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In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a downward trend in the US stock market, the Federal Reserve has implemented an innovative Corporate Credit Facility (CCF) program from March 23 to December 31, 2020. The CCF aims to purchase the eligible corporate bonds and ETFs under the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF). Firstly, our result shows that the Corporate Credit Facility program has stabilized the return of the S&P 500 by 0.68 in variance reduction. Secondly, the SMCCF has exhibited a better effect on the stock market compared with PMCCF. The coefficient of SMCCF is statistically significant. However, announcement and PMCCF are not significant in the variance equation. Thirdly, the joint Wald test of PMCCF and SMCCF positively and significantly affect the return of the S&P 500, evidenced by the mean equation. Lastly, the announcement of CCF has an adverse effect on the S&P 500. It can be concluded that the Fed's Corporate Credit Facility has been innovative in combating the financial market's instability.

This chapter examines the long-run and short-run spillover effects of US quantitative easing (QE) on the money market in India. The study adopts the autoregressive distributed lag bounds testing co-integration approach for monthly data from September 2008 to May 2019 to investigate the spillover impact. The results reveal that a 10% rise in US QE led to a 25 bps softening of the weighted average call rate and a 2–5 bps hardening of the Treasury Bill. This impact was beyond the active participation by the Reserve Bank of India on the policy rate and liquidity in the system during the QE episodes. It suggests that the Indian money market is susceptible to US QE.

This paper investigates the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policies. It identifies an anti-growth bias in the ECB’s monetary policy approach: the ECB is quick to hike, but slow to ease. Similarly, while other players and institutional deficiencies share responsibility for the euro’s failure, the bank has generally done “too little, too late” with regard to managing the euro crisis, preventing protracted stagnation, and containing deflation threats. The bank remains attached to the euro area’s official competitive wage repression strategy which is in conflict with the ECB’s price stability mandate and undermines the bank’s more recent unconventional monetary policy initiatives designed to restore price stability. The ECB needs a “Euro Treasury” partner to overcome the euro regime’s most serious flaw: the divorce between central bank and treasury institutions.

This chapter challenges a commonly accepted view such that the increase in monetary supply aiming to lower the market rate and/or aiming to ease liquidity conditions would encourage the banks as financial intermediaries or the investors as fund providers to provide more funds, which results in stimulating the macro-economy. This chapter suggests that there is no clear-cut mechanism in the economic theory for underpinning the commonly accepted view upon which the Quantitative Easing policy is based. This theoretical analysis suggests that there may exist an appropriate level of market reference rate, which can encourage the investors to absorb the relatively wider range of credit risk in the bond market. Extremely higher market rate would discourage the borrowers to raise funds, while lower market rate would drain “risk” funds in the bond market. In this context, the appropriate level of market rate may stand on a narrow range of the kind of “knife-edge,” though the level per se does not always guarantee the optimal allocation of financial resources.

All over the world, the role of central banks is being redefined following the outbreak of the global financial crisis and subsequent breakdown of the “great moderation” consensus. Consequently, most advanced economies adopted non-conventional approaches of monetary policy which resulted in spill-overs to emerging markets and developing countries with implications on their financial system and monetary policy transmission. This, coupled with, internal developments in the financial systems of developing countries necessitated modifications of not only monetary policy frameworks but also responsibilities of most central banks. This chapter acknowledges possible evolutions of the financial structure variables in developing countries and uses data from Kenya to analyze the dynamic linkages between financial sector variables and monetary policy transmission in the light of the financial crisis. The study used structural vector autoregression to examine the relationship between financial structure variables and monetary policy as well as assess the relative importance of various monetary transmission channels in Kenya. The results show that the changing financial structure represented by credit to the private sector and stock market indicators in Kenya only slightly altered relative importance of monetary policy transmission. The insignificance of credit to the private sector suggests that the importance attached to the bank lending channel in previous studies is waning while the marginal significance of the stock market indicator signals the potential for asset price channel. The results also indicate that the interest rate and exchange rate channels are relatively more important in Kenya while the asset prices is only marginally significant and bank lending channel is the weakest in the intermediate stage of monetary policy transmission. However, transmission of monetary policy to the ultimate objectives is somewhat slow and weak to inflation and almost absent to output. The result implies a limited role of monetary policy on growth and questions the wisdom of pursuing multiple objectives.

Social scientists have increasingly turned to constructivist models to explain when, and how, international and world-level social forces constrain the policy-making autonomy of national states. While constructivists have shown that international ideational processes matter for domestic policy making, they have had a harder time explaining why some ideas gain prominence in policy discussions while others do not. This chapter develops an institutionally centered materialist model of idea selection, arguing that international relations of dependency give actors who control vital financial resources a greater capacity to shape the ideational agenda. This model is explored through a case study of the international sources of American monetary policy in the early 1960s. A detailed examination of archival materials shows that European officials at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development were able to advance their own ideas for American monetary policy because the United States was dependent on European cooperation to help resolve its mounting balance of payments problems.

This chapter analyzes the rules and institutions that have characterized the European Monetary Union (EMU) during its prolonged crisis, stressing the limits of the strategy pursued by the European authorities. It also examines the issues of current account imbalances, economic growth and the problem of debt, and their interconnections. The main purpose of this chapter is to indicate feasible economic solutions and political arrangements in order to complete the institutional system of the EMU. This requires appropriate reforms of its institutional architecture. But such reforms demand changes in the treaties in order to make the Eurosystem more consistent and endowed of democratic legitimacy, so to have appropriate tools, resources and policies that can contribute to the stability, cohesion and development of the Eurozone.

It has often been alleged that the financial markets, with all their speculative excesses, wastefully absorb resources that could be better employed in the real economy. Fritz Machlup, originally a student of Ludwig von Mises, dealt with that charge in the aftermath of the 1929 crash. His defense of the stock market remains germane to our time. In it, he argues that the stock exchange offers an important alternative mechanism of allocating savings to investment, while generally being a way station through which money travels on its way to the real economy either to finance capital projects or to be spent on consumer goods. To the extent the stock market ever absorbs capital, it is only during stock market booms. Yet these are generated by the uncertain course of central bank monetary expansion. Bull and bear markets cycles are, at bottom, politically driven events.