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Proposals have been made to separate BT vertically into two parts: an access network (LoopCo) providing services to all operators, and a core network. The aim is to counter discriminatory behaviour by an integrated firm. The paper reviews similar approaches to separation in UK utilities and establishes criteria for evaluating the LoopCo proposal. It suggests that technological developments are moving the dividing line between core and access networks. A separation made on the basis of current technology may lead to difficulties in the future in co‐ordinating investments. It proposes instead more effective means of policing discrimination.

A debate continues on whether the structural separation of incumbent telecommunications operators would increase competition in telecommunications markets leading to a more dynamic industry. John Cubbin and David Currie, the future Chairman of OfCom, and the OECD have both contributed to this debate. More recently (in Issue 4 of this Volume) Professor Martin Cave asked the question “Is LoopCo the answer?”. In the light of the regulators’ objectives in the new EU framework to promote efficient investment, this article answers some of Professor Cave’s arguments against structural separation and sets out a framework for analysing the impact of separation on innovation in the sector and in other industries which use telecommunications as a key input. The article draws on work conducted by other academics, notably The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis and Michael Porter.

Considers the case for auctioning spectrum and evaluates the charges made by Nicholas Negroporte against the British Government, regarding taxing Internet technology. Argues that the size of the licence fee does not affect prices, and disputes the various attempts made to refute the argument. Posits the lesson to be learned by the Government is better auction design, plus rigorous competition policy implementation.

Evaluates the Commission’s 1999 Review, focusing on competition issues relating to access to networks. Notes the review’s revised proposals in relation to regulatory obligations imposed upon firms with significant market power. Notes the poor record of the Leased Lines Directive in controlling leased line prices. Argues that access‐pricing problems in the future are best tackled by proper enforcement of competition rules.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how spectrum policy can support the changing objectives of universal service in communications services.

The paper presents a review of current universal service obligations, analysis of how they will change, and identification of spectrum policy responses.

The study reveals that, in future, universal service will be delivered in a technologically neutral way; this will require a re‐appraisal of the way it is provided and the development of spectrum management techniques to ensure that it is provided efficiently.

The paper contains advice to European and other regulators about medium‐term universal service policy.

The paper explores the linkage between two previously separated areas of research.

To analyse the application of competition law and regulation in the value chain for television broadcasting in the UK, and to evaluate the need for intervention through the financing of public service broadcasting.

Arguments relating to public service broadcasting are deployed and UK competition laws and regulatory interventions are analysed.

In the digital age, the need for public intervention in broadcasting is weakened, but further development of competition law is required to prevent abuse of the market power.

A broad debate about the role of public intervention in the broadcasting market place is now taking place, and the paper proposes that such interventions be largely confined to competition policy and regulation directed to the goal of competitive markets.

Recognizes significant constraints that the UK’s international obligations as a member of the International Telecommunications Union and the European Conference of Post and Telecommunications Administrations impose. States there is also a trade‐off between internationally mandated allocations, which give certainty to equipment manufacturers and states spectrum is an important input into the production of a wide range of services – from mobile telephony to national defence.

Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States are going through deep and dramatic changes and are entering a new era. The development of high‐technology industries is considered crucial to help revitalize the economies of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, the eastern provinces of Germany (former German Democratic Republic), Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the old Soviet Union. Moreover, the current status, operation, and progress of the information processing industry represent the most fascinating areas of old East Bloc industrialization. It is widely known that the majority of industries in these countries are obsolete in comparison with the Western countries. Computer and communications technologies comprise this branch of industry where the technological gap between East and West is the widest. Catching up with western countries would take eastern countries ten years for software and supercomputers, eight years for mainframes, six years for microprocessors, and five years for minicomputers. Western countries consider this necessity to catch up as one of the main obstacles to future European integration.

The purpose of this paper is to consider circumstances when technological neutrality in fixed broadband (according firms the power to determine technological choices untrammelled by regulation or the operation of specific incentives) should be adopted.

The paper reviews the likely effect of such a policy on the competitive structure of fixed broadband markets, taking four case studies as examples.

The paper finds that choices made by broadband firms with respect to the adoption of fibre to the home versus fibre to the premise, the use of vectoring and the variant of fibre to the home adopted (point to point or point to multipoint) can have a significant effect on the nature of access products which can be provided and thus in the market structure of fixed broadband markets. Access providers can, thus, abridge or foreclose competition in downstream markets. Accordingly, regulators may decide to seek to influence such technological choices to promote competition. But this should be done carefully.

These issues are part of the on-going debate concerning the revision of the European regulatory framework for electronic communications services.