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This paper aims to present a multi-period dynamic power project financing model to produce pragmatic estimates of benchmark wholesale power prices based on the principles of normal profit. This, in turn, can guide policymakers as to whether price spikes or bidding above marginal cost in wholesale electricity markets warrants any investigation at all. One of the seemingly complex areas associated with energy-only wholesale electricity pools is at what point market power abuse is present on the supply side. It should not be this way. If a theoretically robust measure of normal profit exists, identification of potential market power abuse is straightforward. Such a definition readily exists and can be traced back to the ground-breaking work of financial economists in the 1960s.

Using a multi-period dynamic power project model, the authors produce pragmatic and theoretically robust measures of normal profit for project financed plant and plant financed on balance sheet. These model results are then integrated into a static partial equilibrium model of a power system. The model results are in turn used to guide policymaking on generator bidding in energy-only power markets.

Under conditions of perfect plant availability and divisibility with no transmission constraints, energy-only markets result in clearing prices which are not economically viable in the long run. Bidding must, therefore, deviate from strict short-run marginal cost at some stage. To distinguish between quasi-contributions to substantial sunk costs and market power abuse, a pragmatic and robust measure of normal profit is required.

This article finds policymakers can be guided by an ex-post analysis of base energy prices against pragmatic estimates for the long-run marginal cost of the base plant, and an ex-ante analysis of call option prices along the forward curve against pragmatic estimates of the carrying cost of the peaking plant.

The representative firm model is used to demonstrate that competitive markets yield least‐cost production in the long run. This model is deficient in two respects: The demonstration's validity is suspect and it fails to show that least‐cost production occurs in the short run as well.

It is demonstrated how an analysis of airports’ cost structures and the calculation of long-run marginal costs (MCs) of serving passengers and airplanes can be used as a basis for setting airport charges according to the principles of welfare economics. Based on Norwegian data, the MC for an extra passenger (PAX) and extra air traffic movement (ATM) are used to set airport charges under the assumption that the charges should be equal for all airports in the country. When adjusting the estimates to meet revenue restrictions and comparing the estimates to current charges, we observe that PAX should be charged more and ATM less. This finding is in line with recommendations from the International Air Transport Association (IATA). When allowing charges to vary between airports, we demonstrate how a Ramsey pricing approach can be applied to set differentiated PAX and ATM charges, considering both the supply side (the competitive conditions between the airlines operating at the airports) and the demand side (the passengers’ price elasticity of demand).

The present essay re-examines the scope of Sraffa’s critique of Marshall’s supply curves that the former developed in his 1925 and 1926 articles showing that neoclassical supply curves derived from non-proportional returns are not robust both in the short and in the long run. After examining what a short-run and a long-run equilibrium means both for the original Sraffa’s articles and for Marshall’s pioneer contribution, the chapter discusses the common procedure in conventional economics to introduce the limitations to the growth of the firm. The argument of the chapter will be based on the 1920s articles as well as on the ‘Lectures on Advanced Theory of Value’ delivered in 1928–1931 by Sraffa at Cambridge University, now publicly available online by the Wren library, Trinity College, Cambridge. For short-run analysis, it must be assumed that the number of firms is fixed. This assumption entails serious problems with regards to the notions of competition and competitive behaviour. For long-run analysis, the sources of increasing costs are problems of management and control. However, this idea is untenable both on logical and empirical grounds. We argue that contemporary mainstream microeconomic treatment of costs and supply in the context of perfect competition still presents several problems. These problems, rather than being superficial, lie at the root of the supply and demand approach of value and distribution.

This paper generalizes the critical loss concept of Harris and Simons to account for a broader range of possible cost structures. Our analysis presents a specialized market-level equilibrium for a relatively homogeneous good in which the Harris and Simons’ critical loss structure is appropriate for market definition. Then, we broaden the equilibrium and propose a generalized critical loss analysis. Of course, for relatively differentiated goods, market definition analysis would use firm-level modeling and therefore the standard market-level critical loss modeling could be inappropriate.

Suggests a spatial conjunctive use model of an irrigation project in which the utility invest optimally for the water distribution system and charge farmers the shadow price of surface and groundwater. Seepage from the irrigation canal and on the field are assumed to recharge the groundwater aquifer. Particular attention was given to the effects of conveyance on the allocation of both surface and groundwater resources and the distribution of rents. An empirical model indicated that higher conveyance costs skew the distribution of water as well as rents over the project area. This suggests that the tail farmers need to face a substantially higher price for water if the system deteriorates and conveyance costs increase in the long run.

Current antitrust doctrine seemingly accepts average variable cost as one possible boundary between competitive and predatory pricing. Certain authors contend, however, that equally efficient rivals can sometimes be excluded from a market even when a dominant firm prices above its own average variable cost. A model is developed to test for predatory conduct in one such case. This model is applied to the reconstituted lemon juice industry. It shows that under certain conditions, even prices above average variable cost can be exclusionary.