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The characteristics of businesses change with the change in ownership structure of the business. This study examines the change in ownership structure of the firm after the departure of lone founders, and its influence on dividend payout decisions of the firm.

The authors employed 4,302 firm-year observations of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2007–2021. To test the hypotheses, the authors employed ordinary least squares regression, and additionally, generalized method of moments estimation and fixed effect analysis were applied to check for the robustness of results.

Using the lens of agency theory and social identity theory, the authors report that the presence of lone founder (family owners) is negatively (positively) associated with dividend payout, however, transition of lone-founder ownership to family-owned and family-managed firm leads to more dividend payout, whereas its transition to family-owned and non-family-managed firm results in lesser dividend payments.

This study provides novel insight into the strategic behavior of lone founders and extend the limited family business heterogeneity literature by examining the effects of ownership transition and its influence on firm's dividend payout decisions.

This study examines the effect of lone founder and family ownership on borrowing cost. In addition, the study examines the moderating influence of gender diversity on this relationship.

The study used a sample of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2012–2021. The authors used ordinary least squares regression analysis method to test the hypotheses along with generalized method of moments estimation technique to control for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity.

The authors report that borrowing cost is higher in lone founder ownership, whereas borrowing cost is lower in family firms due to lesser risks attached to such firms by lenders. Further, the presence of female directors on the board weakens this relation in the case of lone founder ownership, whereas their presence further reduces borrowing cost in family-owned firms. Additionally, using the framework of critical mass theory, the authors found that higher number of female directors on boards reduces borrowing cost. Overall, this study’s results provide empirical support for social identity and critical mass theories in the sample firms.

The study provides novel evidence of the influence of lone founder and family ownership on borrowing cost in an emerging economy, as well as the moderating effects of gender diversity on this relationship.

This paper attempts to reconcile two opposing views of the strategies and conduct of closely held firms: that of entrepreneurship and that of family business. The former view suggests that these firms tend to be value maximizing organizations that pursue growth strategies and outperform. The latter often argues that these businesses are utility maximizers that pursue conservative harvest strategies and fail to outperform.

In order to reconcile the controversy, this paper examines the literature in an attempt to relate ownership priorities and risk taking preferences to governance distinctions relating to family involvement, ownership, and management.

It concludes that the value‐maximization expectations of the entrepreneurship literature apply only to lone or unrelated founder businesses whose owners, unencumbered by family distractions, embrace growth and outperform. By contrast the utility‐maximization expectations of the family business literature apply when there are multiple family owners or executives. These parties are argued to be harvest‐oriented, mediocre performers, especially after a new generation has entered the firm. This may be because their priorities and loyalties are shared between business and family considerations. However, family and lone founder firm outcomes are argued to be further shaped by owners' levels of control and ownership, their managerial roles, and the breadth of family personal and generational involvement.

The analysis has implications for the effective governance, board composition, and management of these different types of firms.

The paper reconciles two important literatures to derive implications for strategy and performance that must be addressed by agents of corporate governance in family and founder firms.

The aim of this paper is to explore the family firms' propensity to undertake R&D investments after going public, showing how it varies due to the ownership structure.

The analysis is based on a sample of 132 French and Italian family and nonfamily IPOs in the period 2013–2018.

The empirical findings show a positive relationship between the quantity of post-IPO shares retained by family owners and R&D investments. Furthermore, the abovementioned relationship is negatively affected by the generational stage and positively by the presence of a lone founder.

Outside investors of family firms may be assured in buying shares of founding family firms after going public because they are stimulated to undertake R&D investments and therefore create overall value in the long term. Furthermore, external managers of lone-founder and first-generation family firms can adopt innovation investments without fear of being replaced as a consequence of a hostile takeover. Lastly, private equity should support later generation family IPOs, providing them with capital and managerial skills in order to generate value for shareholders.

Past studies have mostly shown family firms' reluctance to undertake R&D investments; however, scholars have focused on private or public family firms, ruling out the analysis of family firms' innovation behaviour within the setting of an IPO. To the best of the author's knowledge, this study represents the first empirical attempt to investigate the relationship between family firms and post-IPO innovation investments, when the capital infusion relaxes the financial constraints of family firms.

There is a growing consensus that entrepreneurial activity is essentially a collective family endeavour, with some configuration of family involvement in business (FIB) working better than others. This paper aims to examine the effects of FIB on strategy and financial performance (FP), drawing from the institutional theory for the Indian family businesses.

The sample comprises of 105 pharmaceutical companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange for FY2013–2017. A two-way random effects panel model was invoked to examine the relationship between FIB and strategy, as well as the intermediating effect that strategy has on the FIB-FP link.

On average, the family has a high ownership concentration, with the founders predominantly holding the chief executive officer (CEO) and chair positions. The econometric results highlight that the founder’s descendants adopt a conservative strategy. A significant positive moderating effect of strategy on FIB-FP link was observed for the descendants as the largest owners, CEO and board chair. The presence of a professional CEO and independent chair, however, leads to an intervening adverse impact on FP. The ownership-management-governance configurations highlight that some combinations of family and non-FIB leads to better performance than others.

The study provides a plausible explanation for the conflicting evidence on the direct FIB-FP relationship through the strategy intermediation. The institutional perspective emphasizing the identity and role family members play in terms of strategy provides an unconventional epistemological underpinning to the present research.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the development of the five dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) over time by taking a founder’s perspective.

The paper draws on an in-depth single-case study. It combines semi-structured interviews in the company with archival data, such as annual reports, press clips and interviews in business magazines.

The results indicate that the EO dimensions change from being personalized and directly solution-oriented to being intangible value-creation-oriented.

By suggesting ownership-based EO configurations, this study contributes insights into how different ownership forms propel EO. These configurations – that is, personal, administrative based and intangible focused – show the impact of the EO dimensions and provide a systematic and theoretical understanding of EO change over time.

As widely known and well established, strategic decision-making at family firms is an interface between business interests and family considerations. The purpose of this paper is to understand the underlying basis of decision-making in setting corporate strategy and designing chief executive officer (CEO) compensation at founder- vis-à-vis descendant-led family firms in the Indian pharmaceutical sector.

A sample of 106 BSE-listed pharmaceutical companies have been studied over the period 2012–2017 resulting in a total of 636 firm-year observations. Impact of family involvement in business (FIB) on corporate strategy and CEO compensation has been analysed by constructing multivariate panel data regression models. To deal with the problem of endogeneity, Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel data estimation procedure has moreover been conducted.

Supporting stewardship theory, founder-owned and governed firms have been found to favour “growth” strategy and distribute “conservative” executive pay, thereby exerting a positive moderating impact on the strategy-compensation linkage. On the contrary, descendants/second-generation entrepreneurs have put forth a “conservative” stance for growth and innovation, and have rather been observed to favour a “liberal” compensation policy, thereby showcasing the application of behavioural agency theory.

The research is a novel attempt to unravel the interaction between corporate strategy and CEO compensation in a family firm backdrop carried out in the context of an emerging economy. The study, moreover, adopted an all-encompassing definition of FIB (ownership, management and governance).

Concentrated ownership implies greater alignment between ownership and control, mitigating the agency problem. However, it may also engender governance challenges such as funds appropriation through related party transactions and the oppression of minority shareholders, especially in the context of weak legal systems. We draw from legal theory (the tradeoff controlling shareholder model and private benefits of control) and from organization theory (socioemotional wealth), to suggest that concentrated ownership can be beneficial in both robust and weak legal systems for different reasons. We advance theory on the effects of controlling shareholders and suggest that the longer-term outlook associated with engaged concentrated ownership can aid the shift of the corporation toward Berle and Means' (1932, p. 355) “third possibility” of corporations serving the interests of not just the stockholders or management but also of society.

Empirical studies provide conflicting conclusions regarding the corporate social performance (CSP) of family firms. The purpose of this paper is to synthesize the existing empirical evidence and examine the potential role of research design and contextual factors.

A meta-analysis of existing empirical studies was performed to examine the role of sampling, measurement and contextual factors in explaining the different and often conflicting results of empirical studies in the family business literature.

The overall relationship between family firms and CSP is positive. The relationship between family firms and CSP is positive for private family firms but is negative for public family firms. The relationship between family firms and CSP is positive when family involvement includes both family ownership and management as opposed to only family ownership or family management. Private family firms care more and public family firms care less about the community, environment, and employees than private and public nonfamily firms. The relationship between family firms and CSP is stronger in institutional environments with weak labor and corporate governance regulatory frameworks.

The operationalization of both the family firm and CSP constructs significantly predicts the magnitude and direction of the relationship between family firms and CSP.

Family firms should become more skilled at measuring and disseminating information about the firm’s CSP. Family firms should work to improve public perceptions about the CSP of family firms.

Policy should encourage family firms to remain privately owned by the family. Policy should also incentivize the involvement of family owners in the management of family firms.

Although several literature reviews address the relationship between family firms and CSP, this is the first review to use the meta-analysis method. The authors contribute to the family business literature by analyzing how differences in study-, firm- and country-level factors can explain some of the variance in the results of the studies in the literature.

Using the panel data of 465 Taiwanese listed companies and taking into consideration endogeneity issues this paper aims to examine the influence of family ownership on firm performances.

The use of a panel data set encompassing a five‐year period enables one to examine both cross‐sectional and within‐firm variations in the relationships between family ownership and firm performances. The paper also uses a simultaneous equation system to account for the endogeneity between family ownership and firm performances, and apply the quadratic equations to identify the percentage of family ownership that maximizes firm performance.

When either a profitability indicator (ROA) or a valuation indicator (Tobin's Q) is applied, the empirical results show that family ownership positively affects firm performance. The results also show that the profitability of a firm (ROA) first increases and then decreases with family ownership. In other words, when families have more than 30 per cent control of the firm, the potential for entrenchment and poor performance becomes greater.

This paper is the first to examine the relationships between family ownership and firm performances, while simultaneously addressing the issue of endogeneity and identifying the optimal level of family ownership in Taiwanese firms. The finding that family ownership positively affects firm performance elucidates why a family firm is one of the most important business development models in Taiwan. Meanwhile, the finding that the percentage of family ownership should not exceed 30 per cent to avoid the occurrence of poor performance also suggests that excessive family shareholdings may not be necessarily healthy for a family firm in Taiwan.