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This paper aims to show that evolutionary game theory not only provides a general and unified theory of political philosophy and strategic management theories but also a positive theory of interactive behavior.

This study suggests a way of the evolutionary game-theoretical model.

The model presented in this paper demonstrates coopetition is derived from balance points in multi-actor games. As the political–philosophical address of those strategic games will of all becomes convention in this balance point at which common knowledge occurs global optimum.

This study explores the connections between several streams in philosophy and strategic management. What does a particular philosophy contribute to strategic management with respect to game theory? When addressing this question in historical or exploratory terms, or in a combination of both, the end result is similar: particular philosophical issues, properly explained, are discussed in relation to important questions in strategic management.

What are the psychological and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decisions of this kind? What type of cognitive frames and managerial mental models, such as the game-theoretical model, might enable or hinder the integration of real-world problems in strategic decision-making?

What explains the evolution of such mental models, as well as the development of philosophical ideas, in informing the origins? How does the evolution of social and political contexts influence change in the cognitive and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decision-making?

This study highlights the overt power of strategic management ideas – competition, cooperation and coopetition – which have historically been built on the foundations of organizational theory, while also underlying the potential of philosophies, collective wisdom and Condorcet’s jury theorem and Rousseau’s (1998) correctness theory in games of evaluation. This study investigates whether the many produce better decisions than the wise few.

While being integrated together conceptually and practically, the literature on game theory in the context of financial markets lacks a cohesive understanding. This study aims to systematically scrutinize and analyse the literature of game theory in the context of financial markets, through a systematic literature review.

A systematic literature-based approach, through the theories, context, characteristics and methodology (TCCM) framework has been applied to 97 articles, extracted and filtered from two databases, Scopus and Web of Science, for a comprehensive review and understanding of the intellectual development in the domain of game theory and financial markets.

The review highlighted the most utilitarian theories within the literature, the context of research in terms of countries and industries, four themes which characterize the literature, as well as the methodologies and research designs used in this research domain. The paper also uncovered certain essential areas that present scope for further research.

While two of the largest indexation databases have been used, some relevant articles may have been excluded due to the restriction of databases and screening criteria, which may lead to the less exploration of several facets of the domain.

Practically, the paper has implications for multiple stakeholders including traders, businesses and governments. For traders, this paper acts as a guide to entering and understanding the dynamics of financial markets. The review also covers decision-making from the perspective of firms, including venture capitalists. This paper would allow firms to understand how game theory can help influence or analyze the strategic interactions between their stakeholders in terms of information disclosure, or consumers and their behavior to stimuli from the firm’s actions.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first of its kind that attempts to comprehensively provide an overview of the literature on game theory in financial markets. In doing so, this study shall help assess the current state of knowledge in the said field and locate gaps in the literature to propose new research directions.

From the quantum game perspective, this paper aims to study a green product optimal pricing problem of the dual-channel supply chain under the cooperation of the retailer and manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions.

The decentralized and centralized decision-making optimal prices and profits are obtained by establishing the classical and quantum game models. Then the classical game and quantum game are compared.

When the quantum entanglement is greater than 0, the selling prices of the quantum model are higher than the classical model. Through theoretical research and numerical analysis results, centralized decision-making is more economical and efficient than decentralized decision-making. Publicity and education on carbon emission reduction for consumers will help consumers accept carbon emission reduction products with slightly higher prices. When the emission reduction increases too fast, the cost of emission reduction will form a significant burden and affect the profits of manufacturers and supply chain systems.

From the perspective of the quantum game, the author explores the optimal prices of green product and compares them with the classical game.

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether a Nash equilibrium of a two-country trading economy is symmetry-breaking or not.

The approach to tackle this topic is a theoretical treatment by the general equilibrium trade theory and game theory.

If each government's domestic policy serving private production is diminishing to the private production scale, the Nash equilibrium is not symmetry-breaking.

In the existing study of Chatterjee (2017), a similar result is derived by focusing on the properties of each country's GDP function. The authors, however, consider an economy where each country's PPF is strictly concave and show that the Nash equilibrium uniquely exists and this equilibrium is symmetry.

The author develops a bilateral Nash bargaining model under value uncertainty and private/asymmetric information, combining ideas from axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory. The solution to the model leads organically to a two-tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) setup with intra-error dependence. The author presents two different statistical specifications to estimate the model, one that accounts for regressor endogeneity using copulas, the other able to identify separately the bargaining power from the private information effects at the individual level. An empirical application using a matched employer–employee data set (MEEDS) from Zambia and a second using another one from Ghana showcase the applied potential of the approach.

This paper is a dedication to Professor Ngo Van Long who introduced the idea of Kant–Nash equilibrium. The author extends this analysis to the study of adult and child labor markets.

This is a game theoretic analysis of the market for adult and child workers when some firms behave in the neoclassical Nashian way and some firms follow a Kantian social norm.

The presence of Kantian firms in the output market in addition to Nashian lowers industry output and labor demand. This raises the possibility that Kantian behavior in the output market could lower wages sufficiently and increase the incidence of child labor. If firms engage in Kantian behavior in the labor market by not hiring child workers, adult wage rises but could lower child wage as children if they work can only work for Nashian firms. When labor demand is sufficiently high, more Kantians could raise adult wage above subsistence and eliminate child labor supply.

This is the first paper to apply Kant–Nash equilibrium to the labor market. The result that Kantian behavior could have an unintended negative spillover effect in other markets is new. The paper keeps alive the ideas of Professor Long, which hopefully will stimulate further work and build on his ideas.

Cross-layer approach in media access control (MAC) layer will address interference and jamming problems. Hybrid distributed MAC can be used for simultaneous voice, data transmissions in wireless sensor network (WSN) and Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Choosing the correct objective function in Nash equilibrium for game theory will address fairness index and resource allocation to the nodes. Game theory optimization for distributed may increase the network performance. The purpose of this study is to survey the various operations that can be carried out using distributive and adaptive MAC protocol. Hill climbing distributed MAC does not need a central coordination system and location-based transmission with neighbor awareness reduces transmission power.

Distributed MAC in wireless networks is used to address the challenges like network lifetime, reduced energy consumption and for improving delay performance. In this paper, a survey is made on various cooperative communications in MAC protocols, optimization techniques used to improve MAC performance in various applications and mathematical approaches involved in game theory optimization for MAC protocol.

Spatial reuse of channel improved by 3%–29%, and multichannel improves throughput by 8% using distributed MAC protocol. Nash equilibrium is found to perform well, which focuses on energy utility in the network by individual players. Fuzzy logic improves channel selection by 17% and secondary users’ involvement by 8%. Cross-layer approach in MAC layer will address interference and jamming problems. Hybrid distributed MAC can be used for simultaneous voice, data transmissions in WSN and IoT applications. Cross-layer and cooperative communication give energy savings of 27% and reduces hop distance by 4.7%. Choosing the correct objective function in Nash equilibrium for game theory will address fairness index and resource allocation to the nodes.

Other optimization techniques can be applied for WSN to analyze the performance.

Game theory optimization for distributed may increase the network performance. Optimal cuckoo search improves throughput by 90% and reduces delay by 91%. Stochastic approaches detect 80% attacks even in 90% malicious nodes.

Channel allocations in centralized or static manner must be based on traffic demands whether dynamic traffic or fluctuated traffic. Usage of multimedia devices also increased which in turn increased the demand for high throughput. Cochannel interference keep on changing or mitigations occur which can be handled by proper resource allocations. Network survival is by efficient usage of valid patis in the network by avoiding transmission failures and time slots’ effective usage.

Literature survey is carried out to find the methods which give better performance.

Over the last years, powerful advances in the area of dynamic games have enriched game theory and made it more applicable to the modeling of real-world competitive strategies. The study of strategic behaviors of firms in an oligopoly market has received little attention, even though real firms have been shown to compete in output and in price in a single industry. The purpose of this study is to propose a game-theoretic approach to studying strategic behaviors of firms in an oligopoly market structure.

This approach was developed to study market dynamics and pricing strategic behavior of firms that have the possibility of deciding to be one of the two types (price-maker or price-taker) and reconsider the choice overtime on the basis of their current insights and knowledge and their experience. Firms try to improve their performance in the competitive market in a strategic way, by considering their steady-state profits and choosing the best type given the other firms’ types, actions and interactions.

The results of the present study confirm the previous study that the Cournot market is a stable market, where each firm can be a price-maker and enjoy individual learning as well as social learning. On the contrary, the market with price-takers only is never stable, and, therefore, the Walrasian equilibrium may not be supported in some instances. The Cournot market loses its stability as the number of firms in the market increases due to the fact that it will be more profitable for a firm to switch to price-taking when the number of firms is high enough. In such a situation, when the number of price-takers increases, there are no stable markets and price dynamics are destabilized.

The study and modeling of real-world competitive strategies would enhance the understanding of oligopoly markets. The study of strategic behaviors of firms in an oligopoly market has received little attention, even though real firms have been shown to compete in output and in price in a single industry as price-takers and price-makers.

This paper aims to examine the optimal sourcing strategies and pricing decisions of competing toy manufacturers and to discuss how manufacturers’ decisions are impacted by competition.

The authors consider a single-period model to characterise the competition between two competing toy manufacturers. Both of them are free to choose between virgin material and recycled material. The authors consider two types of consumers: sensitive consumers who are concerned about product safety and prefer the toy made of virgin material and insensitive consumers who do not care what material is used in the toy. The competing manufacturers play a Cournot competition.

The results reveal a special case of a win-win situation for both the manufacturer and the consumer. In addition, an increasing number of sensitive consumers does not always raise the price of virgin-material toys.

The authors derive the manufacturer’s equilibrium sourcing strategies, corresponding market-clearing prices and profits obtained.

The paper investigates how toy manufacturers’ optimal sourcing strategies are impacted by competition, considering market segments.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of demand information sharing on products’ greening levels with downstream competition. Specifically, this study examine two types of green products, “development-intensive” (DI) and “marginal-cost intensive” (MI), in a two-echelon supply chain where the manufacturer produces substitutable products, and competing retailers operate in a market with uncertain demand.

The authors adopt the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game-theoretic framework and consider a multistage game. This study consider how retailers receive private signals about uncertain demand and decide whether to share this information with the manufacturer, who then decides whether to acquire this information at a certain given cost. This paper considers backward induction and Bayesian Nash equilibrium to solve the model.

The authors find that in the absence of competition, information sharing is the only equilibrium and improves the greening level under DI, whereas no-information sharing is the only equilibrium and improves the greening level under MI, an increase in downstream competition drives higher investment in greening efforts by the manufacturer in both DI and MI and the manufacturer needs to offer a payment to the retailers to obtain demand information under both simultaneous and sequential contract schemes.

This paper contributes to the literature by examining how the nature of products (margin intensive green product or development intensive green product) influences green supply chain decisions under information asymmetry and downstream competition.