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This paper aims to explore the design of management teams when the critical task facing individual managers is monitoring the performance of worker teams and producing performance measures under uncertain information environments.

The authors use a multi-agent LEN framework – linear contract, exponential utility and normal density – to model the incentive provision and organizational design.

The main lesson is that the use of performance measures under uncertainty is greatly affected by the potential for free-riding in the very monitoring activities which generate the measures to begin with. Accordingly, the value of having a management team, that is the incremental benefit of having a second manager, depends on the monitoring technology. Of particular importance are the potential free-riding in monitoring effort among multiple managers and synergies gained from having more than one manager, such as correlation among the performance measures produced or improvement due to splitting workers pool into separate groups for each manager to monitor separately.

The paper pushes this line of research further by explicitly modeling the endogenous process of signal generation within a rich economic environment. In this environment, number of workers being evaluated and number of managers who produce the signals are both endogenous. Furthermore, both workers and managers are subject to moral hazard problem. In particular, the managers suffer from potential free-riding problems but may benefit from synergistic forces due to team monitoring.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of managerial ownership in relation to agency theory in the Malaysian business environment. In addition to examining the total managerial shareholdings, this study also investigates the association between direct and indirect managerial shareholdings with agency costs.

The data for the study is obtained from two sources, namely primary (questionnaire) and secondary (annual reports) data. The sample companies are 235 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for the financial year ended 2006. Multiple regression analysis is used to estimate the relationship between the variables.

The results of the study indicate that managerial ownership in various segments has an inverse relationship with total monitoring costs as predicted in agency theory. This finding is consistent with earlier studies in western countries and supports the convergence of interest hypothesis.

This study gives a unique contribution to corporate governance studies relating to the effect of ownership structure in relation to agency theory in Malaysian companies, one of the countries in Asia. Previous studies claimed that it is unknown whether the agency theory findings in western countries have equal impact in Asian organizations. Previous literature also indicates that there is a possibility that given the cultural differences, the typical nature of agents in agency theory may not be the case with regard to non‐western countries. Thus, this study provides evidence that support prior research findings in western countries relating to the effect of managerial ownership on the agency relationship which is reflected in its agency costs.

In recent years, electronic performance monitoring (EPM) has increased dramatically. The managerial decision to implement an EPM system is important for it has significant implications for an organization. Even so, little attention has been paid by researchers to this decision. The present paper reviews the published research on EPM and identifies factors that probably impact this decision. A model is offered to help researchers identify relevant psychological and organizational variables that may impact the decision to implement an EPM system. Psychologically, issues of trust, privacy, social facilitation, justice beliefs and stress reactions must be considered. Organizationally, a firm's Human Resource strategy, organizational culture, and anticipated consequences of EPM (i.e., increasing performance, reducing theft) are also discussed.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of salespersons' attributions about managerial e‐monitoring on salespersons' customer orientation.

Hierarchical linear modeling was used to test the six study hypotheses. A main effects model was used to test the first two hypotheses, with a comparison of regression models used to identify pure modifiers.

The results of this study found informing attributions enhance customer orientation. This effect, however, can be weakened under highly bureaucratic organizational cultures. Similarly, the ability of controlling attributions to hamper customer orientation is less pronounced in cultures described as more bureaucratic.

Building on self‐determination theory (SDT), the authors' study provides an explicit test of e‐monitoring and examines the nature and effects of information and controlling attributions. Given a low variance extracted value attained for bureaucratic culture, future research investigating the underlying dimensions of bureaucratic cultures is warranted. Likewise, more tests of the cognitive mechanisms behind salespersons' attributions are needed to further extend SDT.

Managers seeking to improve customer orientation through the use of e‐monitoring might be best served by encouraging a salesperson's informing attributions. This might be accomplished by clearly communicating the purposes of the e‐monitoring to members of the salesforce.

By investigating the positive and negative effects of e‐monitoring on salesperson customer orientation, this study offers concrete implications for researchers and practitioners on a topic that previously has been examined in the literature only via speculative post hoc analysis.

The purpose of this study was to examine the moderating role of institutional ownership on the relationship between board gender diversity and earnings management (EM) among listed firms in East African Community (EAC) partner states.

The study used a sample of 71 firms listed in the EAC partner states over 2011–2020. Data were handpicked from the individual firm's audited annual financial reports. Based on the results of the Hausman test, the study used the results of the fixed-effect regression model to test the hypotheses. To test the robustness of the results, the study employed an alternative measure of EM and two additional econometric techniques, including the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and the system generalized method of moments (GMM).

The empirical findings revealed that female directors improve the board's effectiveness in monitoring managerial roles. Specifically, the results showed a significantly negative relationship between the proportion of women in the corporate board and EM (as measured by discretionary accruals (DAs)). The findings further revealed an inverse relationship between the proportion of institutional ownership and EM. Finally, the results further demonstrated that institutional ownership enhances the role of board gender diversity in mitigating EM among listed firms in the EAC.

The findings of this study may be useful to managers, investors and regulators in assessing the role of institutional ownership and women's participation on corporate boards as a strategy for alleviating unethical manipulation of earnings.

The findings of this study contribute to the growing concern on gender inequality, especially the marginalization of women from the paid labor force and decision-making. The findings highlight the importance of having more women in the corporate board since this may help in mitigating corporate fraud. Similarly, the findings highlight the importance of institutional ownership as a corporate governance (CG) tool.

Previous studies have reported mixed empirical results on whether board gender diversity mitigates EM. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first paper to fill the existing gap by exploring whether institutional ownership moderates the relationship between board gender diversity and EM among listed firms in the EAC.

The paper seeks to present a novel conceptual framework that integrates the strategic dynamics of the firm with changes in its governance systems.

The agency research agenda is extended to include other corporate governance roles, such as resource and strategy functions, alongside monitoring and control functions. Theoretical arguments are supported by empirical data related to the founder‐manager/IPO, IPO/maturity, maturity/decline and reinvention thresholds.

The paper shows that corporate governance parameters may be linked to strategic thresholds in the firm's life‐cycle. Successful transition over a threshold is accompanied by a rebalancing in the structure and roles of corporate governance compared with each previous stage in the cycle.

In the absence of longitudinal data relating to firms as they pass through all life‐cycle stages the study has been restricted to reporting illustrative data from different studies regarding each strategic threshold. Further research might usefully undertake detailed long‐term case studies using a combination of archival and interview data to trace the evolution of firms across the four thresholds.

This paper develops a novel conceptual framework that integrates the strategic dynamics of the firm with changes in its governance systems. It rejects the notion of a universal governance template and argues that corporate governance parameters may be linked to transitions from one stage to another in the firm's life‐cycle. Accordingly, it argues that changes in a firm's strategic positioning may be associated with rebalancing between the wealth‐protection and wealth‐creation functions of governance.

During recent years, financial economists have made a significant contribution to the rapid development of a vibrant and growing literature on organization structure and corporate governance. In reviewing the development of this literature, it becomes easy to see how the seminal contributions of Ronald Coase (awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991) have become the cornerstone of a new institutional economics. In particular, researchers following in Coase’s footsteps have clarified the conditions under which voluntary contracts between private agents can resolve a wide variety of so-called “agency problems.” More than just representing an important discovery of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy, Coase’s work has become an important foundation for the theory of contracts and for the whole field of “organization economics.”

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010.

Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance.

After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.

The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis.

The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation.

Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.

This paper aims to investigate the joint effect of board independence and gender diversity on the effectiveness of boards in monitoring CEO compensation in a continental European context, i.e. France.

Fixed-effect regressions are used to study the impact of board independence, gender diversity and their interaction, i.e. the proportion of female independent directors on the different components of CEO compensation (total, fixed and variable).

The authors observe that both the proportions of independent directors and women sitting on the boards positively influence the various components of CEO compensation. However, the interaction of these factors, i.e. the proportion of female independent directors, is negatively associated with CEO compensation. These results suggest that independent women directors improve board effectiveness in monitoring CEO compensation, especially its fixed component.

The results of this research help to elucidate the importance of women being appointed to boards as independent directors to properly monitor managerial pay. These results provide support to the approach of the French Cope-Zimmerman law of January 2011, which promotes female representation on boards as independent directors to enhance board decision-making. Thus, evidence presented and discussed in this paper should provide useful insights for academics, corporate managers and regulators.

Explains how most people with managerial responsibility have a specialist background. Also, most management may be undertaken by “hybrids” who combine specialist activity and managerial responsibility. Unless the process of converting specialists into part‐time or full‐time managers is carefully planned, management responsibilities may be neglected in favour of specialist activity. Key interventions are in the areas of role definition, selection, management development and monitoring.