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We evaluate the performance of financial analysts versus naïve models in making long-term earnings forecasts. Long-term earnings forecasts are generally defined as third-, fourth-, and fifth-year earnings forecasts. We find that for the fourth and fifth years, analysts' forecasts are no more accurate than naïve random walk (RW) forecasts or naïve RW with economic growth forecasts. Furthermore, naïve model forecasts contain a large amount of incremental information over analysts' long-term forecasts in explaining future actual earnings. Tests based on subsamples show that the performance of analysts' long-term forecasts declines relative to naïve model forecasts for firms with high past earnings growth and low analyst coverage. Furthermore, a model that combines a naïve benchmark (last year's earnings) with the analyst long-term earnings growth forecast does not perform better than analysts' forecasts or naïve model forecasts. Our findings suggest that analysts' long-term earnings forecasts should be used with caution by researchers and practitioners. Also, when analysts' earnings forecasts are unavailable, naïve model earnings forecasts may be sufficient for measuring long-term earnings expectations.

Financial analysts act as crucial conduits of information between firms and stakeholders. However, comparatively little is known about how these information intermediaries evaluate the believability and importance of corporate disclosures. We argue that a firm’s level of managerial discretion, or latitude of executive action, acts as a cue for financial analysts, which helps them interpret and respond to voluntary management earnings forecasts. Our study provides strong, robust evidence that financial analysts find management forecasts significantly less believable in low-discretion than in high-discretion environments, and therefore tend to be much less responsive to these forecasts. We also show that managerial discretion is especially impactful on analysts’ responses in those circumstances where analysts are typically most uncertain about how to interpret management forecasts.

Although prior research documents that analysts sometimes herd their forecasts, very few studies investigate how investors’ judgments are influenced by their perceptions of the likelihood of analyst herding. I conduct an experimental study to investigate the conditions under which investors’ assessments of uncertainty about future earnings are influenced by their perceptions of the likelihood of analyst herding. As expected, and consistent with motivated reasoning, the results show that the temporal order of analyst forecasts influences investors’ estimates of the likelihood of analyst herding and investors’ uncertainty judgments when analyst forecasts are preference-inconsistent but not when analyst forecasts are preference-consistent. This study provides a potential explanation for the mixed findings of prior research in regard to investors’ reactions to the likelihood of analyst herding. In addition, this study extends research on investors’ credulity by providing evidence that motivated reasoning and skepticism may serve as a mechanism that contributes to that credulity.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.

The purpose of this study is to examine the sophistication (accuracy, bias, informativeness for changes in accruals) and market pricing of analysts’ cash flow forecasts for Eurozone listed firms and the effects of financial distress and auditor quality.

Accuracy/bias is investigated using analysts’ cash flow forecast errors. The naïve extrapolation model is used to examine the forecasts’ informativeness for working capital changes. A total return model is used to examine value-relevance. This study controls for the forecast horizon, using the Altman z-score and a BigN/industry specialization auditor indicator to proxy for distress and auditor quality, respectively.

Analysts efficiently adjust earnings forecasts for depreciation during cash flow forecast formation but fail to efficiently incorporate working capital changes. Findings indicate cash flow forecasts’ accuracy improves for distressed firms and firms of high auditor quality, attributed to analyst conservatism and accounting choices and more accurate earnings forecasts, respectively. Cash flow forecasts’ value-relevance increases for distressed firms, particularly those of high auditor quality and timely forecasts.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine analysts’ cash flow forecasts taking into consideration financial distress and auditor quality, controlling for the analyst forecast horizon.

Given the limited studies that have started to focus on contexts where integrated reporting (IR) is voluntarily adopted, this paper aims to explore the moderating role of institutional characteristics on the association between voluntary report release and analyst forecast accuracy.

This study uses a quantitative empirical research method grounded on voluntary disclosure theory to provide empirical evidence on an international sample of companies choosing to release integrated reports. Preliminarily, a cluster analysis is used to group countries according to institutional patterns. Multivariate analyses detect the associations between report release choice and analysts’ forecast accuracy across clusters. Multiple econometric approaches are used to address the endogeneity concerns.

IR release is not informative for the market unless considering systematic variations across different institutional settings. Analysts’ forecast is more accurate for IR adopters located in strong institutional enforcement settings than for all the other companies. In the strong institutional setting that is also characterized by a pluralistic society, IR release benefits for the market are conditioned by the fact that the choice to release IR depends on environmental, governance and social disclosure-based managers remuneration and disclosure requirements. In weak institutional settings, IR release is not beneficial for the forecast accuracy.

Academics and practitioners can gain understanding of the usefulness of voluntary IR across different institutional settings.

The study advances the understanding of the IR’s informativeness, overcoming the common dichotomous distinctions between strong and weak institutional settings.

This paper examines the effect of managerial insider trading on analyst forecast accuracy, dispersion and bias. Specifically, the authors test whether insider-trading information is positively associated with the precision of earnings forecasts. In addition, this relationship between Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) and the Galleon insider trading case is examined.

Pooled ordinary least squares (Pooled OLS) rregressions with year-fixed effects, firm-fixed effects, and firm-level clustered standard errors are used. Our proxies for forecast precision are regressed on alternative measures of insider trading activities and a vector of control variables.

Insider-trading information is positively associated with the precision of earnings forecasts. Analysts provide better forecast accuracy, less forecast dispersion and lower forecast bias among firms with insider trading in the six months leading to the forecast issues. In addition, bullish (bearish) insider trades are associated with increased (decreased) forecast bias. Insider trading information complements analysts' independent opinion and increases the precision of their forecast.

Regulators may pursue rules that promote the rapid disclosure of managerial insider trades, particularly given the increasing availability of Internet tools. Securities regulators may attempt to increase transparency and enhance the reporting procedures of corporate insiders, for example, using Internet sources with direct release to the public to ensure more timely information dissemination.

The authors document a positive association between earnings forecast precision and managerial insider trading up to six months prior to the forecast issue. This relationship is stronger after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prohibited the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information through Regulation FD. In addition, the association between insider trading and forecast accuracy has weakened after the Galleon insider trading case.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between Bumiputra (in reference to Malay indigenous race) directors, a proxy for culture and analysts forecast. In addition, the study investigates whether corporate governance affects that relationship.

The sample of this study is based on 664 firm-year observations from 193 firms during the 1999-2009 periods. The authors employ a panel least square regression with both period and industry fixed effects. The authors retrieved of analyst data from the Institutional Broker Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database while the authors hand collected the corporate governance variables. The remaining data were collected from Compustat Global.

The authors find a positive relationship between the proxy of culture, Bumiputra directors and analysts forecast error suggesting that cultural values influences the level of information in the Malaysian capital market.

The research is dependent on the data availability from I/B/E/S database.

The authors extend the work of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) in investigating how cultural values influence the capital market. In addition, this is the first study that investigates culture values and the analysts forecast.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of firm’s deviant strategy on analysts’ earnings forecasts and further examine the effects of firm’s information transparency and environmental uncertainty on these relationships from information asymmetry perspective.

The sample includes listed firms on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2007-2013.

The results indicate that firms’ deviant strategies have effects on analysts’ earnings forecasts, in particular, firms with extreme strategies have less analysts following, larger forecast error and dispersion compared with firms following industry norms. Moreover, information transparency and environmental uncertainty have effects on the relationship between strategic deviance and analysts’ earnings forecasts.

The empirical results of this paper provide strong evidence that strategy information is an important source of information for analysts’ earnings forecasts, which shows that analysts should pay attention to not only financial information but also the strategic information, especially when the information is related to strategic choice. In addition, it is necessary for investors to focus on strategic information to have a better understanding on financial information of enterprises and make better investment decisions.

The findings of this study indicate that corporate strategic deviance has an effect on analysts’ earnings forecasting behavior. This study enriches research studies on corporate strategy and external stakeholders and complements related research on analysts’ earnings forecasts from strategic perspective and information asymmetry perspective.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of insider trading on analyst coverage and the properties of analyst earnings forecasts. Given the central role of analysts for information diffusion in stock markets, advancing understanding of the role insider trades may play in analyst coverage and forecasts, especially in the context of a changing legal environment (e.g. the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure [Reg FD]), should be a worthy goal.

To address the research questions, the authors run regressions in which the authors identify and control for as many possible determinants of analyst coverage and forecasts (e.g. firm size, information asymmetry and earnings performance) that are correlated with insider trades. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, the authors use three approaches. First, the authors extend the sample period to the post-Reg-FD period in which managers are not allowed to provide private information to financial analysts. Second, the authors measure analyst coverage in a window that is lagged by insider trades. Third, the authors employ firm-fixed-effects regressions in all the multivariate tests. Finally, following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), the authors conduct the impact threshold for a confounding variable test to assure that all regression analyses are indeed immune to the potential correlated-omitted-variable bias.

The authors find that the level of analyst coverage is positively related to the intensity of insider trades and that analyst coverage is more strongly associated with insider purchases than with insider sales. The authors also find that the positive association between analyst coverage and insider trades is less pronounced after the passage of Reg FD. Further investigations reveal that analysts revise their earnings forecasts upward following insider purchases, the informativeness of analyst forecast revisions significantly increases following insider purchases and optimistic bias in analyst forecast revisions is reduced as a result of insider purchases; the authors do not find similar evidence for insider sales.

A large body of insider trading literature (Johnson et al., 2009; Badertscher et al., 2011; Thevenot 2012; Skaife et al., 2013; Billings and Cedergren 2015; Dechow et al., 2016) provides evidence that insiders actively trade on their private information, such as their foreknowledge of price-relevant corporate events. This literature suggests that insider trades are potentially value-relevant and are informative about a firm’s future prospects. However, less research attention has been paid to investigating how insider trades might affect market participants’ (especially sophisticated participants’) behavior. This study contributes to understanding the role that insider trading may play in shaping analyst behavior.

Prior research (Frankel and Li, 2004; Lustgarten and Mande, 1995; Carpenter and Remmers, 2001; Seyhun, 1990) maintains that insider sales are less informative about a firm’s future prospects than are insider purchases because insider sales might take place for the liquidity and diversification purposes. By probing the stock price responses to insider selling activities, Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jeng et al. (2003) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) infer that insider selling is not informative about future firm performance. However, for such an inference, the authors cannot rule out the possibility that insider sales do convey value-relevant information, but the stock market does not react correctly to such trading information (Beneish and Vargus, 2002). Because the authors focus on examining analysts’ responses to insider sales, and analysts are supposed to be sophisticated in information processing, this study adds more compelling evidence for the notion that insider sales convey less information about a firm’s future prospects than do insider purchases.

There is an ongoing debate about the benefits and drawbacks of insider trading. Opponents of insider trading view insider trades as inequitable and immoral and assert that restricting insider trades curbs resource misallocation and benefits the whole society. Proponents contend that insider trading accelerates the price discovery process, increases market efficiency (Leland, 1992; Bernhardt et al., 1995; Choi et al., 2016) and may even play a role in rewarding and motivating executives (Roulstone, 2003; Denis and Xu, 2013). The authors add to this debate by documenting that insider trading increases the amount of information valuable to analyst research activities and helps enhance analyst services.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to offer firm-level evidence of a positive association between insider trades and analyst coverage. By accounting for the post-Reg-FD regime, this paper is also the first to provide evidence on how analysts, in the absence of access to management’s private information because of the regime change by Reg FD, react to insider trades.