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1 – 10 of over 98000Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some…
Abstract
Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.
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Guido Carati and Alireza Tourani Rad
Differentiates market (e.g. USA) from group‐based (e.g. Germany) corporate governance systems, traces their evolution and asks whether they are converging. Puts forward a…
Abstract
Differentiates market (e.g. USA) from group‐based (e.g. Germany) corporate governance systems, traces their evolution and asks whether they are converging. Puts forward a theoretical convergence model based on the belief that agency problems can best be solved by specific corporate control mechanisms, recognizing that it would demand more changes from group‐based than from market systems. Examines current trends for both relating to institutional/regulatory environments, the market for corporate control and the focus on shareholder value creation/activism. Presents statistics from the USA, UK, Germany and France to show their trends towards the convergence model and discusses them in some detail. Concludes that they have all moved towards the model although in different ways and at different rates.
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Since the late 1990s, developing countries have been encouraged by international financial organisations to adopt a shareholder primacy corporate governance model. It was…
Abstract
Purpose
Since the late 1990s, developing countries have been encouraged by international financial organisations to adopt a shareholder primacy corporate governance model. It was anticipated that in an increasingly globalised financial market, countries which introduced corporate governance practices that favour investors would gain a comparative advantage and attract more capital leading to financial market growth. This paper aims to empirically test this hypothesis.
Design/methodology/approach
The present research paper quantitatively investigates whether adopting shareholder primacy corporate governance norms has had any impact on the growth of the financial market, focusing on nineteen developing countries between 1995 and 2014. Time series indices are prepared for corporate governance regulations, financial market development along with three control indices. Then a lagged multilevel regression between these indices is used to investigate the strength of causality between the adoption of pro-shareholder corporate governance and the growth of the financial market.
Findings
The research paper finds that shifting towards a shareholder primacy model in corporate governance has a very small effect on growth of financial market in developing countries. Overall the financial, economic and technological controls have much more impact on the growth of financial markets.
Originality/value
This paper conclusively ends the discussion as to whether change in corporate governance has any impact on financial market growth of a country. The papers uses Bayesian econometric model. The paper thus signals the end of LLSV led question as to whether law can affect finance.
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Frank H. Stephen and Ju¨rgen G. Backhaus
After the precipitated decline of the Soviet Empire and its satellite states, a system change seemed to be called for, and many countries embarked on social and political reforms…
Abstract
After the precipitated decline of the Soviet Empire and its satellite states, a system change seemed to be called for, and many countries embarked on social and political reforms focussing on property structures in the economy. This raised the issue of governance in the institutions that would constitute the structures in which production would have to take place. In particular, some Central European countries opted for mass privatisations of the means of production, on the face of it so as to have the people participate in the wealth of the nation. In fact, the wealth of the nation depends on the structures in which it is constituted. Dissipation of property rights will reduce the value of the nation's productive capital, whereas an intelligent structure that creates good governance structures at the same time, increases the value of the producing capital. This relatively simple insight lies at the heart of our understanding of how to analyse different processes of mass privatisation. This essay develops a theoretical framework by which different governance structures can be analysed. The framework consists of a blend of the economic theory of property rights, new institutional economics and Austrian economic theory.
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Ruan Carlos dos Santos, Lidinei Éder Orso, Mônica Cristina Rovaris Machado and Antonia Márcia Rodrigues Sousa
This paper aims to contribute to research on corporate governance in regulated sectors, with emphasis in the field of activity of foreign investors through the ownership structure…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to contribute to research on corporate governance in regulated sectors, with emphasis in the field of activity of foreign investors through the ownership structure and legal system that regulates companies in Brazil.
Design/methodology/approach
In the first moment, the investigation had a quantitative approach of relational nature. Based on the data about the valuation of actions, statistical methods were applied to a secondary database containing measurable information provided by the organizations that operate the Brazilian stock-market and documentary evidence provided by the companies. In the second moment, a qualitative approach was adopted, resorting on the use of semi-structured interviews with investors and agents of the sector.
Findings
The results lead to two paths: presenting the perspective that foreign investors play a key role in improving governance practices because foreign ownership mitigates agency problems, provides adequate follow-up and optimizes the use of corporate resources; and evidencing the existence of a mitigation of operational risks in the face of the various obligations imposed by the concession contract with the regulatory agency, without direct interference under the ownership structure of regulated companies.
Research limitations/implications
The literature portrays a distinct economic scenario in Brazil, where stock control is pulverized and mechanisms of corporate governance and scope of action of investors and regulated sectors are well-defined and implemented.
Practical implications
A great part of the studies from this field discusses the same object: the impact of the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms on selected efficiency indicators or on the value of the companies' actions. This investigation, on the other hand, targeted a differentiated approach so that its contribution would lie in the investigation under the influence of the regulation on the legal attributions and the performance of the investors how many conflicts between the other shareholder/regulatory body, as the control measures import by the regulatory agent the concessionaires of the Brazilian highways and transportation sector.
Social implications
The identification of the presence of foreign investors as a determinant for: better performance of companies in Brazilian regulated sector in terms of market valuation; better mitigation of requirements with the regulatory framework for the agencies that regulate the concession sector, targeting a reduction in the asymmetry of information and transparency among all stakeholders.
Originality/value
The fact that Brazil is an emerging country that lacks a rigid legal system and corruption-control measures in corporate environments and public sectors, stresses the importance of the application of the “Best Codes of Corporate Governance Practices” in the main developed countries. This also stresses the need for effective supervisory bodies that contribute to a better financial performance of companies, guaranteeing investors the legal system.
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Francisco Elder Escossio de Barros, Ruan Carlos dos Santos, Lidinei Eder Orso and Antonia Márcia Rodrigues Sousa
From the agency theory’s point of view, this paper aims to analyze corporate governance mechanisms about the characteristics of the companies quoted in the segments Bovespa Mais…
Abstract
Purpose
From the agency theory’s point of view, this paper aims to analyze corporate governance mechanisms about the characteristics of the companies quoted in the segments Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais 2 and their influence on the creation of value in preparation for the opening of the initial public offering (IPO).
Design/methodology/approach
A quantitative approach was adopted to achieve the proposed objective using the panel data with fixed effects and secondary data collected on the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários website, using statistical software Stata® 13.0 for statistical tests. The population comprises non-financial companies belonging to the Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais Level 2 groups, as the survey sample took into account the period of adhesion of the companies, totaled in 15 companies, which cover the period from 2008 to 2019. The selected variables correspond to the ownership structure’s characteristics, then the board’s composition and the fiscal council as the body responsible for supervising the administrators’ acts.
Findings
The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. However, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers.
Research limitations/implications
The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. Despite this, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers.
Practical implications
This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market. This paper finds that internal governance characteristics (founder-chief executive officer, executive incentives and board independence) and external network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist syndication and board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms.
Social implications
While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally crucial strategic decision. This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market.
Originality/value
This situation generates value to shareholders and is perceived by the market and, ultimately, generates a direct relationship with the market performance of companies. While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally major strategic decision.
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Li Liu, Wen Qu and Janto Haman
The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between firm performance and product market competition (PMC), and then examine the mitigation effect of corporate…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between firm performance and product market competition (PMC), and then examine the mitigation effect of corporate governance and/or state-ownership (SOEs) in the association between PMC and firm performance using Chinese listed firms.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors consider three determinants of the PMC that affect the nature of competition, and use market concentration, product substitutability and market size as proxies for PMC. The authors construct a corporate governance index which measures the extent of board independence, monitoring strength of supervisory board over board of directors, and monitoring strength of board of directors over CEO. The authors use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance. The authors use a sample of 20,706 firm-year observations listed on the Chinese stock market between 2001 and 2016 to empirically investigate the research questions proposed in the paper.
Findings
The authors find that higher PMC is associated with lower firm performance. The authors find that good corporate governance practices moderate the negative effect of higher PMC on firm performance. The association between higher PMC and lower performance is weaker for firms controlled by SOEs compared to non-SOEs. Further, the moderation effect of SOEs on the association between higher PMC and lower performance is more pronounced for firms with good corporate governance practices compared to firms with weak corporate governance practices.
Originality/value
Extant studies investigating the relationship between PMC and corporate governance suggest an either complementary or substitution relationship in developed economies. Our study highlights the interactive role played by SOEs and good corporate governance practices in firm performance in highly competitive product markets in an emerging economy. The findings provide insightful information to regulators of other emerging countries that SOEs with good corporate governance practices can play an important role in the economy by mitigating the negative effect of higher PMC on firm performance.
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Deregulation shifts the responsibility for mitigation of agency problems from the regulatory parties to the firms' shareholders. We investigate whether and how governance…
Abstract
Deregulation shifts the responsibility for mitigation of agency problems from the regulatory parties to the firms' shareholders. We investigate whether and how governance structure changes in response to the dynamics of the new business environment after the Regulatory Reform Act of 1994 for the US trucking industry. We show that deregulation increases market competition in the trucking industry. The deregulated trucking firms not only adjust internal governance structure but also alter antitakeover provisions to adapt themselves to the competitive status of business environment after deregulation.
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Purpose – As corporations and capital markets become more global, it is increasingly important to understand the differences in corporate governance practices.Approach – This…
Abstract
Purpose – As corporations and capital markets become more global, it is increasingly important to understand the differences in corporate governance practices.
Approach – This chapter provides a framework for the implementation of corporate governance that can be used globally for study and adaptation. It also describes three corporate governance systems (Anglo-American, Communitarian, and Emerging Markets) and provides an analysis and comparison of how the framework for corporate governance is applied differently, and how success should be evaluated differently, in these three systems. Lastly, it considers the possibility of convergence toward a global system of corporate governance.
Practical implications – There is significant heterogeneity in corporate governance worldwide but there are universal aspects, such as roles, responsibilities, inputs, and processes, which result in effective corporate governance. Understanding the similarities and differences enables researchers and managers to work with multiple systems in different countries where corporations and stakeholders have varying objectives, structures, and internal and external determinants.
Value of chapter – This chapter presents a comparison of the three systems that is critical for further study of global practices. Additionally, the internal and external determinants that impact the varying corporate governance systems are analyzed to more carefully consider the performance measures that account for differences in objectives, motivations, and performance.
Shareholder dividends are “rents”: they are paid out of a producer's surplus that, in a fully competitive market, would not exist. In any market system, no one has a right to…
Abstract
Shareholder dividends are “rents”: they are paid out of a producer's surplus that, in a fully competitive market, would not exist. In any market system, no one has a right to rents. Why, then, do shareholders receive dividends? Most likely, share gains have been the result of the usefulness of the share-centered ideologies in justifying a tremendous shift of corporate wealth from employees to an alliance of top managers and shareholders. This alliance now shows signs of breaking down, as the managers learn they no longer need the ideological cover. Standard accounts conceal the struggle over corporate surplus and the weakness of shareholder claims to appropriate it. Recognizing that distribution of corporate surplus is a political struggle is the first step towards a less ideologically blindered discussion of how that struggle ought to be structured.