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Article
Publication date: 22 March 2022

Agnieszka Lipieta and Artur Lipieta

A serious problem in the pandemic days is that in this period many firms face difficulties with remaining on the market. It causes that the entrepreneurs do not undertake…

Abstract

Purpose

A serious problem in the pandemic days is that in this period many firms face difficulties with remaining on the market. It causes that the entrepreneurs do not undertake activities which could result in introducing innovations. In this context, the authors examine new mechanisms which lead competitive economy to the long-run equilibrium under the assumption that producers are change-averse.

Design/methodology/approach

The results have the form of theorems with rigorous proofs and provide the ideas on the way of developing the economic policy in respect of firms in the pandemic days.

Findings

As a result, the authors justify that in some cases it is worth leading an economic sector or a whole economy to the long-run equilibrium state.

Originality/value

The authors show that there exists a mechanism in the sense of Hurwicz which transforms the economy into an economic system being in the long-run equilibrium as well as the authors determine optimal mechanisms, under the criterion of distance minimization, in some subsets of the mechanisms designed.

Details

Journal of Economic Studies, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0144-3585

Keywords

Book part
Publication date: 21 November 2014

Eduardo Melero

A model of reputation is developed to show how firms operating in concentrated sectors can use the sponsorship of general human capital investments to specifically trained…

Abstract

A model of reputation is developed to show how firms operating in concentrated sectors can use the sponsorship of general human capital investments to specifically trained workers as a device of commitment with prospective employees. Employees of firms that operate in concentrated sectors learn skills that are valuable only for a limited number of alternative employers. This gives monopsonistic power to the training firm over the trained workers. Anticipating it, potential employees will be reluctant to work for the firm unless the employer is able to commit oneself’ must be turned back to ‘herself. I argue that human resource policies including the provision of general human capital to workers reduce employers’ commitment costs. Evidence from two representative samples of workers from Spain and the United Kingdom show that, consistent with the predictions of the model, firms from more concentrated sectors are more likely to sponsor their employees’ education.

Details

International Perspectives on Participation
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78441-169-5

Keywords

Abstract

Details

Structural Models of Wage and Employment Dynamics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-44452-089-0

Book part
Publication date: 13 December 2013

Federico Echenique and Ivana Komunjer

In this article we design an econometric test for monotone comparative statics (MCS) often found in models with multiple equilibria. Our test exploits the observable…

Abstract

In this article we design an econometric test for monotone comparative statics (MCS) often found in models with multiple equilibria. Our test exploits the observable implications of the MCS prediction: that the extreme (high and low) conditiona l quantiles of the dependent variable increase monotonically with the explanatory variable. The main contribution of the article is to derive a likelihood-ratio test, which to the best of our knowledge is the first econometric test of MCS proposed in the literature. The test is an asymptotic “chi-bar squared” test for order restrictions on intermediate conditional quantiles. The key features of our approach are: (1) we do not need to estimate the underlying nonparametric model relating the dependent and explanatory variables to the latent disturbances; (2) we make few assumptions on the cardinality, location, or probabilities over equilibria. In particular, one can implement our test without assuming an equilibrium selection rule.

Details

Structural Econometric Models
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78350-052-9

Keywords

Book part
Publication date: 3 May 2016

Jose Miguel Abito, David Besanko and Daniel Diermeier

We model the interaction between a profit-maximizing firm and an activist using an infinite-horizon dynamic stochastic game. The firm enhances its reputation through…

Abstract

We model the interaction between a profit-maximizing firm and an activist using an infinite-horizon dynamic stochastic game. The firm enhances its reputation through “self-regulation”: voluntary provision of an abatement activity that reduces a negative externality. We show that in equilibrium the externality-reducing activity is subject to decreasing marginal returns, which can cause the firm to “coast on its reputation,” that is, decrease the level of externality-reducing activity as its reputation grows. The activist, which benefits from increases in the externality-reducing activity, can take two types of action that can harm the firm’s reputation: criticism, which can impair the firm’s reputation on the margin, and confrontation, which can trigger a crisis that may severely damage the firm’s reputation. The activist changes the reputational dynamics of the game by tending to keep the firm in reputational states in which it is highly motivated to invest in externality-reducing activity. Criticism and confrontational activity are shown to be imperfect substitutes. The more patient the activist or the more passionate it is about externality reduction, the more likely it is to rely on confrontation. The more patient the firm and the more important corporate citizenship is to firm’s brand equity, the more likely that it will be targeted by an activist that relies on confrontation.

Abstract

Details

Urban Dynamics and Growth: Advances in Urban Economics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-44451-481-3

Abstract

Details

Panel Data and Structural Labour Market Models
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-44450-319-0

Book part
Publication date: 30 December 2013

Liu Taoxiong and Hu Angang

This chapter develops a growth model of a country under a Hobbesian environment with international conflicts in which national defense is the only way to prevent external…

Abstract

This chapter develops a growth model of a country under a Hobbesian environment with international conflicts in which national defense is the only way to prevent external predation. The long run growth path is determined by the equilibrium of a dynamic game with three players: the external predator, the government, and the family. The equilibrium growth path has three phases: submissive equilibrium, tolerant equilibrium, and full-protected equilibrium. Different defense strategies result in different growth prospects, and sustainable growth will endogenously induce adjustment of defense strategies.

Details

Cooperation for a Peaceful and Sustainable World Part 2
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78190-655-2

Book part
Publication date: 31 December 2010

Martin Kahanec

Are ethnic specialization and thus a downward sloping labor demand curve fundamental features of labor market competition between ethnic groups? In a general equilibrium

Abstract

Are ethnic specialization and thus a downward sloping labor demand curve fundamental features of labor market competition between ethnic groups? In a general equilibrium model, this chapter argues that spillover effects in skill acquisition and social distances between ethnic groups engender equilibrium regimes of skill acquisition that differ in their implications for ethnic specialization. Specifically, fundamental relationships through which relative group sizes determine whether ethnic specialization arises and in what degree are established. Thus, this chapter theoretically justifies a downward sloping labor demand curve and explains why some ethnic groups earn more than others, ethnic minorities underperforming or outperforming majorities.

Details

Migration and Culture
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-85724-153-5

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Abstract

Details

Documents on Modern History of Economic Thought: Part C
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-76230-998-6

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