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This study on corporate demand for general takāful (Islamic insurance) aims to identify potential growth areas and areas for improvement in takāful business practices in Malaysia.

A survey on corporates’ protection needs, takāful/insurance coverage obtained and awareness on takāful/insurance was conducted for this paper.

The findings from the survey are as follows: There is potential for takāful operators to further penetrate the corporate sector, as the majority of respondents indicated willingness to spend on takāful/insurance. Emphasis on takāful value propositions apart from its Sharīʿah compliance status is needed to attract corporates, as respondents were found to be indifferent on Sharīʿah compliance status of their protection. Strong market presence, expanded product offerings and efficient services were key determinants to attract takāful subscription. Respondents’ heavy reliance on intermediaries warrants strong collaboration with intermediaries to widen market outreach. The small and medium enterprises segment appeared promising, as it is found to be underserved despite having higher propensity to obtain takāful/insurance coverage compared to the overall respondents.

This study is limited to Malaysia’s experience. The findings are indicative (though they may not be conclusive) of the target segment as well as the takāful industry as a whole.

The insights on respondents’ considerations when obtaining takāful/insurance coverage and the correlation of these factors with respondents’ characteristics can assist takāful/insurance providers in structuring products and business strategies to better serve this market segment. The paper may also aid discussions among researchers and regulators on areas for further development of the industry.

The purpose of this paper is to contend that the dominant voluntarism approach to the accountability of transnational corporations (TNCs) is inadequate and not fit-for-purpose. The authors argue for the establishment of an international legal mechanism for securing the accountability of TNCs, particularly in the context of developing countries with notoriously weak governance mechanisms to protect all relevant stakeholders.

The study adopts insights from the fields of management and international law to draw out synergies from particular understandings of corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and international human rights. The challenges to governance in developing countries with regard to securing the accountability of TNCs are illustrated with the Nigerian experience of oil-industry legislation reform.

The specific context of the experiences of developing countries in Africa on the operations of TNCs particularly commends the need and expedience to create an international legal regime for ensuring the accountability of TNCs.

Mainstream research in this area has focused mainly on self and voluntary models of regulation and accountability that have privileged the legal fiction of the corporate status of TNCs. This paper departs from that model to argue for an enforceable model of TNC’s accountability – based on an international mechanism.

The issue of cybersecurity has been cast as the focal point of a fight between two conflicting governance models: the nation-state model of national security and the global governance model of multi-stakeholder collaboration, as seen in forums like IGF, IETF, ICANN, etc. There is a strange disconnect, however, between this supposed fight and the actual control over cybersecurity “on the ground”. This paper aims to reconnect discourse and control via a property rights approach, where control is located first and foremost in ownership.

This paper first conceptualizes current governance mechanisms through ownership and property rights. These concepts locate control over internet resources. They also help us understand ongoing shifts in control. Such shifts in governance are actually happening, security governance is being patched left and right, but these arrangements bear little resemblance to either the national security model of states or the global model of multi-stakeholder collaboration. With the conceptualization in hand, the paper then presents case studies of governance that have emerged around specific security externalities.

While not all mechanisms are equally effective, in each of the studied areas, the author found evidence of private actors partially internalizing the externalities, mostly on a voluntary basis and through network governance mechanisms. No one thinks that this is enough, but it is a starting point. Future research is needed to identify how these mechanisms can be extended or supplemented to further improve the governance of cybersecurity.

This paper bridges together the disconnected research communities on governance and (technical) cybersecurity.