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The editorials of the then-new Business Week during the 1929–1933 contraction offered sophisticated Keynesian policy prescriptions: against a laissez-faire response, against deflation, against balanced-budget fetishism, for monetary expansion. These editorials, which seem to have been largely forgotten, likely played a considerable role in the dissemination of Keynesian economics in the United States in the 1930s. This chapter reviews the editorials and their congruence with Keynes’s writings. The magazine’s archives, including surveys of their readers, suggest that the editorials were among the most read and most valued parts of the magazine. The magazine cultivated an elite executive readership at that time, so the editorials may well have been important in gaining business support for Keynesian policies in the early New Deal.

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

Assesses whether the current pattern of relative wage rigidity and labour inertia in Europe is a problematic factor in the successful functioning of the European monetary union as viewed by many observers given the absence of interregional fiscal transfer payments.

Uses econometric methods to test whether the onset of monetary integration in the US and the gold standard in selected countries has increased the pro‐cyclical behaviour of real wages.

Finds suggestive empirical evidence that indeed a Lucas Critique argument applies such that credibly fixed exchange rate regimes might induce wages to carry the burden of macroeconomic adjustment in lieu of independent monetary policy and/or fiscal transfers.

Makes a novel contribution to the literature by attempting to test for the existence of endogenous adjustment mechanisms based on historical monetary unions analogous to EMU.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

John Taylor devised a simple monetary policy rule that links the Federal Reserve's policy interest rate with inflation and output targets. This paper compares actual policy rates with the rates that would have been recommended by the basic Taylor Rule for three long periods in U.S. economic history: 1875–1913 (“Pre Fed”), 1914–1951 (“Early Fed”), and 1952–1998 (“Modern Fed”). In addition, the authors develop a more complex version of the Rule to facilitate a comparison of the way in which each monetary authority would have reacted to the economic challenges presented outside its own time period. The empirical evidence suggests that Modern Fed would have reacted more promptly and appropriately to inflation and output problems outside its time period than either Early Fed or Pre Fed, and that the movement of interest rates in the Pre Fed period came closer to the corrective policies of Modern Fed than did those of Early Fed.

We would like to thank C. Y. Chen, Wenchih Lee, two anonymous referees and the seminar participants at the 2000 FMA annual meeting for their helpful comments and encouragement. All of the remaining errors are our responsibility.

Questions whether the planned European Monetary Union is capable of solving the social economic challenges of our time. Examines the economic and financial history of modern times; explains the formulation of the impossibility theorem in practice, suggesting the equation of unified knowledge as a solution to the problem of economic calculation; and constructs a plan for a free and stable European Monetary and Economic Union. Looks at the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) questioning its ability to solve the basic problems of the member states of the European Union. Addresses a number of issues contained within the Treaty: acceptable socially beneficial goals; unacceptable socially harmful, adverse anti‐equilibrium means, policies, reforms and regulations; and the phenomenon of physics’ ‘chain reaction’ within economics. Gives a synopsis of anti‐equilibrium elements and forces in the Treaty of Maastricht, debating what needs to be done to ensure that European Monetary and Economic Union can become an immediate and lasting success.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an extensive review of the monetary model of exchange rate determination which is the main theoretical framework on analyzing exchange rate behavior over the last 40 years. Furthermore, we test the flexible price monetarist variant and the sticky price Keynesian variant of the monetary model. We conduct our analysis employing a sample of 14 advanced economies using annual data spanning the period 1880–2012.

The theoretical background of the paper relies on the monetary model to the exchange rate determination. We provide a thorough econometric analysis using a battery of unit root and cointegration testing techniques. We test the price-flexible monetarist version and the sticky-price version of the model using annual data from 1880 to 2012 for a group of industrialized countries.

We provide strong evidence of the existence of a nonlinear relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals. Therefore, we model the time-varying nature of this relationship by allowing for Markov regime switches for the exchange rate regimes. Modeling exchange rates within this context can be motivated by the fact that the change in regime should be considered as a random event and not predictable. These results show that linearity is rejected in favor of an MS-VECM specification which forms statistically an adequate representation of the data. Two regimes are implied by the model; the one of the estimated regimes describes the monetary model whereas the other matches in most cases the constant coefficient model with wrong signs. Furthermore it is shown that depending on the nominal exchange rate regime in operation, the adjustment to the long run implied by the monetary model of the exchange rate determination came either from the exchange rate or from the monetary fundamentals. Moreover, based on a Regime Classification Measure, we showed that our chosen Markov-switching specification performed well in distinguishing between the two regimes for all cases. Finally, it is shown that fundamentals are not only significant within each regime but are also significant for the switches between the two regimes.

The results are of interest to practitioners and policy makers since understanding the evolution and determination of exchange rates is of crucial importance. Furthermore, our results are linked to forecasting performance of exchange rate models.

The present analysis extends previous analyses on exchange rate determination and it provides further support in favor of the monetary model as a long-run framework to understand the evolution of exchange rates.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

We document how inflation expectations evolved in the United States during the fall of 1933 using narrative evidence from historical news accounts and the forecasts of contemporary business analysts. We find that inflation expectations, after rising substantially during the spring of 1933, moderated in the fall in response to mixed messages from the Roosevelt Administration. The narrative accounts and our econometric model connect the dramatic swings in output growth in 1933 – the rapid recovery in the spring and the setback in the fall – to these sudden movements in inflation expectations.