the CEO-employee pay gap negatively moderates the relationship between employee pay growth and R&D efficiency

Recently enacted pay gap disclosure requirements mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act will make the disparity between CEO and non-executive compensation more salient. This study provides evidence of a firm outcome associated with that disparity.

This study is among the first to investigate the impact of the pay gap on R&D efficiency, a firm outcome not previously explored in the literature. This study also investigates CEO-employee pay gap’s role as a factor that moderates the effects of employee pay growth and institutional ownership on R&D efficiency

The interest in promoting diversity in corporate governance is increasing gender equality on boards. Even so, previous research shows that women are underrepresented on boards of directors. This study aims to explore how an increasing presence of women on boards reduces gender pay disparity among nonexecutive directors (NEDs).

This study explores how an increasing presence of women on boards reduces gender pay disparity among NEDs.

The results indicate that for boards to reduce the gender pay disparity among NEDs, women need to reach a critical mass of 33% of board members. In addition, this study finds that women’s presence on influential committees further reduces the gender pay disparity among NEDs.

The study uses critical mass and social identity theories to explain the impact of women directors on NEDs’ remuneration in a sample of 365 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange over 16 years (1999–2015). The findings indicate the importance of reducing gender pay disparity as a tool to promote gender equality on boards.

This study provides evidence on the importance of corporations including gender diversity on board committees to reduce gender pay disparities at the board level.

In addition, this study finds that women’s presence on influential committees further reduces gender pay disparity among NEDs.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of corporate governance (CG) developments in Greece and has two objectives: to enrich the debate in this area and to contribute to the increasing literature by presenting the main aspects of the Greek CG framework; and to place the current CG developments and trends in Greece within the international debate, especially in the light of the recent debate to improve and convergence CG in the EU.

First, reviews the evolution of the CG debate in Greece and its implication at the EU level. Second, provides a short view of the institutional‐economic environment in Greece, as it influences corporate governance practices. Then analyzes the CG mechanisms in the light of the recent key reforms. Finally, summarizes the findings and proceeds with some critical points and recommendations.

The general finding is that the development of regulatory reforms was mostly an endogenous process influenced mainly by the speculative events in the Greek capital market during 1999.

The evolution of the Greek CG may have significant implication, such as that the Greek market is a newly mature euro‐area market and CG is supposed to be a key factor for the competitive transformation of the capital market and the business world. In addition, the evolutionary path of CG in Greece may have significant implication for the new EU member states.

The paper shows how the CG practices evolve in a small open economy influenced by speculative events and is valuable to policymakers, regulators and academics.

The purpose of this paper is to examine novel corporate governance-based determinants of risk disclosures among index-listed Finnish companies. Therefore the focus of the study is on explaining the board’s monitoring role in relation to corporate managers.

Firms’ risk disclosures are analysed in terms of their Quantity and Coverage. The authors focus on two board characteristics not examined in prior related literature: first, non-executive board members’ self-interested financial incentives, measured by their share or option ownership, and annual compensation and second, non-executive board members’ competence, measured by their experience in the company and managerial capability proxied by prior education. The sample is composed of the OMXH-25-listed firms, representing the most traded and followed firms among Finnish publicly listed companies.

The authors find that the risk disclosures of these firms can be explained by financial incentives (wealth and compensation) and competence-related factors (attrition rate and education). The results indicate that among the “best disclosers”, the narrative risk disclosures are, on average, on a high level, and variation in risk reporting is largely associated with board characteristics.

The relatively small sample size makes the results vulnerable to type two error. Further research could continue by examining the impact of board work on corporate disclosures across countries and disclosure items.

Board members’ financial incentives and competence impact the dynamism of board work. In this way, they are also associated with board members’ disclosure decisions.

This paper contributes to the extant literature by demonstrating the impact of previously unexamined board characteristics on the quality of the narrative risk disclosures of highly followed firms.

This paper aims to derive firm value implications for various kinds of employee stock options (ESOs) in a framework that considers uncertainty, non‐diversification and the US statutory tax treatment.

The authors extend the analysis of ESOs from the case of perfect capital markets to two cases of imperfect capital markets using the Benninga‐Helmantel‐Sarig framework.

It is found that ESOs are inferior to cash compensation and that the degree of option inferiority depends on employee diversification. In addition, incentive stock options (ISOs) are generally inferior to non‐qualified stock options (NSOs). This relative profitability of the NSO versus ISO increases as market imperfections are added. The authors also find that in general firm hedging of ESOs is suboptimal.

The paper highlights the firm value of employee stock options.

The case highlights a $1.4 billion fraud committed by the founder of a NYSE listed, Information Technology Services firm in India. In response to the crisis, the Indian government appointed an interim board to find a strategic investor in the company. The case traces the events leading to the fall of the company. Students are asked to analyze the governance and intermediation failures, assess the financial position of the company and to estimate the intrinsic value of the company from an acquirer's perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to determine what aspects of board independence, in terms of board structure and characteristics of non‐executive directors (NEDs), are associated with effective monitoring of management, as evidenced through lower levels of earnings management.

This paper examines the effectiveness of board independence requirements under the 2003 Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (POGCG) for a sample of 231 firms listed on the ASX in the financial year 2005. The associations of board composition, share ownership and compensation of NEDs with the level of earnings management are estimated. To explore the characteristics of NEDs that are important for effective monitoring, NEDs are separated into “grey” (affiliated) directors and independent directors and compensation is separated into variable and fixed components.

The results of the paper indicate a positive relation between earnings management and share ownership of NEDs, particularly that of grey directors. There is a negative relation between NED compensation and the level of earnings management, particularly the fixed compensation component for independent directors.

This paper is important to shareholders, academics and policy makers because it shows the type of remuneration and ownership levels for NEDs that are consistent with good corporate governance. NEDs are more effective monitors when independent directors are compensated more as a fixed amount that is not related to the firm's performance. The compensation of grey directors is not associated with the level of earnings management. On the other hand, NEDs are less effective monitors as share ownership by grey directors increases. The share ownership of independent directors is not associated with the level of earnings management. To ensure the independence of the board and enhance its ability and incentives to effectively monitor management, the paper recommends that remuneration of NEDs should be a fixed amount, and the share ownership of NEDs should be limited.

The findings provide guidance as to the meaning of board independence, in terms of the payments and returns that NEDs receive from a company. The results provide support for recommendation 2.1 in the ASX's POGCG that requires the majority of the board to be independent directors. The paper highlights the need for boards to be careful when choosing and rewarding NEDs.

Today, most firms provide equity‐based incentive compensation to their non‐executive directors. We summarize viewpoints supportive and critical of this development. We argue that the effectiveness of incentive compensation is related to the structure of the incentive pay contact. We discuss the use of options and shares as well as the issue of whether incentive pay should be geared towards current rewards or future incentives. We also discuss the critical issue of maintaining the ownership exposure of directors by providing sufficient levels of equity as well as placing restrictions on cashing out. Using our arguments above, we suggest guidelines for constructing an optimal contract. We compare 289 incentive plans offered by public companies in the USA during 1988‐1998 and find that plans deviate significantly from the optimum.