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The purpose of this paper is to examine whether International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption complements corporate governance factors (e.g. ownership structure) in monitoring managers’ discretional behavior in an emerging market context.

The paper relies on a sample of listed companies in the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, South Africa and the Philippines during an eight-year period on average (four years of pre-adoption period and four years of post-adoption period).

The authors find no evidence of lower earnings management after the switch to IFRS reporting, suggesting that managerial discretional behavior is insensitive to a firm’s IFRS adoption. However, the authors document effective monitoring role of a firm’s ownership structure on earnings management. More interestingly, institutional investors are effective in constraining earnings management when holding a high level of ownership. Moreover, the effect of blockholders and institutional blockholders varies as their ownership rises following a non-linear pattern.

First, the assumption that discretionary accruals are adequate measure of earnings management may be criticized in different ways. Second, the findings, performed on listed companies in the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, South Africa and the Philippines, should be interpreted with caution and cannot be generalized to all emerging market countries.

Standards setters and market authorities should be aware of earnings management determinants to set adequate and fitting accounting standards limiting opportunistic behavior of managers and mainly to set up training programs to accounting professionals improving the IFRS implementation. Moreover, considering specific features of firms in emerging market countries related to ownership structure, international investors may rely on such criteria to evaluate firms. Finally, auditors should be aware of different incentives for earnings management in order to be able to detect eventual manipulation of accounting earnings.

This paper provides a timely contribution to the continuous debate of the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management in a poorly exploited setting, emerging market context. When investigating, additionally, the eventual non-linear effect of institutional ownership, block ownership, institutional block ownership and non-institutional block ownership on earnings management, a major contribution is that it brings to light the finding of a differential influence of ownership levels on earnings management.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, good corporate governance (CG) practices among UK publicly listed firms and consequently ascertain whether board characteristics and ownership structure variables can explain observable differences in the extent of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices.

This study uses one of the largest data sets to-date on compliance and disclosure of CG practices from 2008 to 2013 containing 120 CG provisions drawn from the 2010 UK Combined Code relating to 100 UK listed firms to conduct multiple regression analyses of the determinants of voluntary CG disclosures. A number of additional estimations, including two stage least squares, fixed-effects and lagged structures, are conducted to address the potential endogeneity issue and test the robustness of the findings.

The results suggest that there is a substantial variation in the levels of compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices among the sampled UK firms. The authors also find that firms with larger board size, more independent outside directors and greater director diversity tend to disclose more CG information voluntarily, whereas the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure is insignificantly related to the existence of a separate CG committee and institutional ownership. Additionally, the results indicate that block ownership and managerial ownership negatively affect voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. The findings are fairly robust across a number of econometric models that sufficiently address various endogeneity problems and alternative CG indices. Overall, the findings are generally consistent with the predictions of neo-institutional theory.

This study extends, as well as contributes to, the extant CG literature by offering new evidence on compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG recommendations contained in the 2010 UK Combined Code following the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. This study also advances the existing literature by offering new insights from a neo-institutional theoretical perspective of the impact of board and ownership mechanisms on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the firm’s capital market benefits in a high-quality information setting. More specifically, the authors address the question of whether the commonly documented IFRS benefits are capable of influencing inducing shareholders to increase their equity investment in adopting firms.

This study is performed on publicly listed firms in three emerging countries, namely, Morocco, South Africa and Turkey. The design of the ownership database allows a panel analysis for the years 2001 through 2011. The trend approach is suitable to account for concurrent effects that are unrelated to financial reporting while controlling for time-lasting behavior of investors. Overall, a minimum of four-year periods before and after the IFRS adoption date are warranted.

Overall, the findings support evidence of increases in equity holdings following a firm’s IFRS adoption. More specifically, institutional investors and institutional blockholders (both domestic and foreign) invest more heavily in the stocks of the firms that have committed to IFRS. By contrast, the authors fail to report evidence for ownership by blockholders and controlling shareholders.

The current empirical work should be of value to international investors, policy makers and market authorities. As for international investors facing reduced information disadvantage and comparable financial information across worldwide markets, they will find it easier to select and invest in value-creating stocks. This study may be useful for policy makers in acquiring a clear view of advantages, challenges and relevance of IFRS adoption to emerging markets. In particular, this study contributes to an understanding of potential capital market consequences of IFRS adoption. Furthermore, market authorities should be aware of the importance of institutional framework to enhance IFRS implementation and usage.

This work contributes to the ongoing empirical research on the intended capital market benefits of IFRS. The authors provide deeper insight into shareholdings changes of a number of key investors in a context where supply and demand of information are stained with asymmetry and mostly, influenced by differences in accounting practices. A major contribution of this study is the use of a methodological approach that outperforms commonly used approaches in the way how it considers concurrent events (compared to the shift specification) and time-lasting investor behavior (compared to the difference-in-differences analysis).

In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010.

Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance.

After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.

The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis.

The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation.

Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.

Using a data set of listed firms domiciled in Taiwan, this paper aims to empirically assess the effects of ownership structure and board of directors on firm value.

Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 1997 to 2015, this study uses a panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section and time–series nature of the data. Furthermore, two stage least squares (2SLS) regression model is used as robustness test to mitigate the endogeneity issue.

The main results show that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the smaller the board size, together with a two-tier board system and no chief executive officer duality, the stronger the firm’s performance. With respect to ownership structure, block-holders’ ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and family ownership are all positively related to firm value.

Although the Taiwanese corporate governance reform concerning the independent director system which is mandatory only for newly-listed companies is successful, the regulatory authority should require all listed companies to appoint independent directors to further enhance the Taiwanese corporate governance.

First, unlike most of the previous literature on Western developed countries, this study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in a newly industrialised country, Taiwan. Second, while a number of studies used a single indicator of firm performance, this study examines both accounting-based and market-based firm performance. Third, this study addresses the endogeneity issue between corporate governance factors and firm performance by using 2SLS estimation, and details the econometric tests for justifying the appropriateness of using 2SLS estimation.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the association between the corporate ownership characteristics and the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses over financial reporting under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002.

The paper employs both ordered and binary logistic regression models for a sample of 695 US firms who reported internal control weaknesses for the first time, pursuant to SOX Section 404, and evaluates the impact of the stock ownership characteristics on the timeliness in remediation of their control weaknesses.

The test results show that the corporate ownership characteristics, as a part of governance mechanism, play an incrementally critical role to influence firms' decisions to promptly remediate their internal control problems and improve the reliability of financial information. In addition, it was also found that a corporate board independent of its CEO is effective in monitoring timely remediation of control problems. Sub‐sample analyses for the company‐level and account‐specific internal control weaknesses produce similar results in support of the effect of corporate stock ownership characteristics on the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses.

First, the paper adds to the literature by demonstrating the incremental effect of the stock ownership characteristics on a firm's timeliness in remediation of control weaknesses, even after controlling the effect of audit committee and board characteristics in the analysis. Second, the paper shows that even in the post‐SOX years with enhanced regulatory oversight in corporate affairs, the effect of corporate ownership attributes as a part of governance is incrementally observable in a situation that calls for prompt managerial action to ensure the reliability of financial information. Third, for the first time, the study makes a separate detailed analysis on the association between the stock ownership attributes and the remediation of company‐level and account‐specific control weaknesses. The results provide valuable insights into the ownership governance effect on the remediation of the two types of control weaknesses that have different rigor, auditability (more or less auditable), and effects (pervasive or non‐pervasive) on financial reporting quality. Fourth, the study further enhances one's understanding of several important governance factors that help achieve a sound financial reporting system and restore investors' confidence in the system.

The relationship between ownership structure and firm value has long been of interest in the academic society. The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between European real estate investment trusts' (REITs) ownership structure and the observed firm value as measured by market‐to‐book (M/B) ratio. In addition, the potential effects of differing REIT ownership structures on other financial ratios, such as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), are analyzed. Finally, the potential impact of strategic/insider ownership on REITs is assessed.

Several “difference between means” tests are run. In each test, the studied group of REITs is divided into three groups according to set criteria. Then, the potential differences observed between the groups are documented, analyzed and reported. Finally, statistical significance of the potential differences among groups is tested.

First, consistent with the previous studies, this study shows that increasing REIT block ownership results in lower M/B ratios as well as decreased dividend yield, ROE and ROA. In other words, the results suggest that, in terms of M/B ratio, the markets value REITs with low block holdings slightly higher than those with more block holders. However, the relationship is not totally explicit. Second, the relationship between strategic/inside ownership and firm value (and other financial measures) is somewhat obscure. The effects of strategic ownership are an interesting topic, also in terms of potential future research.

One of the fundamental ideas behind REIT legislation is to provide investors with a liquid means of investing in indirect real estate by regulating the ownership structure of the vehicle. The results of this study suggest that the more dispersed the shareholder structure, the higher the firm value, potentially due to increased stock liquidity. This finding could serve as an indication to lawmakers that the REIT ownership regulations not only work in theory but in practice, too.

For the first time in an academic context, the relationship of European REIT ownership structures and firm value is studied in‐depth. Proven scientific methods are employed to discern potential, yet unrevealed patterns between REIT ownership and firm value.

The purpose of this study is to explore how governance mechanisms (internal and external) enhance the performance of the return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), earning per share (EPS) and dividend payout ratios (DP) of the banks of Pakistan. The study incorporates not only the internal factors of governance (board size, out-ratio, annual general meeting, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, block holder stock ownership and financial transparency) but also the external factors (legal infrastructure and protection of minority shareholders, and the market for corporate control).

The sample size of the study consists of 30 banks (public, private and specialized) listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) for the period 2008-2014. The panel data techniques (fixed or random effect model) have been used for the empirical analysis after verification by Hausman (1978) test.

The results revealed that not only do the internal mechanisms of governance enhance the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan but external governance also plays a substantial role in enriching the performance. The findings conclude that for a good governance structure, both internal and external mechanisms are equally important, to accelerate the performance of the banking sector.

Internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance can also be checked by adding some more variables (ownership i.e. foreign, female and family as internal and auditor as external), but they are not added in this work due to data unavailability.

The study contributes to the literature and could be useful for the policy makers who need to force banks to mandate codes of governance through which they can create an efficient board structure and augment the performance. The investments from different forms of ownership can be accelerated if they follow the codes properly.

The study facilitates the bankers in incorporating sound codes of corporate governance to enhance the performance of the banks.

This work is unique as no one has explored the impact of external mechanism of governance on the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan.

This study examines the bi-directional relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) and ownership structure through a dynamic empirical framework in an emerging economy context.

Data over 10 years are used to investigate the response of disclosure to ownership structure variables and vice versa. Dynamic bi-directional relationships are hypothesised and empirically investigated using a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model. The ownership structure variables used are government ownership, block ownership and director ownership, while CSRD is constructed as a score through content analysis.

A bi-directional negative relationship between CSRD and government ownership is found, revealing a preference for the state to invest in companies with opaque disclosure. CSRD is found to respond negatively to block ownership, albeit weakly. Results also show that directors prefer to own shares in the company they manage when there are low levels of CSRD.

The current empirical set-up of using a small emerging economy may not carry to the context of larger emerging economies where the institutional context may differ. Thus, future research could use this dynamic empirical approach to re-examine the questions raised in this paper using data from other emerging economies. The use of a longer time series makes it feasible to explore further analysis what was not possible in this study, such as an impulse response analysis examining the reaction of the variables of interest, CSRD and ownership variables for a specific time horizon to particular changes or shocks associated with one of the endogenous variables in the PVAR.

A major implication is that expecting disclosure practices to improve due to government and director initiatives would be less likely in emerging economies. State and director shareholders prefer to invest in opaque companies because they may purposely choose to keep the minimum disclosure levels. The paper calls for a transparent process and ethical guidelines to guide government investment in firms.

The study investigates the bi-directional relationship between ownership structure and CSRD in contrast to the existing literature's presupposed one-way relationship between these variables by demonstrating that bi-directionality does matter. This paper also contributes to the CSRD literature in the emerging economy context. The bi-directional negative relationship between CSRD and government ownership calls for a transparent selection process of board members as representatives of the state in those companies where the government has an ownership stake. It also calls for a transparent process and ethical guidelines to guide government investment in firms.