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This study aims to see the moderating effect of board diversity on the relationship between ownership structure and real earnings management.

This study uses unbalanced panel data of 75 listed energy firms (346 firm-year observations) from three South Asian emerging economies (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) from 2015 to 2019. The two-step system GMM estimation is used for data analysis. This study also uses fixed effect regression to obtain robust findings.

The findings show that firms with a greater ownership concentration and managerial ownership significantly reduce real earnings management. In contrast, the data refute the idea that institutional and foreign ownership affect real earnings management. We also find that board diversity interacts significantly with ownership concentration and managerial ownership, meaning that board diversity moderates the negative link of the primary relationship that reduces real earnings management. On the other hand, board diversity has no interaction with institutional and foreign ownership, implying no moderating effect exists on the primary relationship.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is unique research investigating how different ownership structures affect real earnings management in the emerging nations’ energy sector, which the earlier studies overlook. More specifically, this research focuses on how board diversity moderates the relationships between ownership structure and real earnings management, which could be helpful for future investors.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate two related questions. First, is earnings management behaviour in private firms related to managerial ownership and if so, what form does the relationship take. Second, is there evidence of opportunistic earnings management behaviour in private firms.

This study uses univariate and multivariate (regression) methodologies to examine the association between managerial ownership and earnings management in private firms. The study employs a data set of 1,223 large private UK firms.

Evidence is presented indicating opportunistic earnings management behaviour in private firms. Specifically, firms with low managerial ownership appear to engage in more earnings management when faced with poor performance. Further, when firms report income-increasing discretionary accruals, the magnitude of abnormal accruals varies non-linearly with managerial ownership.

This study is limited by availability of data on sample firm ownership. This study uses cross-sectional data due to these limitations. Further research could investigate the relationships between earnings management and classes of shareholders other than managers in private firms.

Policy implications of this work suggest that non-managing shareholders in private firms face considerable agency costs, in particular where managerial ownership is very low or very high.

Pervasiveness of earnings management in private firms compared to public firms is well documented in the literature. There is limited extant research on the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management in private firms. The novel aspect of this study is to present findings on the association between this behaviour, managerial ownership and firm performance in private firms.

Based on the socio-emotional wealth and agency theories, this study empirically investigates the impact of family ownership and management on green innovation (GI) in family businesses, as well as the moderating effects of institutional environmental support factors, namely, the technological achievement marketisation index and the market-rule-of law index.

This study empirically tests the hypotheses based on a sample of listed Chinese family companies with A-shares in 14 heavily polluting industries from 2009 to 2019.

There is a U-shaped relationship between the percentage of family ownership and GI, and an inverted U-shaped relationship between the degree of family management and GI. Additionally, different institutional environmental support factors affect these relationships in different ways. As the technological achievement marketisation index increases, the U-shaped relationship between the percentage of family ownership and GI becomes steeper, while the inverted U-shaped relationship between the degree of family management and GI becomes smoother. The market rule-of-law index weakens the U-shaped relationship between family ownership and GI.

First, the authors enrich the research on the driving factors of GI from the perspective of the most essential heterogeneity of family businesses. This study shows nonlinear and opposite effects of family ownership and management on GI in family firms. Second, this study contributes to the literature on family firm innovation. GI, not considered by researchers, is regarded as an important deficiency in research on innovation in family businesses. Therefore, this study fills that gap. Third, the study expands research on moderating effects in the literature on GI from the perspective of institutional environmental support factors.

This study investigated the succession process in small and medium family farms as two distinct but related processes of management transfer and ownership transfer. Past studies focused on the broad subject of succession, without dissecting succession into the components that it contains. Furthermore, this study aimed to evaluate which business, family and owner characteristics were significant in the progress of each process toward the actual transfer of management and ownership.

Telephone interviews were conducted to gather information from rural family businesses in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio. A bivariate ordered probit regression was utilized to model the processes of management and ownership transfer as separate but related processes. Both management transfer and ownership transfer were modeled utilizing three distinct stages of transfer.

Business and owner characteristics were significant to both management and ownership transfer, whereas family characteristics only influenced ownership transfer. Farm family businesses that discussed goals, identified a successor and were educated on how to start the transfer process were more likely to have made progress in both management and ownership transfer.

The authors contribute empirically to the literature by modeling the components of the succession process, management transfer and ownership transfer, as separate but interrelated processes. The authors specifically investigate which business, owner and family characteristics influence the progression of management and ownership transfer in farm family businesses.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between related party transactions and both accrual and real earnings management practices in Jordanian industrial public-listed companies, taking into account the uniqueness of the Jordanian company ownership structure.

Data were collected from Jordanian industrial public-listed companies for the period 2011–2017. Accrual earnings management is measured by using the modified Jones model, whereas real earnings management and related party transactions are measured by using relevant proxies. A regression model is developed and used to assess the relation between related party transactions and earnings management, taking into account the effects of ownership concentration, family ownership and institutional ownership levels of the companies involved.

Accrual earnings management is negatively associated with related party transactions. Regarding the role of ownership structure, the presence of institutional investors is positively associated with using both related party transactions and real earnings management, whereas ownership concentration plays an efficient role to mitigate the use of both accrual earnings management and related party transactions. No statistically significant relations between real earnings management and related party transactions exist.

This study has direct practical implications for the Jordanian regulatory authorities to enact regulations to limit the misuse of related party transactions and earnings management transactions and ensure sufficient monitoring of these transactions because of their prevalence. Jordanian companies should also enhance their corporate governance systems to better approve and monitor such transactions, including enhancing the role of independent and non-controlling board members in this process.

Related party transactions are considered as a major concern of financial reporting quality in developed countries, and such transactions are found to be relatively more problematic in developing countries, where corporate governance is generally weak, and there is limited disclosure and transparency in financial reporting. From this perspective, this study is one of the very few studies in developing countries that explore the issue of related party transactions and their association with earnings management practices. Thus, the findings of this study can arguably be to some extent generalized to other developing country contexts, because of relatively similar business environment conditions, and therefore potentially fill a gap represented by the paucity of similar studies in developing countries.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between internal corporate governance mechanism and earnings management of Jordanian companies. More specifically, the author examines several hypotheses regarding the relationships between ownership and earnings management.

This study measures the magnitude of discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management using the cross-sectional modified Jones model. A number of econometric techniques are used including ordinary least squares and generalized least squares to test the relationship between company ownership and earnings management, using a sample of 62 companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange.

The results revealed that insider managerial ownership, institutional ownership, external blockholder, family ownership and foreign ownership have superior influence on financial reporting quality, as it is, to a greater extent, potentially able to curtail earnings management. The findings contended that the aspects of ownership structure have a significant influence on earnings management, which is in agreement with the theories of corporate governance and opinions that have been highlighted through a number of international bodies.

Due to lack of data, the paper depends on cross-sectional data applied to isolate abnormal accruals.

The evidence may be conceivably beneficial as a supporting fundamental for regulatory action, particularly those that affect the ownership structure. The findings have significant implications for regulators as well as supervisors, who will benefit by the comprehension of how ownership structure affects earnings management and enhance financial reporting quality.

The current research produced its essential contribution through empirically displaying that ownership structure has different implications on earnings management. Moreover, the results recommended that both policymakers and researchers would no longer contemplate ownership structure as a whole, given that ownership structure has different implications on earnings management, measured by the discretionary accruals.

Conventional studies discuss the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance and have conflicting findings. This paper seeks to find divergent mutual effects existing between managerial ownership and firm performance.

The three‐stage‐least squares method and simultaneous equation model is adopted to obtain more efficient coefficient estimation. Both firm‐year observations and company mean variables are used to capture the structural relation and mutual effects between ownership structure and firm performance.

This paper finds divergent mutual effects existing. In a diffused ownership structure, better firm performance may induce management to hold more stockholding. Management with mid‐range of stockholdings has a positive effect on firm performance but not vice versa. For highly concentrated ownership structure, a negative mutual effect exists.

These findings provide the investment purpose as an alternative explanation for insiders' stockholding that agrees with investors' risk aversion attitude in practice. For highly concentrated ownership, possible management entrenchment behavior resulting from dominant control power should be carefully considered and monitored to protect minority shareholders.

This paper provides new evidence that complicated mutual effects may exist between managerial ownership and firm performance. It offers insights for both investors and researchers in corporate governance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption complements corporate governance factors (e.g. ownership structure) in monitoring managers’ discretional behavior in an emerging market context.

The paper relies on a sample of listed companies in the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, South Africa and the Philippines during an eight-year period on average (four years of pre-adoption period and four years of post-adoption period).

The authors find no evidence of lower earnings management after the switch to IFRS reporting, suggesting that managerial discretional behavior is insensitive to a firm’s IFRS adoption. However, the authors document effective monitoring role of a firm’s ownership structure on earnings management. More interestingly, institutional investors are effective in constraining earnings management when holding a high level of ownership. Moreover, the effect of blockholders and institutional blockholders varies as their ownership rises following a non-linear pattern.

First, the assumption that discretionary accruals are adequate measure of earnings management may be criticized in different ways. Second, the findings, performed on listed companies in the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, South Africa and the Philippines, should be interpreted with caution and cannot be generalized to all emerging market countries.

Standards setters and market authorities should be aware of earnings management determinants to set adequate and fitting accounting standards limiting opportunistic behavior of managers and mainly to set up training programs to accounting professionals improving the IFRS implementation. Moreover, considering specific features of firms in emerging market countries related to ownership structure, international investors may rely on such criteria to evaluate firms. Finally, auditors should be aware of different incentives for earnings management in order to be able to detect eventual manipulation of accounting earnings.

This paper provides a timely contribution to the continuous debate of the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management in a poorly exploited setting, emerging market context. When investigating, additionally, the eventual non-linear effect of institutional ownership, block ownership, institutional block ownership and non-institutional block ownership on earnings management, a major contribution is that it brings to light the finding of a differential influence of ownership levels on earnings management.

The authors empirically investigate the association between acquisition, ownership structure and accrual earnings management (AEM) on real earnings management (REM) using Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-listed firms' context.

The authors' sample consists of 1,892 firm-year observations for the period from 2007–2017, and the authors adopt a panel data approach in investigating the interrelationships in this study. The authors employ different econometrics approach to test the authors' hypotheses.

The findings reveal that acquiring companies engage more in AEM if compared to REM. In terms of ownership structure, institutional ownership and state ownership mitigate the engagement in REM, whereas foreign ownership is found to be an ineffective mechanism in reducing engagement in REM. The authors report similar findings on ownership structure for AEM. The authors also find that the GCC firms engage more in REM when the firms engage in AEM, suggesting a complementary relation between these two earnings management techniques. These findings are robust after controlling for different aspects including any endogeneity issue in the authors' models.

The authors' research highlights the importance of understanding REM and AEM dynamics in GCC context. Also, the authors' findings on ownership structure suggest that GCC-listed firms can gain from institutional and state ownership which restricts earnings management, improving firm transparency and subsequently impacting firm performance.

The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management.

This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018.

The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management.

DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management.

First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management.

It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.