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Given the heavy pollution feature of the construction industry, construction corporations need to adopt an effective environmental governance strategy. The quality and quantity of environmental information disclosure (EID) implementation, as an essential part of a corporate environmental governance strategy, is impacted by the characteristics of the top management team (TMT). This paper aims to analyze the relationship between the demographic characteristics of the TMT (i.e. gender, age, tenure, educational level, and duality) and corporate EID.

Using data from listed construction corporations generated between 2014 to 2018 in China, this study employs the Tobit regression model to test the research hypotheses. Also, this study applies a novel analytical approach, necessary condition analysis (NCA), to conduct a series of additional tests.

The results reveal that tenure and educational level are significantly and positively related to EID, while gender, age, and duality in the executive role are not significantly related to EID. When considering the TMT size as a moderator, the TMT age is positively related to the corporate EID, and the size of the TMT acts as a moderator to weaken the positive effect of the TMT age on the EID. The NCA results show that TMT gender, age, tenure, and educational level are necessary when the levels of EID exceed 40%.

Our findings suggest that TMT characteristics have a relatively significant effect on corporate EID levels, which extends EID research to the construction industry. Corporate planners can endeavor to shape TMT characteristics to improve EID levels. The results of NCA provide insights into what TMT characteristics construction corporations need to satisfy in their pursuit of transparent EID, as well as the levels at which these characteristics are desired.

This paper aims to investigate how the technical logics of a World Bank-led performance management reform interacted with the social, political and historical logics within a developing country (DC) regulatory organisation. The institutional environment both within and outside the organisation was considered to understand the performance management reform experience.

An interview-based, longitudinal, qualitative case study approach was used to locate accounting in its technical, social and political space. A large regulatory organisation in Bangladesh was investigated as a case study to reveal how traditional organisational practices and public sector norms mediated a performance management reform. Informed by the institutional logics (IL) and economies of worth perspectives, interviews were used to locate IL at macro-level and associated organisational actors’ strategic responses that ultimately shaped the implementation of a performance management system (PMS).

This paper reveals how accounting, as a social and political practice, influences accountability reform within a regulatory organisation. It provides an account of both the processes and resultant practices of an accounting reform initiative. While a consultative and transparent performance management process was intended to enhance accountability, it challenged the traditional organisational authority structure and culture. The new PMS retained, modified and adjusted a number of its characteristics over time. These adjustments reflected an amalgamation of the influence of institutional pressures from powerful constituents and the ability of the local agents (managers) in negotiating and mediating the institutionalisation of a new PMS.

The findings of this paper carry major implications for policy makers, particularly with respect to the design of future reform programs on PMS.

This paper offers a theoretical mapping of IL and its organisation-level interpretations and practices. Thus, the authors locate power and influence at field and firm levels. The findings of this study reflect historical, political and cultural backgrounds of the case study organisation and how these contextual forces were active in shaping the meaning of reform logics. Though the institutional environment and agents were unique to the case study organisation, this research offers a “process generalisation” that reveals how a best practice PMS was translated and transformed by the traditional organisational practices in a DC regulatory context.

The timeliness and quality of information provided to board members are crucial for them to effectively monitor and advise a firm. This study examines the influence of board composition and structure on (1) the board’s actions to mitigate the information asymmetry problem by implementing enterprise information systems (EIS) and (2) the board of directors’ awareness of information asymmetry, their perception of its causes and their efforts to address it.

Our research employs a mixed-methods approach. First, using data from 115 publicly listed Chinese companies, we empirically assess the likelihood of top-level EIS modules adoption at the firm level. Subsequently, through 23 semi-structured interviews, we aim to gain deeper insights into the behavioral motivations behind directors’ attempts to reduce information asymmetry.

The study reveals that boards with a higher number of independent directors or with a strategy committee – indicative of a greater concern regarding information asymmetry problems – are more inclined to adopt top-level EIS modules. Additionally, we identify three primary sources of information asymmetry that directors consider significant in prompting the adoption of top-level EIS modules to alleviate perceived information asymmetry.

This study contributes to both the corporate governance and information systems literature. The implementation and utilization of EIS at the board level have not been extensively explored previously. Moreover, while the issue of information asymmetry at the board level is recognized as a critical governance challenge, the ways in which directors perceive and address this issue remain largely unknown. Our research seeks to illuminate this relatively less-explored area.

Based on upper echelon theory and signaling theory, we aim to examine the impact of returnee executives on firms’ relative exploratory innovation focus and the moderating effect of economic policy uncertainty on this relationship.

Using panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2020, we obtained empirical evidence to support our arguments.

Returnee executives positively influence firms’ relative exploratory innovation focus. This means that firms with returnee executives will shift the focus of their innovation activities toward exploratory innovation more than exploitative innovation. In addition, we find that economic policy uncertainty strengthens this relationship.

First, by showing how returnee executives positively influence firms’ shift in focus to exploratory rather than exploitative innovation, we expand our understanding of firms’ trade-offs between exploratory and exploitative innovation. Second, this study examines how returnee executives influence the relative importance that firms place on exploratory and exploitative innovation, allowing us to build a realistic and nuanced view of how returnee executives influence firms’ strategic choices. Finally, this study expands the strategic leadership literature and responds directly to the call for studies focusing on how institutional environmental conditions and executive characteristics work together to shape firm outcomes.

This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry.

In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity.

We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect.

Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation.

When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. We find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity tends to increase the degree of CEO pay for luck but reduce the level of asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. These findings partly support the rent extraction theory grounded on the managerial power hypothesis and partly support the optimal contracting theory. Our findings confirm that the optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory are both important for explaining the practices and historical trends of CEO compensation.

Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously awarded incentive compensation after the discovery of accounting manipulation or misconduct. The author evaluates the impact of clawback enforcement heterogeneity on the horizon of executive compensation.

The author provides empirical tests to evaluate the impact of clawback adoption decisions. The author deals with the endogeneity of clawback adoption decisions through an instrumental variables strategy that exploits the transmission of governance choices within firms’ networks.

While the author finds that clawback adoption reduces the frequency of accounting manipulation, this reduction is accompanied by heterogeneous effects on the horizon of executive pay across firms. Clawback adopters with high director independence, high leverage, high managerial termination payments and low executive ownership tilt their compensation toward the short-term.

The results, robust to alternative specifications, suggest that clawbacks allow strong-enforcement firms to tilt compensation toward the short-term, offsetting some of the direct manipulation disincentives generated by the clawback. The stock market reacts positively to the adoption in firms with weak enforcement, suggesting that clawbacks significantly reduce the managers’ rent-extraction capacity.

Using a novel empirical and identification approach, the results suggest that clawbacks allow strong-enforcement firms to tilt compensation toward the short-term, offsetting some of the direct manipulation disincentives generated by the clawback.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of China’s Green Credit Guidelines (GCG) policy on the environmental, social and governance (ESG) scores of restricted enterprises and examine firm’s speculative behavior in response to the policy.

This paper views the GCG policy proposed in 2012 as a quasinatural experiment and uses difference-in-differences (DID) model to evaluate its influence on the ESG scores of Chinese nonfinancial A-share listed enterprises from 2007 to 2019. Robustness tests include the propensity score matching (PSM)–DID method and permutation tests.

The GCG policy significantly increases the ESG scores of restricted enterprises, particularly enhancing environmental (E) performance. However, it only improves the social (S) and governance (G) performance of firms heavily reliant on bank credit, indicating speculative behavior by enterprises. Increased Government attention, a higher proportion of female executives and more developed local green finance reduce speculative behavior, while executives with financial backgrounds promote it.

Governments should mandate standardized ESG reporting and monitor restricted enterprises, banks should monitor speculative behavior and firms should integrate ESG into their long-term strategies to support sustainable development.

The results provide evidence of the effectiveness of implementing the GCG policy in China and offer guidance for better promoting green credit policy in developing countries, contributing to the transition toward a more sustainable future.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to explore if the GCG policy’s asymmetric effects on ESG components are due to enterprise speculative behavior and examines the factors influencing this behavior, providing insights for regulators to better implement the GCG policy to promote sustainable development.

Research on the effect of executive equity incentives is equivocal. Based on agency theory, some scholars take the convergence of interest logic to highlight the benefits of executive equity incentives. In contrast, others adopt the entrenchment logic to emphasize the increased agency costs. This study attempts to reconcile the debate on executive equity incentives and integrates the opposing views to unveil how executive equity incentives impact corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance.

Using the panel dataset of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2022, this study integrates the convergence of interest and entrenchment logic to examine how executive equity incentives affect CSR performance.

We find that the relationship between executive equity incentives and CSR performance follows an inverted U-shaped form. According to the convergence of interest logic, executive equity incentives reduce agency costs when allocating resources to engage in CSR activities and enable firms to increase their CSR investments, ultimately realizing increased CSR performance. After a threshold, however, the accumulation of extensive equity incentives causes the entrenchment effect, resulting in declined CSR performance. Our empirical results also shed new light on its contingent perspective – the inverted U-shaped relationship is attenuated when firms’ stock liquidity is high.

This study attempts to reconcile the debate on executive equity incentives and integrates the opposing views to unveil the inverted U-shaped relationship between executive equity incentives and CSR performance. Our study opens promising avenues for further research on corporate governance and CSR strategies.

The purpose of this paper is to understand how those involved in executive pay determination in large publicly quoted UK businesses see the role of diversity within remuneration committees (Remcos) as enabling the input of different perspectives, which can enhance their decision-making and potentially improve pay outcomes.

Qualitative, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 18 high-profile major-enterprise decision-makers and their advisers, i.e. non-executive directors (NEDs) serving Remcos, institutional investors, executive pay consultants and internal human resources (HR) reward specialists, together with data from three focus groups with 10 further reward management practitioners.

Remco members recognise the benefits of social category/demographic diversity but say the likelihood of increasing this is low, given talent pipeline issues. The widening of value diversity is considered problematic for Remcos’ functioning. Informational diversity is used as a proxy for social category/demographic diversity to improve Remcos’ decision-making on executive pay. While the inclusion of members from wider social networks is recognised as potentially bringing a different informational perspective, the social character of Remcos, reflecting their elite nature and experience of wealth, appears ingrained.

Our original contribution is to extend the application of upper echelons theory in the context of Remco decision-making to explain why members do not welcome widening informational diversity by appointing people from different social networks who lack value similarity. Instead, by drawing views from employees, HR acts as a proxy for social network informational diversity. The elite, upper-echelons nature of Remco appointments remains unchanged and team functioning is not disrupted.

This study aims to investigate whether there is a relationship between the religiosity levels of chairpersons’ hometowns and the financial reporting quality of companies.

Using a unique hand-collected data set obtained from various sources, the authors use ordinary least squares and logistic regressions to test the hypotheses and further implement various methods to address potential issues such as omitted variables, reverse causality and selection bias problems. In addition, the authors control for the religiosity level of chief executive officers’ (CEOs) hometowns. Finally, the authors divide the sample into two subsamples – companies with strong corporate governance and companies with weak corporate governance – to investigate the effect of chairpersons’ hometown religiosity on financial reporting quality under strong or weak corporate governance.

The findings demonstrate that companies with chairpersons from religious hometowns produce high-quality financial reports. Additional tests, such as the Heckman selection model and instrument variable regression, confirm the robustness of the main results. Controlling for the religiosity level of the CEO’s hometown yields consistent findings with the main results. Finally, additional results indicate that the religiosity levels of chairpersons’ hometowns play a significant role in enhancing financial reporting quality in companies with weak corporate governance.

Companies should consider appointing board members or chairpersons from more religious hometowns, as the empirical results of this study support the positive effects of chairpersons’ hometown religiosity on financial reporting quality.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the current study is among the first to demonstrate the relationship between the religiosity level of the chairpersons’ hometown and the financial reporting quality of companies. The study introduces unique hometown religiosity proxies and controls for various variables related to corporate governance, chairperson attributes, company characteristics, and audit firm characteristics.