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The case study analyses competition in the automobile industry in Zimbabwe, a developing economy. From that perspective, it discusses Puzey and Payne’s business operations; a company with a long-standing history in the country’s automobile industry. Since its establishment during the Colonial era, the company endured a prolonged period of rapid car and spare parts sales decline in 2012. Following a management buyout deal in 2013, the decline in sales proved to be its real dilemma and it required strategic decisions to diffuse the impact of the “grey markets”. Government policies added to the company’s problems.

The case study follows a qualitative research approach. Information about Puzey and Payne’s business operations was gathered from archived materials, through qualitative conversations as well as company artefacts. Published materials in newspapers and magazines were used to provide background information.

The case study is appropriate for both undergraduate and postgraduate students studying International Business Management.

To investigate whether acquiring firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, that completed mergers and acquisitions during the period 2001‐2003, tend to manipulate accounting earnings upward prior to the initiation and completion of the transaction.

The focus is on discretionary accruals as a measure of managers' earnings manipulation. To estimate discretionary and non‐discretionary components of total accruals the time series Jones model is adopted.

Results provide weak evidence of biased accruals reported by managers in the year preceding the announcement and the completion of the deal. The results seem to agree with those of Erickson and Wang who found no evidence of pre‐merger earnings management by a sample of acquiring firms that were involved in cash mergers.

The model applied, even if it is considered effective in discriminating abnormal from normal accruals, has been shown to have certain deficiencies, while simultaneously the time series data and number of firms used here could be considered as small. Within the aforementioned limitations further research could examine the effect of mergers and acquisitions in the stock price of the acquiring of target firms and the possibility of earnings management by target firms, since target managers may have different incentives to manipulate earnings.

Findings are of particular interest to Greek regulators for policy‐making purposes as well as to investors in the Greek capital market.

To the best of one's knowledge this is the first study to examine earnings management by acquiring firms in the European capital market context.

Takeovers play an important role in the allocation of re‐sources to the most efficient uses and represent a mech‐anism by which corporate resources are transferred from one management team to another (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). A result of this managerial displacement is expected to be an increase in shareholder wealth. This argument pre‐supposes that managers attempting takeovers are motivated to create value for shareholders. This picture of managerial disinterestedness in the service of share‐holders ignores potential agency conflicts between man‐agers and shareholders. When faced with a takeover bid, which if successful may lead to its own displacement, the management team at the target may devise ways of frus‐trating the bid.

A profile of Birkby's Plastics, a UK‐based leading European plastic moulding company that has successfully completed a management buy‐out. Birkby's supplies to the major automotive OEMs and Tier One manufacturers and to leading business machine OEMs. It is more than a standard trade moulder and has developed a number of innovative processes, such as in‐mould welding (IMW) and in‐mould textiles (IMT), which significantly reduce cost and improve product quality. IMW enables hollow vessel components to be produced complete within the moulding machine and IMT drastically cuts the time of manufacturing textile‐wrapped car trim components. Robotics plays a major role in all of Birkby's operations and together with its process technology is helping the company to compete with low labour cost regions and maintain production in the UK.

A corporate takeover (with major stake in equity) gives the acquirer the right to appoint majority of directors in the target’s board to control its management and policy decisions. When such acquisition is unsolicited and unwelcome, it becomes a “hostile takeover.” In such cases, the acquirer is said to be a “raider” and the raider’s management team may act under the influence of “hubris” implying that they seek to acquire the target for their own personal motives ignoring pure economic gains for the owners of both the companies. The hostile bidder makes all possible efforts to justify the takeover by paying handsome premium over the target’s fairly valued share price. In a hostile takeover, the target management or target promoters resist and fight tooth and nail against the raider to convey to the world that the bidder’s acts are not in the best interest of all their stakeholders. Any unsolicited and hostile takeover offer is generally viewed as oppression, domination or coercion by the bidding company against the target and its management. In a hostile bid, the existing target management always believes that whatever they do is in best interest of everyone. They feel complacent and assume that their standards of corporate governance are of highest order. Therefore, they are unwilling to succumb to the aggression and hostility of another corporate entity for takeover. The “so-called” victimized target resorts to all means to gain sympathy from peers, press, common shareholders, employees and general public. In today’s regulated market for corporate control, an intelligent hostile bidder would probably not acquire a business unless it has good strategic or financial reasons to do so. Hence, “stewardship” on the part of bidder’s management is very important in case of any hostile takeover. This chapter derives motivation from a three-and-half-decade-old abortive hostile takeover bid in India by Caparo Group of the UK and also the recently completed hostile takeover in India of a famous mid-sized information technology company, Mindtree by Larsen & Toubro, a major conglomerate. This research aims at developing a distinctive model to demonstrate that unsolicited hostile takeover may not be a good mechanism for a successful business combination.

This paper aims to explore the structure and underlying contracts of Islamic venture capital (IVC) and to evaluate its prospects. VC can be perceived as an investment vehicle possessing most of the desirable attributes of a Sharīʿah-compliant investment vehicle. There are certain issues involved in the formation, operations and exit strategies of these investments that are discussed in detail in this paper.

A detailed review of relevant literature is performed to identify how IVC investments can be made and how related issues may be resolved.

IVC investment has potential of incorporating Sharīʿah-compliant investment modes. Additionally, it may offer higher than average returns. These attributes can be desirable for Islamic finance industry that is currently in need of equity-based financing products. The major causes of lesser growth of IVC investments are lack of awareness among the investors and the absence of viable investment opportunities for small- and medium-scale investors. IVC may attract general public if established after extensive research aimed at introducing innovative products.

This paper provides an overview of a truly Sharīʿah-compliant investment vehicle, furnishes a synthesis of various suggestions made by industry and academia and suggests viable solutions for valuation, risk management and exit strategies.

The paper aims to examine the similarities of fast‐growth private enterprises (PEs) in China with particular focus on enterprises listed on growth enterprises market in order to draw managerial implications for other PEs.

The paper looks at the release effects of intangible assets in PEs. It examines the excavation effects of preferential policy on PEs and goes on to discuss the agglomeration effects of the inherent advantages of these.

The paper argues that the fast growth of PEs in our sample was attributable to three main factors, i.e. benefits of intangible assets marketisation, shrewd use of government preferential policies and technological and managerial capabilities.

This research calls for the Chinese Government to adjust relevant policies to create a fair and competitive environment for enterprises with different ownerships and different scales.

The paper highlights the fact that the social and economic conditions of China in the post‐transition period have changed greatly and that the Chinese Government needs to clarify and define the existing characteristics and functions of enterprises and improve their service‐oriented functions.

Developments in UK grocery distribution are reviewed; namely centralised networks, composite networks and the increasing use of third party contract distributors. Issues likely to affect the future development of physical distribution are also discussed, such as the quality of operations, customer service improvements through utilisation of information technology, the “greening” demands likely to be encountered and the opportunity for UK distribution companies to expand their services throughout Europe. The major conclusions are found to be that UK grocery distribution is highly developed; centralised, composite systems are in place either operated in‐house by the user or contracted out to third party distribution companies. Quality, service and greening issues are likely to become the tools operators will use to gain competitive advantage in this highly competitive marketplace both in the UK and throughout Europe.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether or not there is a link between CEO incentive-based compensation and earnings management and to examine how institutional environment's features influence such link.

To test the predictions, the authors use a panel of 1,500 American, Canadian, British, and French firm-year observation over the period 2004-2008.

The authors find a significant association between earnings management and CEO incentive-based compensation. Moreover, the analysis provides evidence that institutional factors are strong determinants of this association. Specifically, the results show that firms from countries within the Anglo-American corporate governance model, which provides greater protection of shareholder rights, ensures strict enforcement of law, and scores high on board oversight, tend to have lower level of earnings management. The analysis shows however, that beside the formal corporate governance quality, it is relevant to consider weaker shareholder protection and lower law enforcement indexes to explain earnings management in firms from countries within the Euro-Continental corporate governance model.

This paper is the first to provide insights regarding the extent to which CEO incentive rewards imply management discretion and to indicate how much institutional features matter. The analysis contributes to two distinct strands of research. It extends prior research on the association between executive compensation and earnings management and adds to the literature demonstrating a relationship between institutional factors and financial decisions.