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The purpose of this paper is to document at the firm-specific level whether firms manage earnings up or down to barely miss or meet/beat three common earnings threshold targets, namely, analysts’ forecasts (AFs), last year’s earnings and zero earnings, and whether the market rewards or punishes up versus down earnings management.

The authors assign each firm to its most likely earnings target using an algorithm that reflects management’s economic incentives to manage earnings. The authors place reported (managed) earnings in standard width intervals surrounding the earnings target. Jacob and Jorgensen’s (2007) proxy for unmanaged earnings is also placed into the intervals. Thus, a firm with unmanaged earnings in the interval just below the target and reported earnings in the interval just above the target would be deemed to have managed earnings up. The authors also document whether the market rewarded or punished the earnings management strategy with three-day cumulative abnormal returns.

The authors find that most firms which barely meet/beat their target did so by managing earnings up. The market rewarded this earnings management strategy. The market did not, however, reward firms that managed earnings down (i.e. created a cookie jar of reserves) to barely meet/beat their target. Thus, the meet/beat premium does not apply to all firms. The authors’ explanation is that most earnings targets are set by AFs; that these are usually the highest of the three targets; and that these are, therefore, considered to be “good” firms by the market because they have the ability to find that extra penny to meet/beat the target. Firms that were assigned to the last year’s earnings and/or zero earnings thresholds are not as “good” because they usually do not target the highest threshold and must manage earnings down, as they are more likely to have to reverse income-increasing accruals booked during interim quarters.

The primary limitation in this study is the algorithm used to assign firms to their threshold target. It is ad hoc in nature, but relies on reasonable assumptions about the management’s incentives to manage earnings.

This study has practical implications because investors and regulators can adopt this methodology to identify potential candidates for earnings management that would allow further insight into accounting and reporting practices. This methodology may also be useful to the auditor who wants to understand the tendencies of a new client. It may also be a useful tool for framing auditing hypotheses in a way that would be appropriate for clients who manage earnings.

This paper documents for the first time at the firm-specific level the market reaction to upward versus downward earnings management designed to barely meet/beat the earnings threshold. It also documents the frequency with which firms target the three earnings thresholds and the frequency with which firms miss or meet/beat their threshold.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a new measure of earnings management flexibility based on the limits of the allowable set of accruals, prior discretionary accruals used, and the reversal rate of these accruals.

Quarterly financial data from Compustat for the period 1990‐2009 were used to construct the flexibility measure. Then the author examined how well this measure captures flexibility by investigating its effect on a firm's probability of meeting analysts' forecasts.

The results show that this flexibility measure better captures the firm‐specific flexibility than that of Barton and Simko which captures mainly the difference in flexibility across industries. Further, the positive effect of their measure on a firm's probability of meeting/beating analysts' forecasts is not observed in the extended sample period.

The flexibility measure proposed here can assist investors, analysts, or researchers to compare earnings management flexibility across firms in the same industry, which is useful in evaluating the quality of a firm's financial reports, stock picking or credit granting decisions.

This paper contributes to the earnings management literature by incorporating both the variation in flexibility used and that in flexibility limits. Second, evidence in this paper suggests that while financial benefits motivate managers to undertake earnings management, flexibility determines the extent of earnings management they can undertake. Third, this study points out that the unreversed discretionary accruals impose a constraint on the level of discretionary accruals a manager can incur in the current period, and hence have an indirect influence on current reported earnings.

Managers generally have discretion in determining how components of earnings are presented in financial statements in distinguishing between “normal” earnings and items classified as unusual, special, significant, exceptional or abnormal. Prior research has found that such intra‐period classificatory choice is used as a form of earnings management. Prior to 2001, Australian accounting standards mandated that unusually large items of revenue and expense be classified as “abnormal items” for financial reporting, but this classification was removed from accounting standards from 2001. This move by the regulators was partly in response to concerns that the abnormal classification was being used opportunistically to manage reported pre‐abnormal earnings. The purpose of this paper is to extend the earnings management literature by examining the reporting of abnormal items for evidence of intra‐period classificatory earnings management in the unique Australian setting.

This study investigates associations between reporting of abnormal items and incentives in the form of analyst following and the earnings benchmarks of analysts' forecasts, earnings levels, and earnings changes, for a sample of Australian, top‐500 firms, for the seven‐year period from 1994 to 2000.

The findings suggest there are systematic differences between firms reporting abnormal items and those with no abnormal items. Results show evidence that, on average, firms shifted expense items from pre‐abnormal earnings to bottom line net income through reclassification as abnormal losses.

The paper's findings suggest that the standard setters were justified in removing the “abnormal” classification from the accounting standard. However, it cannot be assumed that all firms acted opportunistically in the classification of items as abnormal. With the removal of the standardised classification of items outside normal operations as “abnormal”, firms lost the opportunity to use such disclosures as a signalling device, with the consequential effect of limiting the scope of effectively communicating information about the nature of items presented in financial reports.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between auditor industry specialization and audit fees surrounding Section 404 implementation.

With a sample of 1,006 industrial firms over the 2003-2005 reporting periods, an ordinary least square regression model was used to regress change in audit fees on auditor specialization measure and other control variables.

It was found that auditor industry specialization is negatively related to the change in audit fees during the first year of Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) compliance (2003-2004). It was also found that there were no significant cost savings associated with auditor industry specialization in the second year of SOX compliance (2004-2005).

These results suggest that industry-specific expertise may enable auditors to adapt more efficiently to new significant audit standards and regulations, but that such efficiencies are likely to be most pronounced during the initial implementation year.

Auditor competition and auditor specialization are at the forefront of today’s ever-changing accounting industry. Analysis of a contemporary auditing issue (auditor specialization) in the context of major legislation (SOX) provides a research setting that gives both academics and practitioners valuable insight toward how future legislation can impact current accounting industry issues such as the increasing need to have more expertise.

The purpose of this paper is to assess whether there is an association between CEO age and analysts forecast properties (particularly forecast accuracy and bias/optimism). CEOs, having the central role in managing firms, can significantly influence the financial and non-financial decisions in an organisation. Furthermore, having been identified as key culprits in past major accounting scandals, it is also important to identify the CEO characteristics that affect financial reporting decisions.

This study adopts the upper echelon theory on the relationship between CEO age and analysts forecast properties. The authors use a sample of 2,730 Australian firm-year observations for the period 2004–2013 drawn from IBES, Connect 4 and SIRCA databases.

The authors find that analyst forecast accuracy increases and bias (optimism) reduces with the CEO age. The authors conclude that earnings and related information provided to analysts improves with the CEO age, which increases the forecast accuracy and reduces bias (optimism). Additional results suggest that the positive (negative) effect of CEO age on forecast accuracy (bias) remains until the CEOs reach the age of their retirement age (65 years). The results remain consistent with a number of sensitivity tests and provide implication for stakeholders such as firms, analysts, auditors, financial statements users and regulators.

The authors demonstrate that the relationship between CEO age and analyst forecast properties is not linear but is, in fact, curvilinear substantiating concerns that CEOs that are much younger or much older do not help increase the quality of the information environment. Consequently, firms hiring CEOs in the right age bracket also benefit by having higher-quality information environment leading possibly to reduce costs such as those relating to debt and/or equity ultimately increasing firm value.

Empirical studies on the association between CEO age and analysts earnings properties in Australia are scarce and this paper contributes to the determinants of the analysts forecast accuracy and bias (optimism) and the CEO age literature.

This paper aims to examine how compensation committees perceive audit quality as indicated by audit firm tenure. Using the contracting weight attached to earnings and cash flows in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation as proxy for the compensation committee’s perception of audit quality, the study examines whether compensation committees perceive performance metric informativeness as being affected by auditor tenure.

The paper regresses CEO cash compensation on accounting-based performance metrics and on interactions between auditor tenure and accounting-based performance metrics while controlling for other factors previously shown to affect CEO pay. Auditor tenure is measured using continuous and dichotomous variables.

Auditor tenure is associated with a reduced (positive) weight on earnings (operating cash flows), which suggests lower perceived audit quality as tenure lengthens consistent with the auditor closeness argument. This relation is asymmetric, i.e. the negative effect of longer auditor tenure on incentive contracting is more pronounced for positive earnings. The results are robust to using CEO total compensation as the compensation measure, as well as using level and change specifications.

The inability to control for audit partner tenure in assessing the effect of audit firm tenure on incentive contracting and the potential endogeneity between auditor tenure choice and incentive contracting are the main limitations of this study. Given the lack of information on US audit partner tenure, the study could not control for the audit partner tenure issue. However, the study has attempted to mitigate the endogeneity issue by using a Heckman selection model that includes in the first-stage a regression of auditor tenure on various firm, performance measure and CEO-related governance characteristics, based on existing models (Li et al., 2010).

Compensation committees view auditor tenure as an indicator of accounting quality in setting CEO pay. Further, long auditor tenure is perceived as detrimental to financial reporting integrity, particularly when earnings numbers suggest positive managerial performance and innovations.

This study provides empirical evidence that auditor tenure matters in setting executive pay. Further, this study shows evidence on the link between auditor tenure and audit quality from an internal user’s perspective. Prior studies have focused either on external users (investors, creditors) or on the preparer (using measures such as discretionary accruals or meet/beat analysts’ forecasts or forecast guidance).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of career concerns on CEOs’ use of expectations management to meet or beat analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. The authors posit that early career-stage CEOs are less (more) likely to use expectations management than are late career-stage CEOs if the market views expectations management as an opportunistic strategy (efficient process) due to reputational capital concerns.

The authors obtain data for CEO career stages and CEO compensation from ExecuComp, analyst earnings forecasts from the detailed I/B/E/S database, financial statement data from quarterly Compustat and stock returns from the daily CRSP database over the period 1992–2013.

The results are consistent with the opportunistic hypothesis and early-stage CEOs seeking to build reputational capital by avoiding the perception of engaging in an inefficient managerial strategy. The authors find robust evidence that late career-stage CEOs are more likely to engage in expectations management than early career-stage CEOs. Furthermore, the authors show that late career-stage CEOs tend to employ expectations management to boost the value of their equity-based compensation.

The findings have important implications because the authors document a different implication of the “horizon problem” related to CEOs’ opportunistic forecasting behavior and the manipulation of analysts’ forecasts for CEOs who are approaching retirement.

The results have practical implications for analysts who provide earnings forecasts for firms whose CEOs are in early or late career stages and for investors who use such analysts’ forecasts in firm valuation models.

The authors contribute to the literature on expectations management by documenting how reputational incentives of CEOs affect the likelihood that managers engage in expectations management. The authors show that an important managerial incentive to engage in expectations management is CEO career concerns. Furthermore, the authors show that CEOs who are in early stages of their careers choose not to engage in expectations management due to the market’s perceived degree of opportunism pertaining to this strategy.

Audit rotation (AR) is a key policy initiative implemented in global jurisdictions to deal with concerns about audit quality. Auditing financial reports involves communicating attested value-relevant company information to investors, and hence audit quality plays a role in the quality of financial reporting information. This paper aims to investigate whether AR affects the degree of information asymmetry (IS) between investors. It further aims to examine whether voluntary AR results in less asymmetric information compared to mandatory AR. Additionally, it examines whether political connections moderate the association between AR and IS.

The authors use data from publicly traded banks across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for the period 2010–2018. The authors include several variables to control for corporate governance and other firm-specific characteristics by using country-year fixed-effects regression model.

The authors find higher IS for banks that periodically rotate auditor, while banks voluntarily choose to rotate auditors obtain high-quality audits, which results in higher trading volume and lower stock return volatility, hence lower IS. The results suggest that when banks voluntarily choose to rotate auditors, investors perceive these banks as more committed to obtaining high-quality audits relative to mandatory AR. Providing higher quality audits enhances the credibility of reported information and thus reduce the level of IS. Moreover, IS following AR is higher for politically connected banks than for similar but politically unconnected banks. Finally, investors perceive voluntary AR as a disciplining tool, which mitigates IS. This mitigating role is not affected by bank political connectedness.

This study has limitations as the definition of AR could be interpreted as binary or too narrow, and hence it may not be appropriate to generalize findings to different contexts. Nonetheless, this study casts light on a new perspective to reconcile the existing mixed evidence on the influence of AR on IS and the moderating role of political connections. A further limitation is that because of data unavailability, the authors were unable to use other proxies (e.g. bid-ask spreads and analyst forecast dispersion) of IS.

The present findings provide insight to regulators, policymakers and standard setters on the potential adverse effect of political connections on the role of AR in mitigating IS. The results underscore the importance of voluntary AR, and suggest that regulators, policymakers and standard setters encourage firms to rotate their auditors periodically.

This study provides evidence in a setting that is unique at the economic, social and regulatory levels. Prior literature is lacking and has been centered on developed countries or focusing on single-country specifications. The data set of this study is unique and allows us to examine the interplay between political influence that arises through ownership and management roles of influential members of state.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the individual and interaction effects of chief executive officers (CEO)-chairman leadership structure (CEO duality) and CEO-serviced early years (the first three years in office) on real earnings management (REM) through sales activities of listed firms in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).

The longitudinal data on CEO and chairman names of 3,825 firm-year observations were manually gleaned from the SET market analysis and reporting tool and the annual reports from 2001 to 2015. Multiple regressions were utilized to analyze the effects.

The findings show a positive relationship between CEO duality and sales-driven REM. However, the CEO-serviced early years have no association with sales-driven REM. The CEO duality/serviced early year interaction effect is positively correlated to sales manipulation. In addition, firms with the CEO duality engage in upward or downward sales-driven REM, while firms with newly appointed CEO adopt only the upward sales-driven REM. In firms which their newly appointed CEO concurrently serves as chairman, either upward or downward sales-driven REM strategy is introduced.

The findings provide some grounds for capital market and regulators to exercise caution when it comes to firms with the newly appointed CEO and/or the CEO duality, given a high tendency to manipulate sales revenues.

This study is the first to investigate the relationship between the CEO duality/serviced early years on sales-driven REM. The findings are expected to complement existing publications on REM.

Krull (2004) finds that US multinational corporations (MNCs) increase amounts designated as permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) to maximize reported after-tax earnings and meet earnings targets. We extend this research by examining the relationship between executive equity compensation and the opportunistic use of PRE by US MNCs, and the market reaction to earnings management using PRE designations. Firms use equity compensation to incentivize executives to strive for maximum shareholder wealth. One unintended consequence is that executives may engage in earnings management activities to increase their equity compensation. In this study, we examine whether the equity incentives of management are associated with an increased use of PRE. We predict and find strong evidence that the changes in PRE are positively associated with the portion of top managers' compensation that is tied to stock performance. In addition, we find this relationship to be strongest for firms that meet or beat forecasts, but only with the use of PRE to inflate income, suggesting that equity compensation incentivizes managers to opportunistically use PRE, especially to meet analyst forecasts.

Further, we provide evidence that investors react negatively to beating analysts' forecasts with the use of PRE, suggesting that investors find this behavior opportunistic and not fully convincing. This chapter makes an important contribution to what we know about the joint effects of tax policy, generally accepted accounting principles, and incentive compensation on the earnings reporting process.