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The case introduces students to the nature of collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and the CDO origination process, with emphasis on the corporate structure of the special purpose vehicles, cash flows to various CDO tranches, and motivation behind CDO origination. Students will learn to quantitatively evaluate the risk-return profile of CDO tranches with emphasis on the equity tranche (also known as “toxic waste”). This is ideal for MBA and advanced undergraduate level courses on financial markets, financial institutions, and investments. In the case, an associate at the Debt Capital Markets desk of Lehman Brothers prepares a CDO issuance for Western Asset. Western Asset had been contacted by a group of commercial banks eager to sell senior secured bank loans and high-yield corporate bonds to lower their capital requirements and free up capital for additional lending.

This case examines the April 2007 decision of British music company EMI to suspend its annual dividend as the company struggled to respond to the effect of digital audio distribution on its core business. The EMI case is intended to serve as an engaging introduction to corporate financial policy and themes in managing the right side of the balance sheet. The case contrasts EMI's storied success with artists such as the Beatles, the Beach Boys, Pink Floyd, and Norah Jones with its recent inability to succeed in financial markets. In light of takeover threats and restructuring costs, EMI's CFO Martin Stewart must recommend EMI's dividend policy.

This case is taught at the University of Virginia McIntire School of Commerce in the fourth year course, “Corporate Restructuring.” The case is suitable for advanced undergraduates or MBS students that have already completed a course in corporate finance or valuation. The material would fit well in a second Corporate Finance class, particularly if the instructor would like to devote some time to discussing financial distress and restructuring. It could also work well in a business reorganization class at a law school. Danfurn LLC is a U.S. manufacturer and retailer of high-end furniture that is in financial distress following a 2007 LBO and subsequent declines in profitability in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–08. The nearly 50-year-old company has recently blown through cash flow covenants on its $100 million senior financing facility and is seeking a restructuring of its capital structure that will allow the company to survive. Although Danfurn's lenders are hopeful that a consensual decision can be reached on how to restructure the company without resorting to a bankruptcy filing, filing for bankruptcy or even liquidating the company are very real possibilities. This case is an exercise in negotiating a consensual restructuring of a financially distressed company when stakeholders have varied incentives, legal rights, potential remedies, and interests in how the company will be managed going forward. The case discussion works best if students are divided into groups representing the different stakeholder groups—the senior lender, mezzanine lender, board, private equity owner, and founder interests—and are asked to think about how best to maximize their positions while recognizing the costs of failing to reach a negotiated outcome.

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

The case presents a lot of information, directly and via references and Web-based links, about the economic consequences of the virus. Several themes are evident: As an opening theory-base, the decades-long stakeholder versus shareholder debate is invoked – but does this extend beyond “stakeholders” to the “public good”? There are contexts (generally wars) in which governments are empowered to instruct private companies to engage in the public good – but how far should/must they voluntarily go? The underlying macro-economic issue is: where will we get the capital? Central banks have not recovered from the 2008 global financial crisis and have limited “ammunition” to address the anticipated economic problems introduced by the virus. The case presents data on selected financial metrics (interest rates, debt levels, risk pricing, etc.) and outlines the conventional stimulatory steps used: lowering short-term rates (monetary policy) and investment in assets (fiscal policy) and the less-conventional Quantitative Easing “QE”.

The coronavirus appears to herald a devastating blow to lives and to the world economy – its impact is yet unknown, but likely to be comparable to war and pestilence of biblical proportion. This case focuses on the possible economic trajectories as a consequence of the virus, with emphasis on bailing-out (restructuring) struggling companies and restoring jobs. Within the framework of a world desperately in need of capital, it raises questions about accountability and responsibility. Should retrenched workers in restaurants, banks and airlines feel the consequences of their poor career choices? Must shareholders (read pensioners) shoulder losses to support the public good? Ought governments bail-out whole industries – using tax-payer money? Or do we allow central banks to conjure-up billions and hope for the best? The case does not attempt to provide answers to these questions but presents several vignettes and offers a context in which participants can debate the merits of these problems.

MBA and Exec-ed.

Teaching Notes are available for educators only.

CSS: 1 Accounting and Finance.

In mid-February 2009, amid the global financial crisis, the news was grim. The U.S. economy had been in recession since December 2007. If the downturn lasted into early spring, it would become America's longest postwar recession. The economy had shed 3.5 million jobs over the previous 12 months, the worst 12-month period on record. Bank lending was plummeting; the few banks with funds available were holding onto them. With this massive shift into liquid assets (cash and cash equivalents) and away from lending of any sort (even for productive uses or, in many cases, the working capital firms needed to survive), the economy would likely grind to a halt. On this brisk mid-February day in Washington, Timothy Geithner and Ben Bernanke rolled up their sleeves and reevaluated their plans to address the nearly impossible task of righting the ship. In terms of monetary and fiscal policy, were they doing all they could to halt this epic slide? Were they doing too much?

This public-sourced case describes the latest restructuring efforts by Deutsche Bank (DB) and gives a short history of prior restructuring efforts from the decade before. In July 2019, Christian Sewing, the new CEO of DB, announced a series of measures that included, among others, the elimination of global equity trading, the layoff of 18,000 employees, the creation of a “bad bank” to transfer noncore assets, and the suspension of dividends until 2022. The case describes key decisions a bank CEO makes when a bank needs to change course to return to profitability and growth. The case offers an opportunity to debate these key decisions, as well as discuss some of the prior ones during earlier restructuring efforts, and put the students in the CEO's shoes: What would you do and why? The case also describes key banking performance metrics (e.g., ROE, ROA) and other critical variables such as those reflecting capital health (Tier 1 ratio), as well as gives an overview of the bank business model and factors impacting bank profitability and value.

The essence of discounted cash flow valuation is simple; the asset is worth the expected cash flows it will generate, discounted to the reference date for the valuation exercise (normally, the day of the calculation). A survey article was written in Parker (1968), where it was stated that the earliest interest rate tables (use to discount value to the present) dated back to 1340. Works from Boulding (1935) and Keynes (1936) derived the IRR (Internal Rate of Return) for an investment. Samuelson (1937) compared the IRR and NPV (Net Present Value) approaches, arguing that rational investors should maximize NPV and not IRR. The previously mentioned works and the publication of Joel Dean’s reference book (Dean, 1951) on capital budgeting set the basis for the widespread use of the discounted cash flow approach into all business areas, aided by developments in portfolio theory. Nowadays, probably the model with more widespread use is the FCFE/FCFF (Free Cash Flow to Equity and Free Cash Flow to Firm) model. For simplification purposes, we will focus on the FCFE model, which basically is the FCF model’s version for the potential dividends. The focus is to value the business based on its dividends (potential or real), and thus care must be taken in order not to double count cash flows (this matter was treated in this case) and to assess what use is given to that excess cash flow – if it is invested wisely, what returns will come of them, how it is accounted for, etc. (Damodaran, 2006). The bridge to the FCFF model is straightforward; the FCFF includes FCFE and added cash that is owed to debtholders. References: Parker, R.H. (1968). “Discounted Cash Flow in Historical Perspective”, Journal of Accounting Research, v6, pp58-71. Boulding, K.E. (1935). “The Theory of a Single Investment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, v49, pp479-494. Keynes, J. M. (1936). “The General Theory of Employment”, Macmillan, London. Samuelson, P. (1937). “Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Capital”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, v51, pp. 469–496. Dean, Joel. (1951). “Capital Budgeting”, Columbia University Press, New York. Damodaran, A. (2006). “Damodaran on Valuation”, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons, New York.

All information is taken from public sources and with consented company interviews.

Opportunities for value creation may be found in awkward and difficult circumstances. Good strategic thinking and ability to act swiftly are usually crucial to be able to take advantage of such tough environments. Amidst a country-wide economic crisis and general disbelief, José de Mello Group (JMG) saw one of its main assets’ (Brisa Highways) market value tumble down to unforeseen figures and was forced to act on it. Brisa’s main partners were eager in overpowering JMG’s control of the company, and outside pressure from Deutsche Bank was rising, due to the use of Brisa’s shares as collateral. JMG would have to revise its strategy and see if Brisa was worth fighting for; the market implicit assessment about the company’s prospects was very penalizing, but JMG’s predictions on Brisa’s future performance indicated that this could be an investment opportunity. Would it be wise to bet against the market?

This study is excellent for finance and strategy courses, at both undergraduate and graduate levels. Company valuation and corporate strategy are required.

This case consists of conversations with six prominent venture capital investors in the United States. The topics covered include investment strategies and relationships with entrepreneurs in the United States and around the world.

Doug Scovanner, CFO of Target Corporation, was about to present his proposal at the November 2008 Board meeting. He was prepared to discuss immediate strategic actions which would provide support for working capital for the discount retailer. The retail community was about to suffer their worst fourth quarter in recent memory. Consumer spending had contracted, unemployment was rising and the deflated housing market had driven the economy into a recession. Although discount retailers had fared better than other industries during the second and third quarters, they were not immune to the overall economic downturn which had become a global crisis. To further complicate matters, Target's largest competitor, Wal-Mart, just posted third quarter growth even though Target was bracing for a busy holiday season. Scovanner anticipated further strain on working capital before year-end as cash flow tightened and the capital markets remained at a virtual stand-still.