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This study examines the impact of situational and stable animosities on quality evaluation and purchase intention while also testing the moderating effects of within- and cross-country cultural distance. It focuses on the case of the US THAAD missile defense system deployment in South Korea (hereafter, Korea) and investigates how the resulting Chinese consumers' animosity affects their quality evaluation of, and purchase intention toward, Korean cosmetics.

This study utilizes a quantitative approach based on a survey and structural equation modeling. The sample comprises 376 Chinese consumers from 19 Chinese regions.

The results indicate that both stable and situational animosities are negatively associated with purchase intention toward Korean cosmetics. However, their effects on quality evaluation are different. While stable animosity is negatively related to product quality evaluation, situational animosity has no such negative association. Finally, the cultural distance between Chinese regions and Korea strengthens the negative relationship between stable and situational animosities and purchase intention.

The study contributes by better unraveling the effects of stable and situational animosities on perceived product quality. The empirical context is unique because it allows the authors to investigate the relationship between Chinese antagonism toward the THAAD deployment in Korea and Chinese consumers' stable and situational animosities in terms of their quality evaluation of, and purchase intention toward, imported Korean cosmetics. Hence, this study contributes to the literature on consumer animosity by empirically testing the moderating effect of within- and cross-country cultural distance on the relationship between stable and situational animosities and purchase intention.

The study has relevant practical implications, notably for Korean exporters' marketing management and within- and cross-cultural management. The results suggest that countermeasures are needed because Chinese consumers' stable and situational animosities are negatively related to their purchase intention toward Korean cosmetics. Moreover, the findings provide the insight that when foreign firms export culture-sensitive products to a large, multicultural country, their managers should pay attention to within- and cross-cultural differences simultaneously.

Previous studies have shown that the effects of animosity on product evaluation and purchase intention differ depending on the animosity dimension, product type, country and the situation causing animosity, among others. However, the existing literature on animosity has neglected the reality that within-cultural differences in a single large emerging market are relevant to explaining the concept of animosity and its effect on the purchase intention toward culture-sensitive products. Furthermore, none of the animosity studies have touched on the important moderating role of within- and cross-cultural differences between a large and multicultural importing country and a brand's home country in this manner. Therefore, the study fills this gap by empirically examining whether different moderating effects of stable and situational animosities exist for a specific conflict situation caused by a military issue and investigates the causes of these different effects.

Briefly reviews previous literature by the author before presenting an original 12 step system integration protocol designed to ensure the success of companies or countries in their efforts to develop and market new products. Looks at the issues from different strategic levels such as corporate, international, military and economic. Presents 31 case studies, including the success of Japan in microchips to the failure of Xerox to sell its invention of the Alto personal computer 3 years before Apple: from the success in DNA and Superconductor research to the success of Sunbeam in inventing and marketing food processors: and from the daring invention and production of atomic energy for survival to the successes of sewing machine inventor Howe in co‐operating on patents to compete in markets. Includes 306 questions and answers in order to qualify concepts introduced.

In this study I revisit the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, in order to gain additional perspective on the relationship between organizational decision making and crisis outcomes. This exercise is an historical “counterfactual” or “what if” excursion, using recently declassified documents and simulated exchange calculations, from which I hope to draw three principal benefits. First, the study may shed some additional light on why Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was willing to take such a dangerous gamble. Second, our counterfactual crisis suggests that the risk of inadvertent war, so much written about in connection with Cuba, 1962, was less important than the risk of a deliberate, but miscalculated, escalation. Third, the balance of command and control vulnerability might have mattered more to crisis‐ridden US leaders than the balance of strategic nuclear forces. If so, it helps to explain the apparent reluctance of US leaders to employ highly coercive forms of nuclear brinkmanship.

Aims to explains the mismatches between political discourse and military momentum in the US handling of the Cuban missile crisis by using the model of the potential autopoiesis of subsystems. Under wartime conditions, the codes of political and military communications can increasingly be differentiated.

The model of a further differentiation between political and military power is developed on the basis of a detailed description of the Cuban missile crisis. The concept of a “semi‐dormant autopoiesis” is introduced for the difference in the dynamics between peacetime and wartime conditions.

Several dangerous incidents during the crisis can be explained by a sociocybernetic model focusing on communication and control, but not by using an organization‐theoretical approach. The further differentiation of the military as a subsystem became possible in the course of the twentieth century because of ongoing learning processes about previous wars.

Politicians should not underestimate autonomous military processes or the significance of standing orders. In order to continually produce communications within the military, communication partners are needed that stand outside the hierarchy, and this role can be fulfilled by an enemy. A reflexively imagined enemy can reinforce the autopoiesis of the military subsystem.

The paper shows that civilian control over military affairs has become structurally problematic and offers a sociocybernetic explanation of the missile crisis. The potential alternation in the dynamics under peacetime and wartime conditions brings historical specificity back on the agenda of social systems theory.

Artificial intelligence (AI)-based systems can save the lives of many people by assessing the safety of flight paths. Unfortunately, the world witnessed a horrible event in January 2020 with the case of flight 752 of Ukrainian International Airlines from Tehran to Kiev and it has prompted us to ask how AI can prevent such events by warning to flight path planners. This paper aims to propose a framework for assessing the safety of flight paths from a shooting of an airplane by air defense systems installed on the path. Unlike the existing studies, this study takes a new look at pre-flight risk assessment by using textual information in social and news networks. To this end, the authors use existing information retrieval techniques to identify high flight risk areas by examining the news articles, comments, posts, tweets, etc., in social media and then estimate the probability of targeting a passenger aircraft by the air defense systems probably installed on high-risk areas with the help of a statistical model. This estimation can then be used by fight planners to avoid such events.

To design a framework for estimating the probability of a fatal shooting of an airplane by air defense systems installed on its flight path, the authors have used the idea of information retrieval in conjunction with statistical methods. The authors have extracted some significant variables in the shooting of flights and proposed an AI-based framework to estimate the probability of a fatal shooting of an airplane during its flight and sketched a case study for using machine learning approaches to assist with flight path planning. As a case study, the authors covered flight 752 to explain the usefulness of the proposed framework in this context.

Unlike the existing methods, this study investigates flight path safety assessment from the social media and crowdsourcing perspective. In this study, the authors proposed an AI-based framework to avoid aviation hazards by estimating the probability of a shooting of an airplane by air defense systems installed on its flight path. Moreover, this study was designed to show how estimating the safety of flight paths by using AI-based methods can help flight planners to avoid such events and gain further insights into the use of AI-based systems in pre-flight risk assessment.

The idea behind the proposed method is original and as the authors’ best knowledge, there is no similar framework using social media for flight path safety assessment.

The European Union (EU) is commonly, and vaguely, labelled as a sui generis foreign policy actor. The European Security Strategy (2003) advances, in an imprecise manner, the possible use of ‘robust’ responses to international challenges, when needed. The military dimension of the EU has to be found in its evolving but still incipient Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since the launch of ESDP and its first missions in 2003, the EU has been able to conduct a noticeable progress on two fronts. On the one hand, it enhances internal capabilities for crisis management; on the other hand, it favours the principle of participation of third countries in missions. The present analysis considers EU international military cooperation in a strategic neighbourhood: Eastern Europe. We take into account the EU necessity to rely on relevant non-EU players to launch missions. We argue that ESDP missions' success depends not only on these external actors, namely on the consideration of power gaps, but also on domestic EU constraints. We explore the causes of poor cooperation with Russia on ESDP and the perspectives for crisis management in Europe. Considering ESDP activities in Eastern Europe, we conclude that the balance between civilian and military tools is not adequate to engage more seriously with Russia towards the stabilisation of the ‘common’ neighbourhood.

The conclusion of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s created new areas of opportunity and concern for U.S. national security policy. No longer menaced by the threat of nuclear war from Soviet military might, the United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's preeminent military power. Successful developments such as this often produce elation in the pronouncements of U.S. officials as a recent Clinton administration declaration demonstrates:

This paper aims to elaborate in a greater detail about how to manage and eventually help resolve outstanding issues, including the core issue of Kashmir between nuclear India and Pakistan. In doing so, this paper elaborates various innovative measures that could be applicable to South Asian nuclear environment that in turn could assist the South Asian nuclear leadership in understanding and managing the fragility of South Asian nuclear deterrence.

Innovatively, this research paper looks at the South Asian nuclear issues at three levels of analysis – understanding the prevailing dynamics of nuclear revolution and improved means of communications and promoting deterrence stability in South Asia. All three levels may be more needed than ever before in the wake of the arrival of nuclear weapons for a broader Southern Asian region.

This paper finds out that although nuclear weapons have become a reality in South Asia and these deadly weapons have prevented major wars between India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons have not prevented the crises between India and Pakistan. Therefore, both India and Pakistan have confronted a number of crises. The paper finds out that any serious crisis between India and Pakistan could further undermine the credibility of existing confidence-building measures and the same could escalate from military to nuclear level. Absent from immediate measures undertaken by the South Asian security leadership, nuclear weapons may not help prevent the war between India and Pakistan at the sub-conventional level, this paper finds out.

By explaining innovative measures at the three level of analysis, this papers adds to the existing literature in understanding the behavior of South Asian security leadership and how these measures could best bring positive results in preventing a major crisis that potentially bears the risk of escalation to nuclear level.

The Kennedy tapes of the meetings on the Cuban missile crisis are evidence of the strategy formulation process. Analysis of the interventions in these meetings reveals that President Kennedy had adopted a questioning, Socratic approach. Conclusions are drawn on President Kennedy's leadership style. The methods employed in 1962 are compared with ideas from strategic management: positioning; resource‐based view; top‐down or bottom‐up; deliberate or emergent; and rational or generative. The author deduces from this evidence: the collective strategy process cannot truly begin until a collective aim has been decided; the strategy process is best led by a facilitator, rather than an authoritarian; both positioning resources need to be considered; strategy formulation is an art, guided by whatever science can be brought to bear.

President John F. Kennedy navigated through the Cuban missile crisis with the help of his advisers in the so-called ExComm. While ExComm attendance was very stable and its goal, the removal of the missiles, clear, true to the garbage can model the options available were socially constructed and were ambiguously related to the objective they purportedly served. An analysis of the recorded discussions reveals that Kennedy's choice of a blockade required the ExComm to suppress talk about the perils it entailed; his decision not to intercept a Soviet tanker was based less on caution than unsustainable indecision; and when Kennedy squared off against his advisers regarding the best way to respond to Khrushchev's conflicting offers on October 26 and 27, the latter worked to exclude him from the very decision he was about to make. The analysis points to a natural affinity between the garbage can model and ethnomethodological attention to the fine-grained details of deliberative talk.