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This study aims to propose a framework for developing strategies for the supply chain of craft beer that can make the business efficient and profitable, and at the same time, generate sustainability benefits from reducing waste, conserving natural resources and reducing pollution.

Based on an extensive review of the literature of academic and industry publications, source material from craft brewers primarily situated in the USA and industry experience in craft brewing, the proposed framework describes strategies to establish sustainable craft beer supply chains.

The framework for craft beer supply chain consists of four categories that contribute to craft beer sustainability: ingredient procurement, recycling efforts, energy usage and distribution systems – some of these mimicking those used by macrobrewers. Each of the categories is further subdivided. Successful practices and examples are highlighted for each of the subcategories.

This proposed framework was built upon current practices and available literature in the USA and focused on the environmental pillar of sustainability. Further, the proposed framework arises from the fact that current best practices in sustainability were available primarily from larger craft brewers, like Sierra Nevada and New Belgium.

By paying attention to operational changes in their supply chains, craft brewers can manage costs and improve their sustainability track record by reducing waste, conserving natural resources and improving upon their pollution footprint. Craft brewers can economize in the use of water, grains, hops and yeast by using practices discussed in this paper.

This is the first time that all aspects of supply chain and sustainability considerations in craft beer production are discussed in a comprehensive manner to propose a framework for analysis and enhancement of productivity and sustainability at the same time. The fact that the proposed framework can be used in future studies to empirically evaluate the utility of various sustainability strategies adds to the originality and value of this research.

While the popular image of the Sherman Act is that of a “trust-busting” statute, conduct remedies have been more common than structural relief. This paper evaluates the effect on economic welfare of conduct remedies that have resulted from ten prominent Sherman Act monopolization cases. In general, we find that in some cases the behavioral relief has had no consequence other than the cost of litigation and cost of compliance; in other cases, the remedies probably reduced consumer welfare. Cases studied are United Shoe Machinery, AT&T, Std. Oil of California, IBM, United Fruit, Kodak, Safeway, GM, Jerrold, and Blue Chip Stamp.

In-class societies such as the Mini-Society and Mini-Economy provide opportunities for teaching important lessons about choice, scarcity, and economic organization. Those lessons are multiplied when in-class societies meet each other for simulated international trade. We describe a Global Entrepreneurship Marketplace Fair (GEM Fair) for participating elementary and middle school students. The basics of in-class societies, the benefits of cross-society trade, and the administrative setup of an international marketplace are summarized. The limitations of a GEM Fair as also discussed, including large subsidies from parents, “end-of-the-world” effects near the end of a GEM Fair, and the tendency of a free GEM Fair market to produce too many snack food items (from a parent’s or teacher’s point of view).

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

This is the first paper in a volume devoted exclusively to antitrust law and economics. It summarizes the other papers and addresses two issues. First, after showing that the federal courts generally view consumer welfare as the ultimate goal of antitrust law, it asks what they mean by that term. It concludes that recent decisions appear more likely to equate consumer welfare with the well-being of consumers in the relevant market than with economic efficiency. Second, it asks whether a buyer must possess monopsony power to induce a price discrimination that is not cost justified. It concludes that a buyer can often obtain an unjustified concession simply by wielding bargaining power, but the resulting concession may frequently – though not always – improve consumer welfare.

By “political economy” I mean both the method of thought and the body of knowledge which refer to human economising behaviour. The body of knowledge includes both theory — theorems, laws, empirical generalisations, etc., and “facts” — history, description of institution, statistical data, etc. By “Christian theology” I mean both the method of thought and the body of knowledge which refer to the human religious understanding of Jesus of Nazareth. “Religious” here implies awareness of, or belief in, God. The body of knowledge may include pre‐Christian religion (such as that reported in the Old Testament), and the results of independent inquiry (such as natural theology) in so far as these are interpreted by, or “refracted” through what theologians call the “Christ event”.

This paper presents evidence to suggest that despite obstacles that made predatory pricing essentially impossible, the National Cash Register Co. (N.C.R.) managed successfully to deploy an arsenal of non-price predatory strategies that permitted it to consolidate and maintain a nearly complete monopoly of the cash-register trade. N.C.R. took actions to raise the costs and reduce the revenues of its rivals, actions that made sense only to the extent that N.C.R. could recoup their costs through the maintenance of monopoly rents. Our analysis suggests that antitrust prosecution was a significant threat to N.C.R., and ultimately forced the company to agree to abandon its most objectionable practices.

Our approach is largely historical, argument by example. We leave it to the theoreticians and empiricists to take the argument in a more technical direction.¹ Throughout, we suppose that germs are self-interested and they have a research question, for example, how might our species improve the chances of survival, the answer to which might potentially benefit germs (or, harm them by less).