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In March 2002, the Bush administration unveiled what it deems to be a “new global development compact”: the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). This new compact builds upon the Millennium Development Goals, e.g. halving world poverty by 2015, put forward by 189 countries at the Millennium General Assembly at the United Nations in September 2000. However, and in stark contrast with the latter strategy, which is aimed at addressing human security issues, the MCA is tied to the objectives of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States. As such, the MCA is primarily aimed at bringing excluded states (or, “failed states”) into the bounds of disciplinary role of capital. For instance, one of the most novel, and coercive, features of this development compact is the “pre-emptive” method in which it will administer aid. Under the MCA, only countries that govern justly, invest in their people, and open their economies to foreign enterprise and entrepreneurship will qualify for funding. In what follows, I argue that while the form of the MCA represents an unabashed articulation of U.S.-led imperialism vis-à-vis the poorest regions in the South, witnessed by the growing privatization of development aid and military intervention, its content reflects the same goals and interests that underlie the proceeding development agenda (i.e. the Washington consensus), namely promoting the idea that the “only” path to increased growth and prosperity is to be found in countries’ willingness and ability to adopt policies that promote economic freedom and the rule of law.

Since World War II, the United States has played a leading role in development assistance in both volume of funds and role. Though the largest bilateral development agency, USAID is somewhat of an outlier in modes of operation, scope and nature of activities, and place within government. This chapter examines the development and character of U.S. foreign assistance. Like others, the United States provides foreign aid for multiple reasons – to relieve suffering and promote long-term economic and social development, to gain favor with allies, to open markets, to help ensure national security. Security and diplomacy do play a large role in U.S. foreign aid, even in basic education. In the context of U.S. internal politics, both humanitarian/development and diplomatic/security rationales have been necessary to sustain public and government support for foreign aid. Still neither rationale has prevailed; the budget is split nearly in half. The need for a humanitarian rationale may be characteristic of U.S. foreign assistance along with the emphasis on democracy. Yet these programs have sometimes been distorted by the diplomatic rationale and the security needs of the state. Many of these tensions and the constant need to justify foreign aid likely derive from the perennial periodic isolationist thread of U.S. politics, the particular adversarial institutions of U.S. policymaking, and the transparency which leaves these processes open. Even so, U.S. development assistance has played a prominent role in the trajectory of international development post-World War II, and has worked to address many of the great challenges of the times.

We consider the relationship between external aid and development in Mozambique from 1980–2004, identifying the specific mechanisms through which aid has influenced the developmental trajectory of the country. We undertake both a growth accounting analysis and review the intended and unintended effects of aid at the micro-level. Sustained aid flows to Mozambique, in conflict and post-conflict periods, have made an unambiguous, positive contribution to rapid growth since 1992. However, proliferation of donors and aid-supported interventions has burdened local administration, indicating a need for deeper domestic government accountability. To sustain growth, Mozambique must maximize benefits from natural resources while promoting constructive international market integration.

The paper discusses various important issues of development aid in the context of the emerging new landscape for Official Development Assistance (ODA) and in particular how aid effectiveness issues are now perceived in a world of scaled-up aid. The paper also discusses the overall nexus between aid, growth and domestic policies in aid-recipient countries by reflecting on the relevant ongoing debate in this area. A substantial part of the paper is devoted to the discussion of the central issues involved in development aid, particularly in connection with recent calls in the international development community for scaling-up aid so that the Millennium Development Goals can be attained, as well as the challenging new policy agenda in this regard.

Outlines the background and aims of the Millennium Development Goals. Presents a brief introduction to the articles in this special issue.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the state of government accounting in Ghana and Benin using neo-patrimonial and organizational façade lenses.

The study used two country case studies that engaged with stakeholders including donors, civil society, politicians, and civil servants. Semi-structured interviews were used as the main data collection technique, which were complemented by document analysis.

The study finds that government accounting reforms are decoupled and used in both countries as a façade which is caused, to a varying degree, by indigenous neo-patrimonial governance traits of informal institutions, patronage, and clientelism. And despite the relatively superior Ghanaian system, in terms of its functioning, compared to the Beninese, government accounting plays a more symbolic role in the former than in the latter.

This is one of the very few theoretically informed empirical studies that examine the state of government accounting in the two major African settings – Anglophone and Francophone. The results inform policies more tailored to indigenous governance issues for better outcomes.

Rapid transformation of agrifood value chains because of population growth, urbanization, rising consumer incomes and increased demand for food quality and safety has resulted in the need for smallholder farmers to coordinate horizontally through group formation and collective marketing to improve farm performance in developing countries. This paper aims to examine the factors that influence farmer group membership and collective marketing decisions and their impacts on smallholder farm performance in rural Ghana.

Using data from a recent survey of 447 rice farmers in rural Ghana, an endogenous switching regression model is employed to account for selection bias arising from both observable and unobservable farmer attributes.

The data reveal that group members and collective marketing participants obtained higher prices and also incurred lower input costs. The econometric estimates show that age, access to credit, mobile phone ownership, distance to market and road status are the main drivers of group membership and collective marketing decisions. The authors also find positive and significant impacts of farmer group membership and collective marketing on farm net revenues.

The findings from this study suggest that government and donor support for the formation of farmer groups during implementation of agriculture and value chain interventions should as well incorporate strategies to facilitate collective marketing.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the role farmer groups and collective marketing play in improving smallholder farm performance.

Education for all has become a rallying call among heads of states, international organizations, corporate leaders and transnational advocacy groups. Implementation of EFA goals has also expanded, and today enjoys both new volumes of aid spending and new modes of aid delivery. This chapter considers why the global promise of EFA has moved beyond international rhetoric to action, and explores what the current EFA movement can tell us about the prospects of rights-based and redistributive forms of global governance.