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The purpose of this paper is to investigate an underexplored aspect of outsourcing involving a mixed strategy in which parallel production is continued in-house at the same time as outsourcing occurs.

The study applied a multiple case study approach and drew on qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews with wood product manufacturing companies.

The paper posits that there should be a variety of mixed strategies between the two governance forms of “make” or “buy.” In order to address how companies should consider the extent to which they outsource, the analysis was structured around two ends of a continuum: in-house dominance or outsourcing dominance. With an in-house-dominant strategy, outsourcing complements an organization's own production to optimize capacity utilization and outsource less cost-efficient production, or is used as a tool to learn how to outsource. With an outsourcing-dominant strategy, in-house production helps maintain complementary competencies and avoids lock-in risk.

This paper takes initial steps toward an exploration of different mixed strategies. Additional research is required to understand the costs of different mixed strategies compared with insourcing and outsourcing, and to study parallel production from a supplier viewpoint.

This paper suggests that managers should think twice before rushing to a “me too” outsourcing strategy in which in-house capacities are completely closed. It is important to take a dynamic view of outsourcing that maintains a mixed strategy as an option, particularly in situations that involve an underdeveloped supplier market and/or as a way to develop resources over the long term.

The concept of combining both “make” and “buy” is not new. However, little if any research has focussed explicitly on exploring the variety of different types of mixed strategies that exist on the continuum between insourcing and outsourcing.

Crime games cannot be simply read with mixed strategies. These strategies are inconclusive of how the players act rationally. This is undeniably true for the crime of tax evasion, where dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, when considering the risk of non-compliance. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that in the presence of a small “private disturbance” of the players’ payoff, the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies provides us with the necessary information on equilibria in pure strategies that will be played.

In tax-evasion games, an equilibrium must necessarily be interpreted in pure strategies, and the only way to do this is to insert some private information into the game and reinterpret it in a Bayesian scheme. We show that taxpayers’ private,subjective considerations on the effective implementation of the penalty and the revenue agency’s private information on the cost of monitoring and conviction can lead to Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies. The present paper takes issue with this Bayesian equilibrium and the implications for comparative-statics results.

In this context, tougher sentencing deters crime, although, as the Italian experience teaches, the necessary condition required is the certainty of punishment and the ability of the government to enforce it. The equilibrium strategies with incomplete information reveal whether it is convenient for the two agents to maintain their “private disturbance” as private information or, on the contrary, it is convenient to expect it to be “common knowledge.”

A distinct set of studies has adopted a game theoretic approach and shows that the standard economic approach to crime deterrence inspired by Gary Beker’s seminal paper might be flawed. See, among others, Saha and Poole (2000), Tsebelis (1989) and Andreozzi (2010). This paper shows that a greater severity of the penalty and a higher certainty of punishment (a lower possibility of appealing against sanctions and no discounts on due penalties) necessarily lead to a unique Bayesian equilibrium without evasion.

This paper attempts to analyze the relationship between the complementarity degrees of imperfect complementary products and sales strategies and give appropriate sales strategies for a two-stage supply chain.

With respect to two-stage supply chain consisting of two manufacturers who produce imperfect complementary products and one retailer who sells the products, aiming at bundling sales strategy, the authors define complementarity elasticity of products and use it to measure the degree of complementary between two products. Based on Stackelberg game and cooperation, the authors analyze the relationship between the complementarity degrees of imperfect complementary products and appropriate sales strategies.

As the impact of complementarity degree on sales strategy decision-making is better, the authors can pinpoint out which sales decision-making is optimal and which bundling sales strategy is the best for a two-stage supply chain. Considering that the degree of complementarity has a significant impact on the product sales strategy, the authors can point out which sales decision-making is optimal, that is, which bundled sales strategy is the optimal in the secondary supply chain of selling complementary products.

An innovative bundling can expand the sales of existing products and new products. It helps a retailer transcend and defeat competitors by reducing marketing expenses while increasing profits. Proper use of bundling can improve consumers utility and create an overall positive effect for both the enterprises and consumer.

The research can help some retailers to make many appropriate bundling sales strategies.

The purpose of this paper is to set the scene for this special issue by synthesising the vast array of literature to examine what constitutes mixed methods research, and the associated strengths and risks attributed to this approach.

This paper takes the form of a literature review. The authors draw on extensive methods research from a diverse range of social science disciplines to identify and explore key definitions, opportunities and risks in mixed methods studies. They review a number of accounting studies that adopt mixed methods research approaches. This allows the authors to analyse variance in how mixed methods research is conceptualised across these studies and evaluate the perceived strengths and limitations of specific mixed methods design choices.

The authors identify a range of opportunities and challenges in the conduct of mixed methods research and illustrate these by reference to both published studies and the other contributions to this special issue.

With the exception of Modell's work, there is sparse discussion of the application and potential of mixed methods research in the extant accounting literature.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate and identify the price sensitivity of consumers of three- and five-star hotels and to determine the impact of bundling strategies on consumers’ price sensitivity.

To calculate price sensitivity, authors apply the van Westendorp’s price sensitivity meter (PSM). To understand the impact of bundling strategies, univariate and bivariate techniques are applied.

PSM results reveal the optimal prices and the range of acceptable prices for three- and five-star hotel. The bundling strategy results reveal that five-star customers are less sensitive to mixed-leader bundling. Regarding mixed-joint bundling, managers could improve sales through bundling strategies if they selected an attractive service (e.g. restaurants).

Findings assist hotel managers to understand the different price sensitivities, according to the hotel typology. Managers can manage prices without the risk of losing market share or revenue. The results help managers in deciding which bundling strategies they can create, as well as the services to be included to achieve highest profitability.

No research to date to the best of the authors’ knowledge has attempted to understand and compare the role of bundling strategies in three- and five-stars hotels. Moreover, no research has attempted to measure and compare customers’ price sensitivity of three- and five-stars hotels.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a practical method to be used in team decision making when allocating resources.

The paper proposes the following hypothesis: the selected team consensus strategy from among all available strategies must have minimum sum of squares of monetary regrets. A general algebraic representation of the above hypothesis is developed.

This hypothesis can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium involving mixed strategies when the entire problem is viewed in game theoretic framework. The paper provides an explanation in quantitative terms of the reasoning process pursued by five business college department chairs faced with three strategies, in an actual consensus decision making to illustrate the above hypothesis. By making observations of the behavior of decision makers in the selection of a budget allocation formula, the paper shows that the hypothesis holds true for the specific reasoning process pursued by the chairs in arriving at the consensus solution. However, the chairs' consensus solution is found to be a local solution vis‐à‐vis the global optimal solution found by solving the game theoretic model.

The authors plan to conduct further empirical testing of the hypothesis using allocation strategies found in diverse decision‐making environments involving diverse decision makers such as business executives, government officers, education administrators, and others.

If this hypothesis can be validated to be true, decision makers should propose for consideration only those rational strategies that have minimal or low variance in monetary regrets since these are the strategies that would most likely be selected in team decision making.

Team decision making involving resource allocation abounds in all organizations, at all levels and in diverse applications. The practical procedure proposed in this paper, based on analytical foundation of game theory, provides decision makers a viable tool for allocating resources that results in consensus of all rational parties involved.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the interpretation strategy of cultural mixing on consumers’ evaluations of global brands that incorporate local cultural elements. Specifically, this paper examines whether a property interpretation and a relational interpretation have different influences on consumers’ evaluations of global brands that incorporate local cultural elements.

Two experiments were conducted as part of this research. Experiment 1 adopted a two (interpretation strategy: property interpretation vs relational interpretation) single-factor between-subjects design. Experiment 2 adopted a 2 (interpretation strategy: property interpretation vs relational interpretation) × 2 (polyculturalist beliefs: high vs low) between-subjects design. The data were analyzed using ANOVA and PROCESS 213.

A property interpretation (emphasizing that some features of a global brand transfer to local cultural elements) leads to a less favorable evaluation of global brands that incorporate local cultural elements than a relational interpretation (emphasizing a relation between global brands and local cultural elements). This effect is fully mediated by perceived cultural intrusion, and it exists only when consumers have a low level of polyculturalist beliefs.

This paper reveals that the phenomenon of cultural mixing occurs when global brands incorporate local cultural elements. In addition, the way that consumers perceive the relationship between global brands and local cultural elements will determine their reactions to global brands that incorporate local cultural elements.

When port authorities or terminal operators set the free time or increase storage density, the decision is often made without a clear understanding of their effects on throughput and rehandling productivity. This is partly because practical methods that deal specifically with the effect of dwell time on throughput and productivity are limited in the literature; hence the motivation for this work. This paper introduces simple methods to evaluate the effect of container dwell time and storage policies on import throughput, storage density, and rehandling productivity. The analysis considers two import storage strategies 1) non-mixed - no stacking of new import containers on top of old ones, and 2) mixed - stacking of new import containers on top of old ones. The results highlight the effect dwell time has on throughput and rehandling productivity. For the non-mixed storage policy, the increasing container dwell time lowers throughput and average stack height - resulting in an increase in rehandling productivity. On the other hand, for the mixed storage policy, the increasing container dwell time raises throughput and average stack height - resulting in a decrease in rehandling productivity. Using the presented methods, port authorities and terminal operators are able to assess and quantify the benefits of their decisions regarding container free time and subsequently make an informed decision.

Adopting efficient marketing strategies is a challenging task in a competitive market place involving complex marketing planning, techniques and mechanisms to identify the best course of action under these circumstances and finding optimal solutions or stable outcomes. Decisions and strategies of competitors in the market influence the selection of the appropriate marketing strategy. The main purpose of this paper is to develop a mathematical methodology based on the game theory approach for planning optimal marketing-mix strategies in dynamic competitive markets, taking into account strategic foresight and interaction effects.

The game theory approach, as a decision-making tool in conflict situations, is suggested for planning and adopting optimal marketing strategy. The main intellectual attraction of the game theory is essentially a question of how to act in gaming situations against highly rational opponents A kind of static, finite and non-cooperative game analytics approach has been developed for this issue, and the proposed model has been implemented to design optimal marketing strategies for two top brands of the automotive parts market in Iran.

The findings of this study show that the optimal marketing-mix strategy for brand A is pricing and for brand B is the product strategy.

Game theory and the Nash equilibrium model can provide a practical approach to find and adopt the right strategy, know competitors' movements and strategies and get more profit.

The integration of the game theory approach into the marketing mix framework has been adopted as a generalized model for marketing strategy planning and analysis as well as to resolve some shortcomings of the marketing mix framework. The Nash equilibrium model has been used to analyze the results. The incorporation of game theory into marketing models has the potential to enrich the scope of marketing modeling.

The strategic orientation of Portuguese firms in the porcelain industry is examined empirically. In the process, the effective use of traditional generic strategies as opposed to emerging strategies is compared. Special attention is devoted to the utility of classical Porter’s generic strategies in comparison to time‐based differentiation strategy. The study concludes that different variations of the classical differentiation strategy, which includes time‐based differentiation, appear to be more effective than cost leadership or mixed generic strategies.