Search results

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the short run incentives for increasing LTV ratios that develop among mortgagees and mortgagors in the presence of excess return to housing. The paper provides a conventional framework for analyzing the capital structure of housing investments where higher LTV‐ratios comes about as stronger appreciation is met by increased mortgage rates and both mortgagees and mortgagors are short sighted.

The comment applies a capital structure approach to housing investments, highlighting the return to home equity. The paper distinguishes between price and leverage gains and presents a framework where the excess return to housing provides incentives for increasing LTV ratios. To illustrate, the Norwegian housing market is applied. The paper discusses short run market developments and the potential need for macro prudential regulations while introducing credit risk policy, nominal return targets and risk pricing.

The implementation of a simplistic capital structure approach to housing investments brings about a framework that allows us to present the incentives for, as well as the risk associated with, higher LTV ratios for both mortgagees and mortgagors. Short sightedness among mortgagees, driven by nominal return targets, allows mortgagors higher LTV‐ratios and increased risk taking.

While standard when analyzing commercial real estate, the capital structure approach – and the formal distinction between price and leverage gains for homeowners – is to the best of the authors' knowledge novel when analyzing housing finance. To understand the mechanisms impacting this playing field is important for both market analysts and regulators.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, it derives the optimal loan-to-value (LTV)-ratio for a mortgagor that maximizes the return to home equity when considering the capital structure of housing investment. Second, it analyses the demand-side contribution to mortgage market variability across monetary policy regimes.

The paper endogenizes both the relation between the LTV ratio and the mortgage rate and the relation between LTV and the rate of appreciation. When we consider LTV-variance and the demand-side contribution to mortgage market variability, three stylized regimes is considered.

The paper finds an intuitive ranking of the optimal LTV-ratios across regimes, and the optimal LTV-ratio peaks during a housing boom. When, however, monetary policy ignores asset inflation the demand-side contribution to market variability is highest during normal market conditions. Hence, there is a potentially hump-shaped relation between the risk exposure of individual mortgagors and the demand-side contribution to mortgage market variability.

The paper finds a potentially hump-shaped relation between the risk exposure of individual mortgagors and the demand-side contribution to mortgage market variability, which, to the best of our knowledge, is novel. The paper shows how macro-prudential and monetary policy are complementary tolls for preserving financial stability.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the relation between the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the price-rent (PR) ratio. The paper intends to relate the PR-ratio to housing return and the potential for a leverage gain in housing investments by considering the funding structure of housing investments.

Combining a PR-ratio approach with the housing return in the case of mortgage-financed housing, as presented by Borgersen and Greibrokk (2012), this paper relates LTV to the PR-ratio.

When formalising the relationship between leverage and housing return, as given by Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), the paper finds the effect of a higher LTV on the user cost of housing as the net effect of a higher borrowing cost and the associated leverage gain. The latter depends on the relationship between house price growth and the mortgage rate and, because the leverage gain has an ambiguous effect on the user cost of housing, the relation between the LTV-ratio and the PR-ratio is context-specific.

The paper aims to contribute to the literature on PR ratios in two ways. First, by explicitly including the LTV-ratio in the user cost of mortgage financed housing and, correspondingly, in the PR-ratio derived from the user cost. Second, by including the funding structure of housing investments the expression for the capital gain, which often is discussed in the PR-ratio literature, is related to the funding structure and includes both a price gain and a leverage gain.

This paper aims to answer how effective the loan-to-value (LTV) regulation has been since 2011 for conventional and Islamic (participation) banks in Turkey in terms of curbing mortgage loan growth and delinquency[1].

The authors first use unit root tests and tests of difference in loan and property price data in pre-LTV and post-LTV period. Second, the authors follow Chow test and ordinary least squares regression analyses to test for a structural break when sensitivity of mortgage loan and delinquency growth changes to property price changes considered.

The authors find that two periods are statistically different, while the significance level is lower for Islamic banks. Moreover, loan growth has become less responsive to property price increases; delinquency sensitivity to property price changes has significantly increased in the post-LTV period for conventional banks, while this is not the case for Islamic (participation) banks.

This paper not only increases empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of LTV ratio policy but also fills the gap in the literature by providing a comparison between conventional banks and Islamic (participation) banks.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the interaction between a profit maximising mortgagor and a newcomer to a mortgage market with Bertrand competition where the newcomer has a populistic entry strategy and undercuts mortgage market rates. The intention of the paper is to relate the populistic entry strategy to mortgage market characteristics and the strategic market position of both the established mortgagor and the newcomer in question.

The paper analyses a mortgage market by combining the behaviour of a profit maximising mortgagor with that of a newcomer to the mortgage market which has a populistic entry strategy and does not maximise profits. The short-run market solution provides comparative statics on the strategic market position of both the established mortgagor and the newcomer to the mortgage market during the entry phase both related to product differentiation and to price mirroring and undercutting of mortgage rates.

The model finds a mortgage market solution where a lower mortgage rate helps the newcomer gain a customer base. As the newcomer's strategy to mirror prices makes it unable to pass-through funding cost to its mortgage rate, the strategy is unsustainable over time. The established mortgagor has a strategically beneficial position as the mortgage market rates only relate to its funding cost. Unless the newcomer has a funding cost advantage, the established mortgagor has a higher interest rate margin. Differentiation impacts the newcomers’ interest rate margin positively. If the newcomer lacks a funding cost advantage, there is a critical mirroring rate that ensures it a higher interest rate margin. The higher the newcomers’ own funding cost, the higher is the upper bound for price mirroring, relating market entry to a small undercutting of mortgage rates and a mortgage market with weak competition. The funding cost of the established mortgagor pulls pricing in the opposite direction, allowing for a lower mirroring rate and tougher mortgage market competition during entry.

The paper aims to contribute to the understanding of market equilibrium in the absence of profit maximising behaviour. Framing a mortgage market in terms of a duopoly where a newcomer enters with a populistic entry strategy offering a lower mortgage rate and a mortgage product with a different loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, a novel mortgage market case comes about. The populistic entry strategy produces an augmented reaction curve, crucial for the mortgage market rates.

This paper aims to highlight co-ops mortgage choice strategy and factors that influence the board’s master mortgage decisions in Swedish co-op associations.

Data are collected through a pre-study interviewing chair persons in co-ops in Stockholm followed up by a more extensive questionnaire. Answers from these are tested by logistic regression and compared to hypotheses based on earlier findings on mortgage choice on a household level and additional findings from the interviews.

The mortgage choice in co-ops seems to be more dependent on financial similarities than physical location. Loan-to-value (LTV) ratios have a dominant influence in that co-ops with high LTV ratios have a lower preference for adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). When checking for location, the media and individual chair persons also seem to affect the choice. Overall, there seems to be awareness in co-ops boards about the potential financial effects of their mortgage choice.

The negative connection between high LTV ratios and ARMs implies that boards try to make their mortgage expenditure more predictable. This reduces liquidity risks which may be of importance for financially constrained owners. Findings indicate that co-ops are risk averse and that the short-term threat for increasing interest costs is low. This is of value to both homebuyers and the financial industry.

This paper examines factors influencing mortgage choices in an organizational context such as co-op associations. The master mortgage in a co-op can have major influence on members financial situation but, to the author’s knowledge, a similar study has never been done before, neither in an international nor a Swedish context.

This study aims to address the critical need for innovative financing solutions in the global housing sector, focusing specifically on Malaysia’s distinct housing finance system encompassing both conventional and Islamic loans. The primary objective is to develop a transformative housing finance model that addresses affordability challenges and reshapes the Malaysian housing landscape.

The study presents an alternate housing finance model for Malaysia, integrating lower monthly payments and reduced household debt. Key variables include house price appreciation rates, interest rates, initial guarantee fees and loan-to-value ratios. Inspired by the Help to Buy (HTB) scheme, the model aligns with proven global initiatives for enhanced affordability, balancing payment amounts, loan interest rates and acceptable price thresholds.

The study’s findings promise to address affordability disparities and reshape Malaysia’s housing finance landscape. The emphasis is on introducing a structured repayment plan that offers a sustainable path to homeownership, particularly for low-income families. Incorporating the future value adaptation concept, inspired by reverse mortgages and Islamic finance, enhances adaptability, ensuring long-term sustainability despite economic shifts.

The proposed model promotes widespread access to homeownership, offering practical solutions for policymakers to improve affordability, prompting adaptable risk management strategies for financial institutions and empowering potential homebuyers with increased flexibility.

The study introduces a transformative housing finance model for Malaysia, merging elements from reverse mortgages, Islamic finance and the HTB scheme, offering potential applicability to similar systems globally.

This paper analyzes real and welfare effects of a permanent change in inflation rate, focusing on macroprudential policy’ role and its interaction with monetary policy.

While investigating disinflation costs, the authors simulate a medium-scale dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints, credit frictions and macroprudential authority.

Providing discussions on different policy scenarios in a context where still it is expected high inflation, there are three key contributions. First, when macroprudential authority actively operates to improve financial stability, losses caused by disinflation are limited. Second, a Taylor rule directly responding to financial variables might entail a trade-off between price and financial stability objectives, by increasing disinflation costs. Third, disinflation is welfare improving for savers, while costly for borrowers and banks. Indeed, while savers benefit from policies reducing price stickiness distortion, borrowers are worried about credit frictions, coming from collateral constraint.

The paper suggests threefold policy implications: the macroprudential authority should actively intervene during a disinflation process to minimize costs and financial instability deriving from it; policymakers should implement a disinflationary policy stabilizing also output; the central bank and the macroprudential regulator should pursue financial and price stability goals, separately.

This paper is the first attempt to study effects of a permanent inflation target reduction in focusing on the macroprudential policy’ role.

This paper offers empirical evidence on factors influencing credit spreads on commercial mortgage loans. It extends existing work on the pricing of commercial mortgage loans. The authors examine the relative significance of a range of factors on loan pricing that are lender, asset and loan specific. The research explores and quantifies the sources of spread differentials among commercial mortgage loans. The paper contributes to a limited literature on the subject and serves the purpose of price discovery in commercial property lending. It offers a framework to compare actual pricing with fundamental-based estimates of loan spreads.

Panel analysis is deployed to examine the cross-section and time-series determinants of commercial mortgage loan margins and credit spreads. Using an exclusive database of loan portfolios in the United Kingdom (UK), the panel analysis enables the authors to analyse and quantify the impact of a number of theory-consistent and plausible factors determining the cost of lending to commercial real estate (CRE), including type and origin of lender, loan size, loan to value (LTV) and characteristics of asset financed – type, location and grade.

Spreads on commercial mortgages and, therefore, loan pricing differ by the type of lender – bank, insurance company and debt fund. The property sector is another significant risk factor lenders price in. The LTV ratio has increased in importance since 2012. Prior to global financial crisis (GFC), lenders made little distinction in pricing different LTVs. Loans secured in secondary assets command a higher premium of 50–60bps. The analysis establishes an average premium of 35bps for loans advanced in regions compared to London. London is particularly seen a less risky region for loan advancements in the post-GFC era.

The study considers the role of lender characteristics and the changing regulation in the pricing of commercial mortgage loans and provides a framework to study spreads or pricing in this market that can include additional fundamental influences, such as terms of individual loans. The ultimate aim of such research is to assess whether mortgage loans are correctly priced and spotting risks emanating from actual loan spreads being lower than fundamental-based spreads pointing to tight pricing and over-lending.

The analysis provides evidence on lender criteria that determine the cost of loans. The study confirms that differences in regulation affect loan pricing. The regulatory impact is most visible in the increased significance of LTV. In that sense, regulation has been effective in restricting lending at high LTV levels.

The paper exploits a database of a commercial mortgage loan portfolio to make loan pricing more transparent to the different types of lender and borrowers. Lenders can use the estimates to assess whether commercial loans are fairly priced. Borrowers better understand the relative significance of risk factors affecting margins and the price they are charged. The results of this paper are of value to regulators as they can assist to understand the determinants of loan margins and gauge conditions in the lending market.