This paper presents evidence to suggest that despite obstacles that made predatory pricing essentially impossible, the National Cash Register Co. (N.C.R.) managed successfully to deploy an arsenal of non-price predatory strategies that permitted it to consolidate and maintain a nearly complete monopoly of the cash-register trade. N.C.R. took actions to raise the costs and reduce the revenues of its rivals, actions that made sense only to the extent that N.C.R. could recoup their costs through the maintenance of monopoly rents. Our analysis suggests that antitrust prosecution was a significant threat to N.C.R., and ultimately forced the company to agree to abandon its most objectionable practices.
Brevoort, K. and Marvel, H.P. (2004), "SUCCESSFUL MONOPOLIZATION THROUGH PREDATION: THE NATIONAL CASH REGISTER COMPANY", Kirkwood, J.B. (Ed.) Antitrust Law and Economics (Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 21), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 85-125. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-5895(04)21003-X
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